Crain v. State
Decision Date | 30 June 2010 |
Docket Number | No. PD-1262-09.,PD-1262-09. |
Citation | 315 S.W.3d 43 |
Parties | Sheldon Keith CRAIN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
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Arnold L. Miller, Amarillo, for appellant.
John L. Owen Asst. D.A., Amarillo, Jeffrey L. Van Horn, State's Attorney, Austin, for State.
In this case, there was substantial disagreement among the Justices of the Seventh Court of Appeals with regard to whether the interaction that took place between the appellant and a police officer was an encounter or a detention for Fourth Amendment purposes.1 We granted the appellant's petition for discretionary review in order to resolve this important question.2 We will reverse.
The appellant was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The weapon was found on his person when two officers patted him down, suspecting possession of marihuana. The appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence and, at the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the judge overruled the appellant's motion. Following a plea of guilty, the appellant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon.3 The appellant pled true to an enhancement paragraph and was sentenced to six years' confinement and a $1,000 fine. The appellant preserved his right to appeal any adverse rulings resulting from his pre-trial motions.
The evidence presented at the suppression hearing showed the following. On July 23, 2006, at approximately 12:30 a.m., Officer Dewayne Griffin of the Amarillo Police Department, while on his way to respond to a theft call, observed the appellant walking in a residential area. Because the appellant "grabbed at his waist" as Griffin drove by him in his marked patrol car, Griffin decided he would return after responding to the theft call to ask the appellant some questions. While at the theft-call scene, Griffin told back-up officer Cody Moore that he wanted to return to where he had observed a suspicious man—the appellant—walking.
After responding to the theft call, Griffin drove back to where he had seen the appellant approximately ten minutes earlier and found him walking across a yard. Griffin called out to the appellant through his rolled-down window "and asked him to come over and talk to me," and shined his patrol car's spotlight on the appellant. On cross-examination, Griffin reiterated that he had "asked" the appellant, even though he had indicated in his report that he "told him to come." Asked, "How did you ask him?", Griffin demonstrated: "Come over here and talk to me." Griffin readily acknowledged that "that sounds like an order." Griffin testified that, had the appellant refused to talk to him, he would have let the appellant go, as he had not observed the appellant do anything that could be construed as criminal activity. The appellant took a couple more steps forward and stopped. Griffin then exited his vehicle and walked up to the appellant and, as he did, the appellant asked what he was doing wrong. Griffin replied that he wanted to talk to him.
However, as soon as Griffin began to talk to the appellant at approximately an arm-and-a-half's length away, Griffin smelled what he thought was the odor of recently smoked marihuana coming from the appellant's clothes and breath. At the hearing, Griffin maintained that he detained the appellant when he began to suspect that the appellant, who showed signs of nervousness, was in possession of marihuana. As Griffin and the appellant walked toward the patrol car, without placing the appellant under arrest, Griffin held the appellant's hands behind his back. It was then that back-up officer Moore arrived in another patrol car.
Both officers patted the appellant down. Noticing a bulge under the appellant's shirt, Moore pushed on it and realized it was a pistol. Moore told Griffin that it was a gun and disarmed the appellant. The officers arrested the appellant, and a search incident to arrest revealed no additional contraband. Griffin transported the appellant to the county jail. Griffin testified that, at no time during their interaction did the appellant resist or threaten the officers in any manner that might have required them to threaten him with or make use of a taser or mace. Further, Griffin testified, he never had to tell the appellant to stop or not to run.
Ms. JoAnn Marez was an acquaintance of the appellant, and it was her yard in which Griffin found the appellant. Marez, who had been expecting the appellant that evening, testified that she saw flashing lights through her living room window and walked to the front of the house to see what was happening outside. She briefly moved the sheer curtain and observed the appellant and an officer in her front yard. Marez maintained (contrary to Griffin's testimony) that, while listening to what was happening outside her house, she heard "stop and don't you run" and then "something about, a thousand volts or something." She then decided to sit on the couch by the door and listen, rather than continue to watch. Marez added that it was clear to her that the appellant and that what she heard was "definitely an order ... a command."
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court found that Griffin had made no display of authority until after he smelled marihuana on the appellant, and therefore, the initial interaction was a mere encounter that did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. The use of the spotlight during the initial interaction, the court held, was "a matter of practical necessity due to the time of night."4 The trial court also concluded that Griffin's testimony was credible and resolved the conflict between what Marez testified she had heard and what Griffin stated he told the appellant, in Griffin's favor—i.e., the trial court found that Griffin neither threatened the appellant with a taser nor told him to stop and not run.5
The appellant appealed that decision to the Seventh Court of Appeals; a majority of that court affirmed, holding that Griffin's conduct would not have communicated to a reasonable person that the appellant was not free to decline Griffin's request and terminate the encounter.6 The court of appeals thus concluded that the subsequent seizure of the handgun, once the encounter progressed into an investigative detention—prompted by the officer smelling marihuana on the appellant—was lawful. Chief Justice Quinn dissented. In his dissent, Chief Justice Quinn explained that a reasonable person in the appellant's shoes would have regarded Griffin's words to the appellant as a command rather than a request to speak. Further, explained Justice Quinn, the spotlight was the equivalent of a patrol car's emergency lights. He noted that, combined, the two actions amounted to an announcement of authority carrying an implicit command. Justice Quinn thus concluded that, under the circumstances, the stop was a detention rather than a mere encounter. And because there was no reasonable suspicion at the time of the initial interaction between the officer and the appellant, the stop was illegal, and the evidence obtained as a consequence of it should have been suppressed.
We granted the appellant's petition for discretionary review to decide whether Officer Griffin detained the appellant. We hold that the meeting amounted to a detention and reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion.7 The trial court is given almost complete deference in its determination of historical facts, especially if those are based on an assessment of credibility and demeanor.8 The same deference is afforded the trial court with respect to its rulings on application of the law to questions of fact and to mixed questions of law and fact, if resolution of those questions depends on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.9 However, for mixed questions of law and fact that do not fall within that category, a reviewing court may conduct a de novo review.10
When the trial court does not make express findings of fact, an appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, assuming that it made any implicit findings of fact that are supported by the record.11 An appellate court will sustain the trial court's decision if it concludes that the decision is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.12 The trial judge is the exclusive fact-finder at the suppression hearing.13 We review de novo whether the totality of circumstances is sufficient to support an officer's reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.14
There are three distinct categories of interactions between police officers and citizens: (1) encounters, (2) investigative detentions, and (3) arrests.15 In determining which category an interaction falls into, courts look at the totality of the circumstances.16 An encounter is a consensual interaction which the citizen is free to terminate at any time.17 Unlike an investigative detention and an arrest, an encounter is not considered a seizure that would trigger Fourth Amendment protection.18 An encounter takes place when an officer approaches a citizen in a public place to ask questions, and the citizen is willing to listen and voluntarily answers.19
On the other hand, an investigative detention occurs when a person yields to the police officer's show of authority under a reasonable belief that he is not free to leave.20 When the court is conducting its determination of whether the interaction constituted an encounter or a detention, the court focuses on whether the officer conveyed a message...
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