Cramer v. Chi., R. I. & P. Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 20 November 1911 |
| Citation | 153 Iowa 103,133 N.W. 387 |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
| Parties | CRAMER v. CHICAGO, R. I. & P. RY. CO. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Wright County; Chas. E. Albrook, Judge.
Action at law to recover for damages done to a shipment of hogs over defendant's road from Galt, Iowa, to Chicago, Ill. Many defenses were interposed, to some of which plaintiff demurred. This demurrer was sustained in part and overruled in part, and the case was tried, resulting in a judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $828. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.Carroll Wright, J. L. Parrish, and Ladd & Rogers, for appellant.
Nagle & Nagle, for appellee.
The appeal presents but a single question. Defendant pleaded as a partial defense certain stipulations in the bill of lading issued to plaintiff for the car of hogs, reading as follows:
These stipulations were expressly made part of the consideration for the rate, and the contract provided that: “Said rate being less than the rate charged for shipments transported at carrier's risk, for which reduced rate and other considerations it is mutually agreed between the parties hereto, as follows.”
Based upon these stipulations and agreements, defendant pleaded the following defenses:
“That at the time the plaintiff shipped the hogs in question, the defendant had on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and on file at Galt, Iowa, its tariff rates on hogs, as required by law. That in said tariff rates, so filed and in force at the time this shipment was made, there were specified therein two rates over defendant's line of railway from Galt, Iowa, to Chicago, Ill.; one where the value of the hogs did not exceed $10 per head, and the other rate, which was higher, where the value of the hogs exceeded $10 per head. It was expressly provided in said tariff rates, so filed and in force at the time the shipment was made, that where hogs were shipped under the lower rate, in case of total loss of any of such hogs, the defendant's liability should not exceed $10 per head. That said tariff rates were open to the inspection of the public, and plaintiff selected the lower rate, and entered into a written contract with said defendant, which provided that in case of total loss of any of said hogs for which the defendant might be liable, payment therefor was to be made on the basis of the actual value at the time and place of shipment, but in no case should the defendant's liability exceed $10 per head. Said contract further provided that in making said contract the undersigned owner of the stock named herein expressly acknowledged that he had the option in making said contract under the tariff rates, either at the carrier's risk or upon a limited liability, and that he had selected the rate and liability named herein, and expressly accepts and agrees to all the stipulations and conditions herein named. A copy of said contract is hereto attached, marked ‘Exhibit A,’ and made a part of this answer.
That said tariff rates under which this shipment was made were binding upon both the defendant and the plaintiff, and neither were at liberty to disregard said tariff rates, without violating the law and being subject to prosecution by the United States government. This court has no authority or jurisdiction to change said tariff rates, by changing the amount of liability that the defendant assumed under said tariff rates at the time the hogs in question were shipped. That the recovery of plaintiff, if he is entitled to recover, is limited to $10 per head for each hog.
Count 3. The defendant further answering states that it kept on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and on file at Galt, Iowa, from where these hogs were shipped, its tariff rates, as required by law. That said tariff rates, duly published as required by law, gave the plaintiff a choice of two rates; one rate where the value of the hogs was $10 or less, and a higher rate, where the value of the hogs exceeded $10. The defendant states that the plaintiff, in order to secure the transportation of hogs in question at less than the published tariff rates, wrongfully represented that the value of the hogs in question did not exceed $10 per head, and that plaintiff signed the contract marked ‘Exhibit A,’ a copy of which is hereto attached, and represented therein that the value of the hogs therein did not exceed $10 per head, when, as a matter of fact, the value of said hogs at the time was much in excess of $10 per head, which fact was known to the plaintiff at the time said valuation was given, and was not known to the defendant. That no officer or agent of the defendant at that time had seen the hogs, and had no knowledge as to the value of said hogs in question, except that obtained from the contract herein.
That the hogs in question were transported at the lower rate, based on a valuation, not exceeding $10 per head. That plaintiff is not entitled to recover more than $10 for each hog, and he is estopped from claiming that the value of the hogs in question at the time of shipment was more than $10 per head.
That the defendant further states that under the terms of the contract under which the shipment was made the recovery of the plaintiff is limited to the sum of $10 for each animal, and states that plaintiff cannot, in any event, recover more than said amount.”
[1] The demurrer to these divisions of the answer was sustained, and the appeal challenges the ruling. Our Code, § 2074, provides that: “No contract, receipt, rule or regulation shall exempt any railway corporation engaged in transporting persons or property from the liability of a common carrier, or carrier of passengers, which would exist had no contract, receipt, rule or regulation been made or entered into.” This section has heretofore been held applicable to such provisions as are relied upon by appellant, and the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the state, in virtue of its reserved or police power, had authority to enact such a rule, even though the shipment be interstate in character. See Solan v. Railroad, 95 Iowa, 260, 63 N. W. 692, 28 L. R. A. 718, 58 Am. St. Rep. 430;Lucas v. Railroad, 112 Iowa, 594, 84 N. W. 673;Winn v. Am. Ex. Co., 149 Iowa, 259, 128 N. W. 663. Also C., M. & St. Paul R. R. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, 18 Sup. Ct. 289, 42 L. Ed. 688, and Penn. R. R. v. Hughs, 191 U. S. 477, 24 Sup. Ct. 132, 48 L. Ed. 268.
It is now argued with apparent confidence that the interstate commerce act (Act Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3154]), with its amendments prior to the one of June 18, 1910, has so changed the situation that we should now hold the section of the Code inapplicable to interstate shipments, and say, once for all, that, as our construction of it affects the published rates approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission, we should now abandon the rule announced in the Solan and other like cases. The fundamental proposition relied upon for this conclusion is that, as Congress has now acted upon the subject, the several states have no further control of the matter, and that the rates approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission must control. The difficulty with this proposition is counsel's inability to point to any act of Congress which undertakes to validate any such provision and stipulations as are relied upon by appellant. Such contracts as these have been held invalid by this court because exempting a carrier from an implied liability growing out of its undertaking to carry the property; and in previous cases it has been said that such exemptions are contrary to public policy, and void at common law. See cases heretofore cited. Upon this proposition, there is conflict in the authorities, however, and the Supreme Court of the United States has adopted a contrary rule. See Hart v. Railroad, 112 U. S. 331, 5 Sup. Ct. 151, 28 L. Ed. 717. But practically all of the courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, have held such a statute as is found in our Code as section 2074 within the reserved or police powers of the state, and not such a regulation of interstate commerce as to be inhibited by the federal Constitution. See cases hitherto cited. We have no doubt of the power of Congress to legislate upon this matter of limiting liability, or to give full recognition and validity to such contracts; but counsel for appellant have failed to point out any act of Congress which does so. Our own reading of the interstate commerce act fails to...
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