Cramer v. Cramer
| Decision Date | 28 October 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 10079,10079 |
| Citation | 81 S.D. 94,131 N.W.2d 102 |
| Parties | Kate CRAMER, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. David C. CRAMER and Madeline Cramer, Defendants and Appellants. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Bogue & Rudolph, Canton, for defendants and appellants.
Bogue & Weeks, Vermillion, Alfred N. Strand, Centerville, for plaintiff and respondent.
This is an action to set aside a transfer of property by an elderly person to a relative. On September 18, 1961, plaintiff, a widow, was the owner of 80 acres of farm land in Turner County, South Dakota, which she inherited from her husband. On that day she signed a warranty deed conveying the premises to defendants husband and wife as joint tenants, reserving a life estate. She moved to this farm when she was married in 1916 and lived there for 42 years. In 1958 her husband died and she moved to a small town nearby. She had no children and apparently no close friends or relatives with whom she did or would confide or procure advice. She was 79 years old, a women of limited education; had never had gainful employment except as a household servant, was somewhat crippled with arthritis for which she took medication and used a cane to get about. The only business shown to have been done by her was to rent the farm for 1959 and 1960 to her cousin and her transactions with defendants. In the fall of 1960 defendant came to her house and talked about renting the farm. Defendant David C. Cramer is a nephew of plaintiff's deceased husband. It appears there are 45 acres of cropland, 4 or 5 acres building area and 30 acres of pasture on which defendants ran 17 head of livestock. An oral rental arrangement was made on the basis of 2/5ths of the crop to plaintiff. The rental as to the pasture and buildings is unclear, but defendants testified they were not to pay any cash rent for these; instead in 1961 they were to perform labor painting the buildings and thereafter were to pay the taxes. The nub of this action is plaintiff's claim she signed a paper believing it was in conformity with an oral agreement she was to sell the land to defendants for $150 an acre and defendants recorded the deed without paying anything to her. Defendants admit plaintiff talked to them or one of them at different times about buying the place, but said they didn't have any money; plaintiff testified to conversations as to the sale price of $150. As to this feature, one defendant didn't remember whether she mentioned it, but if there was such a conversation, it was the very first time, and later denied it; the other defendant said she heard $150 mentioned once.
Defendants admit they never paid plaintiff the sale price she testified to, nor any part thereof. It is not clear whether defendants claim the transaction was a transfer without consideration, that is, a gift or for some consideration, a sale. The complaint alleged a sale of the premises at $150 per acre, that plaintiff was taken to the office of defendants' attorney for the purpose of signing a contract to that end and, relying on representations the deed was in accord with the agreement, she signed the instrument without reading it; that she did not know the deed was delivered to defendants, that a confidential relationship existed between the parties and delivery of the deed was obtained by fraud, undue influence and violation of trust. The answer generally denied the complaint, and neither claimed the transaction was a sale nor a gift. It merely alleged plaintiff executed and delivered the deed of her own free will and accord.
In passing, while it may not make any difference whether defendants' contention of the transaction is a sale or a gift, it appears by their version to be no usual bona fide sale. Defendants were renting on a basis of a share of the cropland and except for painting buildings the first year were to pay the taxes for use of the pasture and buildings as that offset or balanced that rent. As to their claim of the oral agreement for the transfer of the farm to them, the evidence was:
'Q * * * you claim that you were going to get this farm as a gift * * * A Well, not necessarily. * * * I wouldn't say it was a gift. * * *
When I have to pay two-fifths of the crop--and the taxes--and keep the place up.'
This was no change from the lease arrangement unless 'keeping the place up' added something. Paying the usual rental on land to a life tenant 79 years of age with an expectancy of 5 to 7 years, tenants were keeping the place up for themselves as remaindermen. In effect this is a claim of a gift of the fee.
The trial court by extensive findings of fact, found them generally as claimed and testified to by plaintiff and in accord with them and the conclusions of law, cancelled the deed and quieted title in plaintiff.
Insufficiency of the evidence to support many of the findings, conclusions of law and thus the judgment are the main contentions of defendants. Some of defendants' arguments are based and rely on evidence adduced by them. In our review we must accept that version of the evidence, including the inferences that can be fairly drawn therefrom, which is favorable to the trial court's action. Consequently, an appellate court is not free to disturb findings unless they are contrary to the clear preponderance of the evidence. Hilde v. Flood, S.D., 130 N.W.2d 100. The...
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Walsh v. Shoulders, 11092
...fraud. * * * We are of the view that rescission should have been decreed.' See also reference to Orr v. Allen in Cramer v. Cramer, 81 S.D. 94, 131 N.W.2d 102 at 104. Though there are always some differences in the facts in every case, the thread runs clearly in the cases cited that under so......
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Blake's Estate, In re
...we are not free to disturb the finding of the trial court unless it is contrary to the clear preponderance of the evidence. Cramer v. Cramer, S.D., 131 N.W.2d 102. The testator, Frank Blake, was a lifelong bachelor and passed away on September 23, 1963, at the age of 87 years. He and his br......