Craig v. STAFFORD CONST., INC., 17073.
Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
Citation | 856 A.2d 372,271 Conn. 78 |
Decision Date | 14 September 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 17073.,17073. |
Parties | Steven CRAIG v. STAFFORD CONSTRUCTION, INC., et al. |
856 A.2d 372
271 Conn. 78
v.
STAFFORD CONSTRUCTION, INC., et al
No. 17073.
Supreme Court of Connecticut.
Argued May 18, 2004.
Decided September 14, 2004.
Ralph W. Johnson III, with whom was Kevin J. Greene, Hartford, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).
BORDEN, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.
BORDEN, J.
The dispositive issue in this certified appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that an investigation by the city of Hartford police department's internal affairs division constituted a quasi-judicial proceeding, thereby affording absolute immunity to the citizen complainant whose claim gave rise to the investigation. The plaintiff, Steven Craig, appeals, following our grant of certification,1 from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Eugene Ramistella and his employer, Stafford Construction, Inc. (Stafford).2 The plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that an internal affairs investigation conducted by the Hartford police department (department) constituted a quasi-judicial proceeding, thereby triggering the doctrine of absolute immunity. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The plaintiff, a police officer with the department, brought this defamation action against the defendants claiming that they had defamed him when they filed a citizen complaint with the department alleging that he had directed racial slurs toward them at a construction site. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that,
The following facts and procedural history were set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court. "On March 17, 1997, the plaintiff accepted a private duty job offered by Stafford at a construction site at 1700 Main Street in Hartford. Ramistella was employed by Stafford and was working on the construction site that day. During a coffee break, the plaintiff made allegedly derogatory racial comments regarding the purpose of the construction project.
"On April 14, 1997, Ramistella filed a citizen complaint with the internal affairs division [of the department]. The internal affairs division conducted an investigation and formally charged the plaintiff with `conduct unbecoming of a police officer.' During the investigatory process, Ramistella made a false statement regarding the March 17, 1997 incident.3 A hearing was held on June 16, 1998, at which Ramistella withdrew his complaint.4 Several months later, the plaintiff was found not guilty." Id., at 552-53, 827 A.2d 793.
Thereafter, "[t]he plaintiff ... brought a defamation action against ... Ramistella and Miguel Aceves, as well as ... Stafford.... In his second amended complaint ... the plaintiff alleged that, in a citizen complaint against him, the defendants knowingly and falsely had accused him of having made derogatory racial comments. The plaintiff further alleged that, as a result of these allegedly false statements, he had suffered emotional harm and loss of respect and had been turned down for several requested promotions.
"The defendants denied the allegations of the plaintiff and asserted, as a special defense, that Ramistella's statements were not actionable because of the doctrine of absolute immunity. Ramistella's immunity, they alleged, arose out of the fact that the statements of which the plaintiff complained had been made in the course of an investigation conducted by the internal affairs division of the ... department. The defendants claimed that the investigation was a quasi-judicial proceeding ... [and] the defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of their claim of absolute immunity.... [The trial] court granted the motion and rendered judgment in their favor." Id., at 550-51, 827 A.2d 793.
The plaintiff thereafter appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court improperly had concluded that Ramistella's statements were protected by the doctrine of absolute immunity. Id., at 551, 827 A.2d 793. The Appellate Court disagreed with the plaintiff, and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Id., at 561, 827 A.2d 793. Specifically, the Appellate Court concluded that the internal affairs investigation constituted a quasi-judicial proceeding because it involved the exercise of discretion at different levels of the process and included
On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the investigation conducted by the internal affairs division constituted a quasi-judicial proceeding. We disagree.
Before addressing the merits of the plaintiff's claim on appeal, we note the standard that governs our review in the present case. "[T]he standard of review of a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is well established. Practice Book [§ 17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pelletier v. Sordoni/Skanska Construction Co., 264 Conn. 509, 514, 825 A.2d 72 (2003). In addition, the determination of whether an internal affairs investigation constitutes a quasi-judicial proceeding is a question of law over which our review is plenary. Within this limitation, however, whether a particular proceeding is quasi-judicial in nature, for the purposes of triggering absolute immunity, will depend on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. With this standard of review in mind, therefore, we turn to the plaintiff's claim on appeal.
"A defamatory statement is defined as a communication that tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him .... To establish a prima facie case of defamation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant published a defamatory statement; (2) the defamatory statement identified the plaintiff to a third person; (3) the defamatory statement was published to a third person; and (4) the plaintiff's reputation suffered injury as a result of the statement." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chemical Co., 267 Conn. 210, 217, 837 A.2d 759 (2004).
"The effect of an absolute privilege in a defamation action [however] is that damages cannot be recovered for a defamatory statement even if it is published falsely and maliciously.... [L]ike the privilege which is generally applied to pertinent statements made in formal judicial proceedings, an absolute privilege also attaches to relevant statements made during administrative proceedings which are quasi-judicial in nature.... Once it is determined that a proceeding is quasijudicial in nature, the absolute privilege that is granted to statements made in furtherance of it extends to every step of the proceeding until final disposition." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. 549, 565-66, 606 A.2d 693 (1992).
"The judicial proceeding to which [absolute] immunity attaches has not been defined very exactly. It includes any hearing before a tribunal which performs a judicial function, ex parte or otherwise, and whether the hearing is public or not. It includes, for example, lunacy, bankruptcy, or naturalization proceedings, and an election contest. It extends also to the
In Kelley, we concluded that schoolteacher license revocation proceedings before the state board of education were quasi-judicial in nature. Id., at 571, 606 A.2d 693. In support of that determination, we noted that the proceedings had to conform to statutory regulations that listed well delineated causes for license revocation. Id., at 568, 606 A.2d 693. In addition, the request for revocation was taken under oath and had to be filed with the...
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