Cramer v. Crutchfield
| Decision Date | 12 May 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-1718,80-1718 |
| Citation | 648 F.2d 943 |
| Parties | Robert CRAMER, Appellant, v. B. L. CRUTCHFIELD, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
John F. Rick, Richmond, Va. (Farino & Rick, Richmond, Va., on brief), for appellant.
Henry H. McVey, III, Richmond, Va. (McGuire, Woods & Battle, Richmond, Va., on brief), for appellee.
Before WINTER, RUSSELL and WIDENER, Circuit Judges.
Cramer, a citizen of Delaware, appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment for Crutchfield, a Virginia state trooper, in Cramer's suit for damages brought for violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, under diversity jurisdiction, for the common law torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process. We affirm.
On September 5, 1977, Crutchfield stopped Cramer's truck as it drove through Prince George County, Virginia, and accused him of having a radar detection device, the use of which was illegal under Virginia law. Crutchfield asked Cramer to open the truck's locked cab, but Cramer refused. Acting without a search warrant, Crutchfield then used a screw driver to force entry into the cab, and he found a radar detection device under a mattress. Crutchfield arrested Cramer, charging him with possessing the radar device and, because he would not open the cab, with interfering with a police officer.
Cramer was taken before a magistrate, who found that probable cause existed to charge Cramer with the two offenses. Cramer posted bond, and was released. Cramer was later convicted in Prince George County General District Court of equipping his vehicle with a radar detection device in violation of Va.Code § 46.1-198.1. At that trial he made no assertion that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. Following his conviction, he appealed to the Circuit Court of Prince George County. On September 19, 1978, for reasons which the record does not disclose, the Commonwealth's Attorney moved to dismiss the charges against Cramer, and his motion was granted.
On September 18, 1979, Cramer sued seeking damages in excess of $10,000. His complaint alleged a cause of action under § 1983 that Crutchfield had violated Cramer's constitutional rights by subjecting him to an unlawful search and seizure, by maliciously prosecuting him and by malicious abuse of process and a cause of action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process, cognizable under the district court's diversity jurisdiction. The district court granted Crutchfield's motion for summary judgment. It ruled that the alleged search and seizure cause of action under § 1983 was barred by the statute of limitations because suit was filed more than two years after the search occurred, and that the causes of action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process, although not time barred, did not allege a deprivation of constitutional rights. It ruled further that Cramer failed to state a cause of action under Virginia law for the torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process, because, as evidenced by Cramer's conviction in the state district court and by the magistrate's finding, probable cause for the prosecution existed as a matter of law and Cramer failed to allege an ulterior motive for Crutchfield's institution of the prosecution or use of the prosecution for a purpose for which it was not intended. Cramer v. Crutchfield, 496 F.Supp. 949 (E.D.Va.1980).
We hold that the district court correctly ruled that Cramer's search and seizure claim under § 1983 was time barred. Virginia's statute of limitations for suits for personal injuries, Va.Code 8.01-243(A), provides the applicable limitations period of two years. See Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200 (4 Cir. 1972). Suit was filed on September 18, 1979, over two years after the search of Cramer's truck occurred, September 5, 1977. Because we do not find Virginia's rule on tolling the statute of limitations to be inconsistent with federal law, we follow it. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980). Under the Virginia statute, there is no reason to toll the two-year limitations period in this case. See Va.Code § 8.01-229.
The § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution and abuse of process was also properly rejected. A valid cause of action under § 1983 is not alleged simply by the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hines v. Johnson
...due process and not the abuse of process itself"); Cramer v. Crutchfield, 496 F. Supp. 949, 952 (E.D. Va. 1980), aff'd, 648 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1981) (finding that the plaintiff's abuse of process and malicious prosecution claims failed because "he was accorded the full measure of the due pr......
-
Holsey v. Bass
...and seizure claim for damages as a petition for habeas corpus. The Supreme Court cited both Wiggins and Rimmer. Cf. Cramer v. Crutchfield, 648 F.2d 943 (4 Cir. 1981) (§ 1983 claim arises from search by In Rimmer, the plaintiff, without exhausting state remedies, filed a § 1983 claim "for an......
-
Occhino v. U.S.
...upon allegation of a deprivation of "constitutional magnitude," which is clearly not present here. Id. at 296; Cramer v. Crutchfield, 648 F.2d 943, 945 (4th Cir. 1981). D. Res Officers Cich and Valure contend that the remainder of the § 1983 claim against them, involving assault, false arre......
-
Small v. Inhabitants of the City of Belfast
...limitations period for slander actions governs § 1983 claim of defamatory conduct during employee dismissal; Cramer v. Crutchfield, 648 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1981) state statute of limitations in personal injury actions applies in § 1983 action for unconstitutional search and seizure; Rubin v.......