Craig v. Provo City

• Decision Date: 04 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 20131074–CA.,20131074–CA.
• Citation: Craig v. Provo City, 2015 UT App 145, 352 P.3d 139 (Utah App. 2015)
• Parties: Elizabeth CRAIG; Brady Harper; and Nu Lite Sales, LLC, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. PROVO CITY, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

352 P.3d 139

2015 UT App 145

Elizabeth CRAIG; Brady Harper; and Nu Lite Sales, LLC, Plaintiffs and Appellants

v.PROVO CITY, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 20131074–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

June 4, 2015.

Barnard N. Madsen, Mark D. Stubbs, Matthew R. Howell, Provo, and Diana L. Hardy, for Appellants.

Robert D. West, Provo, Gary D. Millward, and J. Brian Jones, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.

Judge KATE A. TOOMEY authored this Opinion, in which Judges GREGORY K. ORME and STEPHEN L. ROTH concurred.

Opinion

TOOMEY, Judge:

¶ 1 Elizabeth Craig, Brady Harper, and Nu Lite Sales, LLC (collectively, Appellants) challenge the district court's decision to dismiss their action against Provo City after concluding that Utah Code section 78B–2–111 (the Savings Statute) does not apply to claims brought under the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (the UGIA). See Utah Code Ann. § 63G–7–101 (LexisNexis 2011). We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Pursuant to the UGIA, Craig and Harper filed a notice of claim against Provo City on February 16, 2011, and Nu Lite Sales filed a similar notice on March 1, 2011. Appellants then filed a tort action in district court on April 13, 2012, against Provo City. This action was dismissed without prejudice on March 27, 2013, after the statute of limitations period had lapsed,¹ because Appellants failed to submit a statutorily required $300 bond at the time the action was filed.²

¶ 3 Appellants subsequently filed a second action with the appropriate bond on June 19, 2013, within the one-year statute of limitations provided by the Savings Statute. Provo City filed a motion to dismiss. After a non-evidentiary hearing, the district court entered a memorandum decision, concluding, “Claims against governmental parties are comprehensively governed by the [UGIA], which does not contain a savings provision. The Utah Savings Statute contained in Utah Code § 78B–2–111 does not refer to the [UGIA], nor does it apply in claims against governmental parties.” Accordingly, on October 28, 2013, the court dismissed the second action with prejudice.

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 4 The issues on appeal are whether the district court erred when it concluded that the UGIA is so comprehensive that it displaces the Savings Statute and that the Savings Statute does not apply to claims against the government. The application of a statute of limitations presents a question of law, which we review for correctness giving no deference to the district court. See Peak Alarm Co. v. Werner, 2013 UT 8, ¶ 7, 297 P.3d 592.

ANALYSIS

¶ 5 “When interpreting a statute, our goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent and purpose.” Francis v. State, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 41, 321 P.3d 1089 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “To determine that intent, we look to the plain language of the statute, reading it as a whole and interpreting its provisions to ensure harmony with other provisions in the same chapter and related chapters.” R.P. v. K.S.W., 2014 UT App 38, ¶ 15, 320 P.3d 1084. “ ‘In doing so, we seek to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and we accordingly avoid interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative.’ ” Thorpe v. Washington City, 2010 UT App 297, ¶ 18, 243 P.3d 500 (quoting Hall v. Department of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ¶ 15, 24 P.3d 958 ). Discerning the plain meaning of a term may start with the dictionary since it catalogues “a range of possible meanings that a statutory term may bear.” Hi–Country Prop. Rights Group v. Emmer, 2013 UT 33, ¶ 19, 304 P.3d 851. But if the statutory language remains ambiguous, “we may resort to other indications of legislative intent, including legislative history and policy considerations.”LeBeau v. State, 2014 UT 39, ¶ 26, 337 P.3d 254.

¶ 6 Title 78B, Chapter 2—the chapter governing statutes of limitation—provides that actions must be commenced within its specified periods, “except in specific cases where a different limitation is prescribed by statute.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B–2–102 (LexisNexis 2012). And the UGIA specifies limitations periods for bringing a notice of claim and beginning actions against governmental entities. See id. §§ 63G–7–101(2)(b), –402, –403 (LexisNexis 2011); see also Peak Alarm, 2013 UT 8, ¶ 17, 297 P.3d 592. In particular, it provides that claims against governmental entities are “barred unless notice of claim is filed ... within one year after the claim arises.” Utah Code Ann. § 63G–7–402. Then, “[i]f the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district court.... [and t]he claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the claim.” Id. § 63G–7–403(2)(a), (b). Furthermore, although the UGIA does not contain its own savings provision, the Savings Statute, contained in Title 78B, provides one chance to bring a second action if the initial action is dismissed for any reason other than on the merits after the statute of limitations has lapsed. See id. § 78B–2–111 (LexisNexis 2012). This new action under the Savings Statute must be commenced “within one year” after the failure. Id. § 78B–2–111(1).

