Craig v. STAFFORD CONST., INC.
Decision Date | 14 September 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 17073.,17073. |
Citation | 856 A.2d 372,271 Conn. 78 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | Steven CRAIG v. STAFFORD CONSTRUCTION, INC., et al. |
Neil Johnson, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Ralph W. Johnson III, with whom was Kevin J. Greene, Hartford, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).
BORDEN, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.
The dispositive issue in this certified appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that an investigation by the city of Hartford police department's internal affairs division constituted a quasi-judicial proceeding, thereby affording absolute immunity to the citizen complainant whose claim gave rise to the investigation. The plaintiff, Steven Craig, appeals, following our grant of certification,1 from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Eugene Ramistella and his employer, Stafford Construction, Inc. (Stafford).2 The plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that an internal affairs investigation conducted by the Hartford police department (department) constituted a quasi-judicial proceeding, thereby triggering the doctrine of absolute immunity. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The plaintiff, a police officer with the department, brought this defamation action against the defendants claiming that they had defamed him when they filed a citizen complaint with the department alleging that he had directed racial slurs toward them at a construction site. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that, because the internal affairs investigation constituted a quasi-judicial proceeding, the allegedly defamatory statements were entitled to an absolute privilege. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., 78 Conn.App. 549, 561, 827 A.2d 793 (2003). This certified appeal followed.
The following facts and procedural history were set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court. "On March 17, 1997, the plaintiff accepted a private duty job offered by Stafford at a construction site at 1700 Main Street in Hartford. Ramistella was employed by Stafford and was working on the construction site that day. During a coffee break, the plaintiff made allegedly derogatory racial comments regarding the purpose of the construction project.
3 4 Id., at 552-53, 827 A.2d 793.
Thereafter, "[t]he plaintiff ... brought a defamation action against ... Ramistella and Miguel Aceves, as well as ... Stafford.... In his second amended complaint ... the plaintiff alleged that, in a citizen complaint against him, the defendants knowingly and falsely had accused him of having made derogatory racial comments. The plaintiff further alleged that, as a result of these allegedly false statements, he had suffered emotional harm and loss of respect and had been turned down for several requested promotions.
court granted the motion and rendered judgment in their favor." Id., at 550-51, 827 A.2d 793.
The plaintiff thereafter appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court improperly had concluded that Ramistella's statements were protected by the doctrine of absolute immunity. Id., at 551, 827 A.2d 793. The Appellate Court disagreed with the plaintiff, and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Id., at 561, 827 A.2d 793. Specifically, the Appellate Court concluded that the internal affairs investigation constituted a quasi-judicial proceeding because it involved the exercise of discretion at different levels of the process and included an investigation specifically intended to ascertain facts. Id., at 556-57, 827 A.2d 793. The Appellate Court further concluded that affording complaints of police misconduct made to the department's internal affairs division absolute immunity "serves the public policy of protecting free speech that furthers the interests of a democratic society." Id., at 561, 827 A.2d 793.
On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the investigation conducted by the internal affairs division constituted a quasi-judicial proceeding. We disagree.
Before addressing the merits of the plaintiff's claim on appeal, we note the standard that governs our review in the present case. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pelletier v. Sordoni/Skanska Construction Co., 264 Conn. 509, 514, 825 A.2d 72 (2003). In addition, the determination of whether an internal affairs investigation constitutes a quasi-judicial proceeding is a question of law over which our review is plenary. Within this limitation, however, whether a particular proceeding is quasi-judicial in nature, for the purposes of triggering absolute immunity, will depend on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. With this standard of review in mind, therefore, we turn to the plaintiff's claim on appeal.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chemical Co., 267 Conn. 210, 217, 837 A.2d 759 (2004).
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. 549, 565-66, 606 A.2d 693 (1992).
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 566, 606 A.2d 693. In addition, this court previously has delineated several factors that assist in determining whether a proceeding is quasi-judicial in nature. These factors include "whether the body has the power to: (1) exercise judgment and discretion; (2) hear and determine or to ascertain facts and decide; (3) make binding orders and judgments; (4) affect the personal property rights of private persons; (5) examine witnesses and hear the litigation of the issues on a hearing; and (6) enforce decisions or impose penalties." Id., at 567, 606 A.2d 693. "Further, it is important to consider whether there is a sound public policy reason for permitting the complete freedom of expression that a grant of absolute immunity provides." Id.
In Kelley, we concluded that schoolteacher license revocation proceedings before the state board of education were quasi-judicial in nature. Id., at 571, 606 A.2d 693. In support of that determination, we noted that the proceedings had to conform to statutory regulations that listed well delineated causes for license revocation. Id., at 568, 606 A.2d 693. In addition, the request for revocation was taken under oath and had to be filed with the secretary for the state board of education. Id., at...
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