Cramer v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Boston

• Decision Date: 17 May 1940
• Citation: 13 A.2d 651,18 N.J.Misc. 367
• Parties: CRAMER v. JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. OF BOSTON, MASS.
• Court: New Jersey Circuit Court

13 A.2d 651

18 N.J.Misc. 367

CRAMER

v. JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. OF BOSTON, MASS.

Circuit Court of New Jersey, Atlantic County.

May 17, 1940.

[Copyrighted material omitted.]

Action by Katherine Cramer, administratrix of the estate of Sarah Fedner, deceased, against the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company of Boston, Mass., on two life policies, On rule to show cause why verdict for plaintiff should not be annulled and a new trial granted.

Rule absolute.

Joseph B. Kauffman, of Atlantic City, for plaintiff.

Cassman & Gottlieb and Ellis L. Gottlieb, all of Atlantic City, for defendant.

JAYNE, Circuit Court Judge.

This action rested fundamentally upon two policies of insurance on the life of one Sarah Fedner, now deceased. The defendant acknowledged its obligation to pay to the estate of the deceased the face amount of the policies. The controversy related to the claim of the plaintiff for additional sums of equal amount, commonly known as double indemnity or accidental death benefits. The factual question was whether the insured sustained bodily injuries solely through external, violent and accidental means which resulted directly and independently of all other causes in her death. The jury resolved this query in the affirmative and rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.

The defendant has a rule to show cause why this verdict should not be annulled and a new trial granted.

True, the burden reposed upon the plaintiff to prove the requisite factual circumstances comprehended by the provisions of the policies. Travellers' Ins. Co. v. McConkey, 127 U.S. 661, 668, 8 S.Ct. 1360, 32 L.Ed. 308; Kresse v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 111 N.J.L. 474, 168 A. 634; Kennedy v. United States Fidelity, etc., Co., 113 N.J.L. 431, 174 A. 531.

Therefore, in the consideration of the present application, the interpretation and accepted meaning of the pertinent provisions of the policies become of primary interest. The expression "accidental means" has been employed in certain policies of insurance for many years. The word "accidental" is defined in Webster's Dictionary as "happening by chance, or unexpectedly; taking place not according to the usual course of things; casual; fortuitous; as an accidental visit." Cooley's Briefs on Insurance (2d Ed.) Vol. 6, p. 5234, defines accidental means as follows: "Strictly speaking, a means is accidental perhaps only when disassociated from any human agency, but this narrow interpretation is not recognized in the law of accident insurance. * * * An effect which is not the natural or probable consequence of the means which produced it, an effect which does not ordinarily follow and cannot be reasonably anticipated from the use of such means, an effect which the actor did not intend to produce and which he cannot be charged with the design of producing, is produced by accidental means." Definitions of like signification are supplied in Couch, Insurance, Sec. 1137; Vance, Insurance, 871; 1 C.J. 425, 427.

It is noticeable that the courts of our sister states and our federal courts have been called upon more frequently to interpret the expression "accidental means." The case to which most of such authorities refer, is United States Mutual Accident Association v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100, 9 S.Ct. 755, 762, 33 L.Ed. 60, 67, wherein the following instructions were approved: "If a result is such as follows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed, in a not unusual or unexpected way, it cannot be called a result effected by accidental means; but that if, in the act which precedes the injury, something unforeseen, unexpected, unusual, occurs which produces the injury, then the injury has resulted through accidental means."

Nevertheless, an examination of the reported cases reveals that from this statement of the law two somewhat diverse views have developed. The one procession of cases hold that, where an unusual or unexpected result occurs by reason of the commission of an intentional act by the insured, where no mischance, slip or mishap occurs in doing the act itself, the ensuing injury or death is not caused through accidental means; that it must appear that the means used were accidental, and it is not enough that the result may be unusual, unexpected or unforeseen. This view is lucidly expressed in Kimball v. Massachusetts Accident Company, 44 R.I. 264, 117 A. 228, 230, 24 A.L.R. 726. It is said that accidental means and accidental cause are synonymous expressions. Caldwell v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 305 Mo. 619, 267 S.W. 907, 39 A.L.R. 56, 80; Bryant v. Continental Casualty Co., 107 Tex. 582, 182 S. W. 673, L.R.A.1916E, 945, 949, Ann.Cas. 1918A, 517. The distinction is made between an accidental death and a death caused by accidental means. See Olinsky v. Railway Mail Ass'n, 182 Cal. 669, 189 P. 835, 837, 14 A.L.R. 784, 786. Other cases are: Fane v. National Ass'n Ry. Postal Clerks, 197 App.Div. 145, 188 N.Y. S. 222, 223; Husbands v. Indiana Travelers' Acc. Ass'n, 194 Ind. 586, 133 N.E. 130, 35 A.L.R. 1184; Fulton v. Metropolitan Casualty Co., 19 Ga.App. 127, 91 S.E. 228, 229; Curry v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 221 Mo.App. 626, 287 S.W. 1053; Smith v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 219 Mass. 147, 149, 106 N.E. 607, L.R.A.1915B, 872; Cobb v. Preferred Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 96 Ga. 818, 22 S.E. 976; Whitehead v. Railway Mail Ass'n, 5 Cir., 269 F. 25, certiorari denied, 255 U.S. 570, 41 S.Ct. 375, 65 L.Ed. 791; Southard v. Railway Pass. Assur. Co., 34 Conn. 574, 576, 578, Fed.Cas. No. 13, 182; Stone v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 133 Tenn. 672, 182 S.W. 252, L.R.A.1916D, 536, 538, Ann.Cas. 1917A, 86; Carswell v. Rail way Mail Ass'n, 5 Cir., 8 F.2d 612; Martin v. Interstate Business Men's Acc. Ass'n, 187 Iowa 869, 174 N.W. 577, 578; Appel's Case, Appel v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 86 App.Div. 83, 83 N.Y.S. 238; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Landsman, 5 W.W. Harr., Del., 384, 165 A. 563, 567; Shanberg v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 8 Cir., 158 F. 1, 5, 19 L.R.A.,N.S., 1206; Pledger, v. Business Men's Acc. Ass'n, Tex.Civ.App., 197 S.W. 889, 891; Rock v. Travelers' Ins. Co. 172 Cal. 462, 156 P. 1029, L.R.A.1916E, 1196; Feder v. Iowa State Trav. Men's Ass'n, 107 Iowa 538, 78 N.W. 252, 43 L. R.A. 693, 695, 70 Am.St.Rep. 212; New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Johnson, 91 Ohio St. 155, 110 N.E. 475, L.R.A.1916B, 1918; Lehman v. Great Western Acc. Ass'n, 155 Iowa 737, 133 N.W. 752, 42 L. R.A.,N.S., 562, 567; Ogilvie v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 189 Cal. 406, 209 P. 26, 26 A.L.R. 116, 120; Clarksbn v. Union Mut. Casualty Co., 201 Iowa 1249, 207 N.W. 132, 133; Smouse v. Iowa Trav. Men's Ass'n, 118 Iowa 436, 92 N.W. 53, 54.

