Craig v. Selma City School Bd.

• Decision Date: 25 August 1992
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 90-0777-AH-S.
• Citation: 801 F. Supp. 585
• Parties: Douglas CRAIG, et al., Plaintiff, v. SELMA CITY SCHOOL BOARD, et al., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

801 F. Supp. 585

Douglas CRAIG, et al., Plaintiff, v. SELMA CITY SCHOOL BOARD, et al., Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 90-0777-AH-S.

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, N.D.

August 25, 1992.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Bruce Boynton, Selma, Ala., for plaintiff.

Larry Bradford, Birmingham, Ala., for defendant.

ORDER

HOWARD, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the Court on motions for summary judgment filed by all parties. The defendants filed their "Amended Motion for Summary Judgment" Doc. # 64 on January 2, 1992. The plaintiffs responded on February 3, 1992, with "Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment" Doc. # 72, incorporating the "Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment" Doc. # 73 and accompanying brief Doc. # 74 filed the same day.

The Court has fully reviewed the motions, the briefs and evidentiary materials filed in support of and in opposition to the motions, and all other pertinent materials in the file. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that, except for Count 14 of the Amended Complaint, the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the defendants' "Amended Motion for Summary Judgment" Doc. # 64 is GRANTED as to all portions of the Amended Complaint except Count 14, and the "Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment" Doc. # 73 is DENIED in its entirety.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT¹

This lawsuit began on October 3, 1990. The original plaintiffs were Douglas Craig, Shinether Craig, Jerry Harris, Sametra Peasant, Sonya Brown, Tonya Brown, and John Dubose, all students at Selma High School. The original defendants were the Selma City School Board, James H. Carter in his official capacity as Interim Superintendent of the Selma City Schools, F.D. Reese in his official capacity as principal of Selma High School, Ralph Hobbs in his capacity as attorney for the Selma City School Board, the State Board of Education, and Wayne Teague in his official capacity as Superintendent of the State Board of Education. Of the original plaintiffs, John DuBose was dismissed on his own motion on July 1, 1991. Doc. # 51 Of the original defendants, the State Board of Education, Wayne Teague, and Ralph Hobbs have all been dismissed from the case. Docs. ## 19, 33, 36

The incidents giving rise to this lawsuit occurred in the Fall of 1990. After a Selma High School football game on September 7, 1990, the plaintiffs became involved in an altercation with another group of students. At about 1:30 a.m. on the morning after the game, Thelma Craig, the mother of two of the plaintiffs, telephoned the defendant Reese, the Principal of Selma High School, to inform him of the fight at the football stadium. Mrs. Craig and Evalina Peasant, along with the plaintiff students (the "Craig group"), arrived at Selma High School on September 10, 1990 at approximately 7:40 a.m. and were instructed by Reese to go to the conference room adjacent to his office.

Principal Reese met with the Craig group for approximately 30 minutes and at the conclusion of the conference instructed them to remain in the conference room. While the Craig group was meeting with Principal Reese, the other people involved in the post-game brawl (the "Ford group") arrived for a conference. As the Craig group left the conference room renewed fighting erupted between the Craig group and the Ford group. During the melee Principal Reese's office and his secretary's desk and typewriter suffered substantial damage.²

The day after the altercation in Principal Reese's office, each plaintiff received a written notice from Reese informing the student that the student would be suspended for five days for "fighting/altercation during school." Subsequently, on the recommendation of Principal Reese that the students be expelled, the plaintiffs or their parents or guardians received a letter dated September 14, 1990 from Selma School Superintendent Carter informing them that they were charged with a Class III violation of the Code of Conduct, namely, "inciting, leading or participating in major disruptions which interfere with the academic program and/or result in damage to private or public property or personal injury."³

The letter from Carter notified the plaintiffs of Reese's recommendation, of the date of a scheduled expulsion hearing, that they had a right to attend the expulsion hearing, that they had a right to legal counsel at the hearing, that they had a right to present witnesses at the hearing, and that they had a right to cross-examine the superintendent's witnesses.

The expulsion hearing was held by the Selma City School Board on September 20, 1990, at which time Superintendent Carter provided the plaintiffs' attorney with a copy of the Code of Conduct for him to use at the hearing. The plaintiffs' attorney requested but the Board refused to allow an open hearing attended by the press.

During the hearing the Chairman, over the objection of the plaintiffs' attorney, allowed the presentation of hearsay evidence on the grounds that the Board was interested in learning all the facts. At the close of the evidence presented by the complaining parties, the plaintiffs' attorney argued that there was no evidence against Sametra Peasant, Sonya Brown, and Tonya Brown, and that the charges against them should be dismissed. The Board did not agree to dismiss the charges.

This lawsuit was filed before the expulsion hearing was completed, with the plaintiffs seeking and failing to obtain a temporary restraining order. The expulsion hearing was resumed on November 19, 1990.⁴ After the hearing the Board expelled Douglas and Shinether Craig and decided that the remaining plaintiffs' suspensions already served were sufficient punishment for their involvement in the matter and allowed them to return to school on "strict conduct probation."⁵

The plaintiffs filed their Complaint predicated on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Middle District of Alabama on October 3, 1990 Doc. # 5 and a motion for change of venue was granted on October 10. Doc. # 16 After an amendment and the voluntary dismissal of several counts, the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint alleges nine causes of action against the remaining defendants. The plaintiffs charge that the defendants' failure to inform the plaintiffs of their procedural rights deprived them of due process of law Count 4, that the expulsion hearing was beyond the authority of the Board and deprived the plaintiffs of a due process right Count 5, that the defendants' failure to provide the plaintiffs with a copy of the Code of Conduct deprived the plaintiffs of a due process right Count 6, that the defendants' failure to prove the plaintiffs' knowledge of the Code of Conduct deprived the plaintiffs of a due process right Count 7, that the defendants' failure to establish a procedure to dismiss an unsupported charge violated the plaintiffs' due process rights Count 9, that the defendants' failure to allow the plaintiffs to receive the § 16-1-24 report violated their due process rights Count 12, that the decision of the defendants Reese and Carter to prevent the plaintiffs from receiving their books violated their due process rights Count 14, that the defendants' failure to provide the plaintiffs with an education deprived them of a due process right Count 15, and that the imposition of any restrictions on returning plaintiffs violated their due process rights Count 16.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This action has been filed by the plaintiffs alleging a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4).

A court may grant a motion for summary judgment only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. A material fact is one which "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citations omitted). On a motion for summary judgment, a court must review the record, and all its inferences, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962).

A. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CLAIMS

Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, no state may "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Under the doctrine known as "procedural due process," the Fourteenth Amendment requires a two-part analysis. After a citizen shows that he has been deprived of a constitutionally protected "life, liberty, or property" interest through state action, a court must determine whether the procedural formalities of that deprivation comport with the requirements of the Due Process Clause. "In short, once it is determined that the Due Process Clause applies, `the question remains what process is due.'" Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985), quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). The Supreme Court has explained that "the fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard `at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965).

In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975), the Supreme...