Craig v. The City of New York
| Decision Date | 30 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:20-CV-02152 (LDH)(PK) |
| Parties | ALBERT CRAIG, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, ELIAS HUSAMUDEEN, NYC DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS COMMISSIONER CYNTHIA BRANN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS AT NYC DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS MARIA GUCCIONE and DEPUTY WARDEN DESIREE HILL, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
DECISION AND ORDER
Albert Craig (“Plaintiff”) brought this action against the City of New York, Elias Husamudeen, New York City Department of Corrections Commissioner Cynthia Brann Executive Director of Labor Relations at New York City Department of Corrections Maria Guccione, and Deputy Warden Desiree Hill (collectively, “Defendants”).
Before the Court on referral from the Honorable LaShann DeArcy Hall is Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint and Add Parties (“Motion,” Dkt. 55), pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a) and 21. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff is a New York City Department of Corrections Officer, and as of 2013, he was also “a duly elected member of the Executive Board . . . of the Corrections Officers Benevolent Association, (hereinafter COBA).” (See First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 5, Dkt. 28.)
On May 12, 2020, Plaintiff, through then-counsel Fred B Lichtmacher, filed the Complaint, alleging that Defendants deprived Plaintiff of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl., Dkt. 1.)
On January 29, 2021, Plaintiff filed the FAC, which asserted four claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) a claim of retaliation by the individual defendants in violation of Plaintiff's First Amendment rights (FAC ¶¶ 99-100); (2) a Monell claim against the City of New York alleging that it violated Plaintiff's free speech rights through its “de facto policy of doing whatever is necessary to demonstrate Rikers needs to be closed as it is violent, dangerous and unnecessary” (id. ¶ 106); (3) a supervisory liability claim against Defendant Brann for failing to supervise employees who were retaliating against Plaintiff for exercising his First Amendment rights (id. ¶ 119); and (4) a substantive due process claim against the City of New York and Brann alleging that they violated Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from state-created dangers by withholding gloves, masks and soap, and not allowing him to provide his own personal protective equipment, forcing him to be exposed to the COVID-19 virus (id. ¶¶ 127-134).
On March 16, 2021, the Court granted Lichtmacher's motion to withdraw as counsel. (See Dkt. 35; Order dated Mar 16, 2021.)
Plaintiff, through new counsel Lakshmi Gopal, requested and was granted leave to file a motion to amend the FAC. (Min. Entry dated June 29, 2021.) On July 29, 2021,[1] Plaintiff filed the Motion, attaching a proposed Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (“SAC,” Dkt. 55-2), a redlined version of the SAC comparing it to the FAC (Dkt. 55-3), and a Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion (“Pl. Mem. of Law,” Dkt. 55-4).
Because Plaintiff also filed a motion to disqualify Husamudeen's counsel, Nathanial K. Charny (Pl. Motion to Disqualify, Dkt. 42), the Court did not require Defendants' response to be filed until a decision on that motion. (Min. Entry dated June 29, 2021.) In addition, on July 15, 2021, Defendant Husamudeen filed a motion for sanctions against Plaintiff and Gopal for statements contained in Plaintiff's motion to disqualify. (Def. Husamudeen Motion for Sanctions, Dkt. 52.)
On June 22, 2022, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion to disqualify Charny and granted in part Defendant Husamudeen's motion for sanctions against Gopal. (Order dated June 22, 2022, Dkt. 59.)
Thereafter, Defendants City of New York, Brann, Guccione, and Hill (hereinafter “Municipal Defendants”) filed their opposition to the Motion (“Municipal Response,” Dkt. 69), and Defendant Husamudeen filed his opposition. (“Husamudeen Response,” Dkt. 70.)