¶ 7 Provo City concedes that, if the Savings Statute applied, Appellants' second action would satisfy the Savings Statute's requirements: Appellants filed the first action in a timely fashion, the court dismissed it for reasons other than on the merits, and Appellants filed a second action within one year of the first action's dismissal. See Ewing v. Department of Transp., 2010 UT App 158, ¶ 7, 235 P.3d 776. Nevertheless, relying on Peak Alarm Co. v. Werner, 2013 UT 8, 297 P.3d 592, Provo City argues that the Savings Statute does not apply in this case because the UGIA's scheme displaces all parts of Title 78B, including the Savings Statute.

¶ 8 In Peak Alarm, a case that involved false-arrest and defamation claims against a municipality and several individuals, the Utah Supreme Court considered “the interaction between the UGIA's procedural scheme and those statutes of limitations [in Title 78B] that apply to suits against private actors,” and broadly held that “[c]laims against governmental parties are comprehensively governed by the UGIA.” Id. ¶¶ 21, 27 n. 4. The court's analysis was confined to whether the UGIA's statute of limitations displaced the general limitations period set forth in Utah Code section 78B–2–302(4) for filing defamation and false-imprisonment actions. Id. ¶¶ 22–27. It determined that the UGIA's requirements for filing a notice of claim and beginning an action in district court displace the more general statute of limitations in Utah Code section 78B–2–302(4) because the limitation prescribed by the UGIA “functions in all respects as a different limitation ... prescribed by statute.” Id. ¶ 23 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). But the court did not consider whether a plaintiff may commence a new action where the initial action, filed within the UGIA's limitations period, is dismissed for reasons other than on the merits after the limitations period has lapsed. Accordingly, the issue in this case falls outside the scope of Peak Alarm 's holding, and we therefore further consider whether the legislature intended for the UGIA to displace the Savings Statute.

¶ 9 The UGIA states that it is the “single, comprehensive chapter” governing claims against governmental entities.³ Provo City argues that the words “single” and “comprehensive” mean the UGIA is the exclusive statute pertaining to claims against governmental parties, in which case the Savings Statute is wholly inapplicable in the context of claims brought against the government. On the other hand, Appellants argue that “comprehensive” is not the equivalent of “exclusive” but instead “refers to the legislature's intent to consolidate, clarify, and simplify rather than expressly exclude other consistent statutory provisions within the Code.” We find Appellants' argument persuasive.

¶ 10 The word “comprehensive” is defined as “covering a matter under consideration completely or nearly completely” or “accounting for or comprehending all or virtually all pertinent considerations.” Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 467 (1966). Although it could be all-inclusive, the ordinary meaning of the word “comprehensive” allows for something less than complete coverage. Furthermore, discerning the ordinary meaning of the UGIA's language does not confine us to such a hyper-literal meaning of each word. “[O]ur plain language analysis is not so limited that we only inquire into individual words and subsections in isolation; our interpretation of a statute requires that each part or section be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. ” Anderson v. Bell, 2010 UT 47, ¶ 9, 234 P.3d 1147 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 11 Construing the subsection addressing the UGIA's “comprehensive” nature in the narrow manner that Provo City suggests would render the statute inoperative. For example, although the UGIA contemplates the government's waiver of immunity from suit, it provides no cause of action. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G–7–202(1)(c) (LexisNexis 2011) (“No cause of action or basis of liability is created by any waiver of immunity in [the UGIA].”). Instead, a litigant must turn to other statutory provisions and common law to supply the causes of action for their claims against governmental entities. Likewise, if the statute were read as narrowly as Provo City urges, the rules of evidence would not apply, even in court proceedings, because the UGIA does not expressly prescribe their use. In circumstances such as the judicial review of informal administrative proceedings, in which the use of the Utah Rules of Evidence might not be assumed, the Utah Code explicitly calls for them. See id. § 63G–4–402(2), (3)(b). In contrast, for claims brought pursuant to the UGIA in district court proceedings, their use is presumed but not explicitly called for....