Craig v. State, 482S145

• Decision Date: 30 August 1983
• Docket Number: No. 482S145,482S145
• Citation: 452 N.E.2d 921
• Parties: Michael Ray CRAIG, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 921

452 N.E.2d 921

Michael Ray CRAIG, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 482S145.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Aug. 30, 1983.

Michael J. McDaniel, New Albany, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Cynthia Sue Stanley, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, Justice.

Defendant-Appellant Michael Ray Craig was found guilty of felony murder by a jury in the Clark Circuit Court on November 24, 1981. He subsequently was sentenced by the trial judge to a term of sixty years imprisonment. Appellant now directly appeals and raises the following four issues for our consideration:

1. whether the trial court erred by denying Appellant's motion to suppress his confession due to his alleged illegal detention;

2. whether the trial court erred by denying Appellant's motion to suppress his confession on involuntariness grounds;

3. whether the trial court erred by denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct; and

4. whether the trial court erred by denying Appellant's motion for appointment of an additional psychologist.

The evidence adduced at trial showed that Karl Johnson was killed on August 2, 1980, by a gunshot wound to the back of his head. Appellant gave a written confession to the police in which he admitted shooting the victim but claimed that it was an accident. Appellant confessed that he intended to rob Johnson of some money on his person but did not intend to shoot him. Other evidence showed that Appellant went to the trailer of Mary Johnson, mother of Dee and Jack Short, looking for Mrs. Johnson's husband. The victim, a stranger, accompanied Appellant to the trailer. Appellant went into the trailer's bedroom with Mary Johnson and asked: "Mary, why don't you go in there and rob that guy?" When Mary ignored him, Appellant asked if she had a gun. Mary brought out a gun and handed it to Dee Short saying that she had no shells. Dee handed the gun, a .22 caliber pistol, to Appellant, who put the gun behind his belt before leaving the bedroom. Appellant, Jack Short, and the victim subsequently left in Dee Short's car.

Appellant recounted to the police in detail the path which he and Jack Short took to a secluded area where they intended to rob Johnson. Appellant said that he never previously had handled a gun and did not know that the gun in his belt was loaded. He also said that he pointed the gun at Johnson with the intent to rob him but that Johnson moved his body and bumped the gun causing it to go off. Appellant and Jack Short then took Johnson's money and left. They also took a satchel containing some papers which Johnson carried. Appellant stated that they later went back to see if Johnson was still alive. He said that had Johnson been alive they would have called an ambulance. Johnson was dead. Appellant later assisted the police in finding the victim's satchel and the murder weapon which Appellant had hidden in his home.

I

Appellant contends that his confession to the police should have been suppressed since he was illegally detained when he made the confession. Appellant admits that he went to the police station voluntarily and willingly discussed the instant crime. Specifically, he made two statements to the police denying any involvement in the instant crime prior to making the confession statement now in question. Appellant does not deny that he received his Miranda rights and signed waiver of rights forms before giving each of his initial two statements. He now alleges, however, that he asked to go home after making his second statement but the police refused his request. Appellant admits that someone told him that the police had reason to believe he was involved in this crime on the basis of certain statements received from other people. Detective-Sergeant Schroeder testified that he informed Appellant after his second statement that he was to be charged with Karl Johnson's murder based on Jack Short's incriminating statement. Dee Short also implicated Appellant. Donald Short, the father of Jack Short who also was charged with this murder, told Schroeder that Appellant told him that Appellant shot the victim and later returned to view the condition of the body. Schroeder stated that he also had information from Oscar Morgan that Morgan had seen the victim, Jack Short and a man Morgan believed to be Appellant together hours before the victim's body was discovered. Accordingly, Appellant's argument that the police had no probable cause to detain him following the taking of his second statement must fail. Moreover, Appellant's contention that he was held involuntarily because he requested to go home is in conflict. The police stated that they did not recall Appellant making any request to go home and that they told Appellant that he was to be charged with homicide. In fact, Appellant indicated to the police that he was giving his third and inculpatory statement because he wanted to straighten matters out. He stated that he did not commit murder because the shooting was an accident. Appellant indicated in his detailed statement that he only intended to rob the victim of his money.

The State contends that the police officers arrested Appellant with probable cause before his inculpatory third statement was given. Arrest without a warrant is legal if, at the time of the arrest, the arresting officer had probable cause to believe the defendant had committed a felony. Funk v. State, (1981) Ind., 427 N.E.2d 1081, reh. denied; Battle v. State, (1981) Ind., 415 N.E.2d 39. Probable cause exists when, at the time of arrest, the arresting officers have knowledge of facts and circumstances which would warrant a man of reasonable caution and prudence to believe that the suspect committed the criminal act in question. Funk, supra; Battle, supra. The facts related above show that the police had such information and therefore had probable cause to arrest Appellant without a warrant. The admissibility of a confession ultimately depends upon questions of fact which are to be resolved by the trial court. If the evidence is conflicting, only that evidence which tends to support the trial court's ruling should be considered on appeal. If the trial court's ruling is supported by substantial evidence of probative value, it will not be disturbed. Chandler v. State, (1981) Ind., 419 N.E.2d 142; Ball v. State, (1981) Ind., 419 N.E.2d 137, reh. denied. Since there is no showing that Appellant's inculpatory confession was given while illegally detained, the trial court correctly denied Appellant's motion to suppress the confession on this basis.

II

Appellant's second basis for contending that his motion to suppress should have been granted is that his confession was given involuntarily. He specifically claims that the police made impermissible inducements to him and that he was in such an intoxicated state that he was unable to intelligently and knowingly make a statement. The facts presented on this issue in support of Appellant's motion to suppress are, at best, in conflict and we will not ordinarily overturn a trial court's determination as to the admissibility of a confession when that determination is based upon conflicting evidence. If the trial court's ruling is supported by substantial evidence of probative value, it will not be disturbed. Chandler, supra; Ball, supra.

Appellant admits that his constitutional rights were read to him four times, that those rights included the right to have an attorney present, that he understood his rights and that he signed waiver of rights forms in each instance. Appellant now states that he asked for an attorney before he gave his inculpatory third statement. Nowhere in Appellant's transcribed statement do we find that Appellant asked for an attorney. In fact, said statement clearly indicates that Appellant was given his rights and understood them. Moreover, Officer Schroeder testified that he did not remember Appellant ever asking for an attorney. Appellant testified at the suppression hearing that approximately seven hours before making his third statement he ingested several Quaaludes, drank an eight pack of beer and smoked approximately six "joints" of marijuana. Appellant said that he had a "buzz" and was not able to give a coherent statement. Officer Schroeder testified that he saw no evidence that Appellant had been drinking; his eyes were not bloodshot nor was his speech slurred. While giving his statement, Appellant was asked by the police about his physical condition. He stated that he was tired and had a little "buzz" but had no trouble conversing with Officers Schroeder and Lutring. Schroeder stated that Appellant did not appear encumbered in any way by intoxication or drug addiction as they talked to him and that he was able to lucidly converse with them about the instant...