The other column of cases hold that, where injury or death is the unusual, unexpected or unforeseen result of an intentional act, such injury or death is by accidental means, even though there is no proof of mishap, mischance, or other unusual or extraordinary circumstance in the act or event which caused such injury or death. Comprehensive statements of this persuasion may be discovered in Western Commercial Travelers' Ass'n v. Smith, 8 Cir, 85 F. 401, 405, 40 L.R.A. 653, 656; Lickleider v. Iowa Traveling Men's Ass'n, 184 Iowa 423, 166 N.W. 363, 366, 168 N. W. 884, 3 A.L.R. 1295, 1300, 1301. Compare, however, with the foregoing citations the following cases from the same State: Lehman v. Great Western Acc. Ass'n, 155 Iowa 737, 133 N.W. 752, 753, 42 L.R.A,N.S, 562, 563; Carncs v. Iowa State, etc, Ass'n, 106 Iowa 281, 76 N.W. 683, 68 Am.St.Rep. 306. Many cases may be taken from the reports which seem to hold that "accidental means" simply implies "means" producing a result which is not the natural and probable consequence of such means. The following citations are illustrative: Mchaffey v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 205 N.C. 701, 172 S.E. 331, 333; Losleben v. California State Life Ins. Co., 133 Cal.App. 550, 24 P.2d 825, 826; Robison v. United States Health & Acc. Ins. Co., 192 Ill.App. 475, 477, 478; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Staccy's Ex'r 4 Cir, 143 F. 271, 5 L.R.A,N.S, 657, 661, 6 Ann.Cas. 955; Horan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 104 Pa.Super. 474, 159 A. 69, 70; Gohlke v. Hawkeye Commercial Men's Ass'n, 198 Iowa 144, 197 N.W. 1004, 35 A. L.R. 1177, 1183; Carter v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 65 Utah 465, 238 P. 259, 41 A.L.R. 1495, 1518, 1519; Hodgson v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 100 Misc. 155, 165 N.Y.S. 293, 297; Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. v. Jordan, 1933, 227 Ala. 383, 150 So. 147, 148; Horsfall v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 32 Wash. 132, 135, 72 P. 1028, 63 L.R.A. 425, 98 Am.St.Rep. 846; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gustafson, 3 Cir, 55 F.2d 236, 237, 82 A.L.R. 729; Young v. Railway Mail Ass'n, 126 Mo.App. 325, 103 S.W. 557, 563; Moutzoukos v. Mutual Ben. Ass'n, 69 Utah 309, 254 P. 1005, 1007, 1008; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Brand, 2 Cir, 265 F. 6, 13 A. L.R. 657, 660, certiorari denied, 253 U.S. 496, 40 S.Ct. 587, 64 L.Ed. 1031; Schleicher v. General Acc, etc, Corp, 240 Ill.App. 247, 253; Horton v. Travelers Ins. Co., 45 Cal.App. 462, 187 P. 1070, 1071; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 4 Cir, 11 F.2d 486, 59 A.L.R. 1290; Continental Casualty Co. v. Willis, 4 Cir, 28 F.2d 707, 709, 61 A.L.R. 1069; Townsend v. Commercial Travelers' Acc. Ass'n, 231 N.Y. 148, 131 N.E. 871, 17 A.L.R. 1001, 1004; Woods v. Provident, etc, Co., 240 Ky. 398, 42 S.W.2d 499, 501; Zurich Gen. Acc, etc, Co. v. Flickinger, 4 Cir, 33 F.2d 853, 854, 68 A.L.R. 161; Grosvenor v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 102 Neb. 629, 168 N.W. 596, 597.

Indeed there are cases which hold that death having been caused through external and violent means, it will be presumed that the death was caused by accidental means. Baciocco v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, D. C, 22 F.2d 700, 702, affirmed, 9 Cir, 29 F.2d 966, certiorari denied, 279 U.S. 854, 49 S.Ct. 350, 73 L.Ed. 996; Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 6 Cir, 100 F. 582, 49 L.R.A. 116; Preferred Accident Insurance Co. v. Fielding, 35 Colo. 19, 83 P. 1013, 9 Ann.Cas. 916; Fort Worth Mutual...