The SAC seeks to add Charny and Marc A. Steier as defendants, add facts, correct errors and inconsistencies in the FAC, restate existing claims, add new claims, and change the relief requested. (See Pl. Mem. of Law at 3-4.) It identifies three “causes of action,” broken down into nine “counts.” Counts I through IV allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in that (1) the City, Brann, and Guccione constructively deprived Plaintiff of his “assignment, on a full-time basis, to time spent on union activities . . . (‘full-time release')” and of his position as the COBA Annuity Fund Trustee, without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (SAC ¶¶ 341-42); (2) all defendants retaliated against Plaintiff for “engag[ing] in protected speech as a union leader and citizen speaking on matters of public concern,” in violation of his First Amendment “rights to free speech and to expressive association” (id. ¶¶ 345-48); (3) all defendants, except Hill, violated Plaintiff's right under the First Amendment to free association by “block[ing] Plaintiff from conducting, continuing, and growing his associative activities, including with a budding minority group within COBA that Plaintiff was gathering against a long-dominant corrupt group within COBA” (id. ¶ 351); and (4) the City deprived Plaintiff of his liberty interest in having effective channels to report corruption, to participate in public life, to perform contracts, and to participate in private elections without interference (id. ¶ 354).
Counts V and VI allege tortious interference in that (1) Husamudeen, Steier, Charny, and Guccione “intentionally procured bre[a]ch of” Plaintiff's contract with COBA to serve as a COBA Annuity Fund Trustee (id. ¶¶ 358-60); and (2) Steier and Charny interfered with Plaintiff's “valid and binding contract for legal services” with Lichtmacher. (Id. ¶ 363.) Count VII alleges that Husamudeen, Steier, and Charny “prevented COBA's compliance with” New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law (“NPCL”) § 715-b, in retaliation for Plaintiff's “whistleblowing and his efforts to seek compliance with NPCL § 715-b.” (Id. ¶ 374.) Count VIII alleges that Husamudeen, Steier and Charny breached their duty of care to Plaintiff under NPCL § 715 “through individual action beyond the scope of employment,” thus committing the tort of negligence per se. (Id. ¶¶ 378-80.) Count IX alleges that, “[a]s an attorney retained by the COBA Annuity Fund, Defendant Charny owed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff, a Trustee of the COBA Annuity Fund,” and that he breached that duty. (Id. ¶¶ 382-83.)
Plaintiff argues that the amendments are necessary to ensure that the SAC reflects the case that Plaintiff originally intended to bring, and would have brought, but for the actions of his prior counsel Lichtmacher. (Pl. Mem. of Law at 4.)
Requests to amend the complaint are generally governed by Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that once the period to amend as a matter of course has passed, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Rule 15 states that “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id.; see Pinyuk v. CBE Grp., Inc., No. 17-CV-5753 (RRM)(CLP), 2019 WL 1900985, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2019) (). Leave to amend may be denied only “for good reason, including futility, bad faith, undue delay, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.” Id. at *2 (quoting McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 200-01 (2d Cir. 2007)). The opposing party bears the burden of showing good reason to deny amendment. See Block v. First Blood Assocs., 988 F.2d 344, 350 (2d Cir. 1993). The determination of whether to grant or deny leave to amend “is within the sound discretion of the district court.” McCarthy, 482 F.3d at 200.
A motion to amend may be denied if the proposed amendment is futile. Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 339 (2d Cir. 2000). A complaint is not futile when it is “sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) ....” Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 244 (2d Cir. 2007); see also IBEW Loc. Union No. 58 v. Royal Bank of Scotland Grp., PLC, 783 F.3d 383, 389 (2d Cir. 2015) (). The Court must accept all allegations in the proposed amended complaint as true and draw all inferences in Plaintiff's favor to determine whether it states a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The complaint's factual allegations, when accepted as true, must “state[] a claim that is ‘plausible on its face.'” Kiarie v. Dumbstruck, Inc., 473 F.Supp.3d 350, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted)). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 governs requests to add or dismiss parties or to add or sever claims against a party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 21. “The same standards that are used when considering motions to amend under Rule 15 have been applied to motions under Rule 21.” Brown v....
To continue reading
Request your trial