Cramer v. Petrie

Decision Date31 August 1994
Docket NumberNo. 93-1102,93-1102
Citation70 Ohio St.3d 131,637 N.E.2d 882
PartiesCRAMER et al., Appellees, v. PETRIE, Appellant.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

An obligation to pay child support is not a "debt" within the meaning of that term in Section 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. Because this obligation does not fall within the scope of Section 15, Article I, an order to pay child support may be enforced by means of imprisonment through contempt proceedings even after the child who is the subject of the order is emancipated.

Sandra M. Cramer, appellee, and James R. Petrie, Sr., appellant, were granted a divorce by the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas on July 10, 1974. The court awarded Cramer custody of the only child born of their marriage. The child, James R. Petrie, Jr., was born May 3, 1973. The court ordered Petrie to pay child support of twenty dollars per week, plus poundage.

In the years after the divorce, Petrie consistently failed to pay child support despite repeated attempts to recover payments from him. The court issued numerous orders directing him to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for failing to obey the court's order to pay child support. At times the court issued orders to Petrie's employers directing them to withhold the support payments from Petrie's pay. On at least one occasion the court ordered Petrie to voluntarily execute an agreement to deduct the support payments from his unemployment compensation during periods of unemployment. Nevertheless, by August 1989, Petrie was in arrears to the extent of $9,795.78.

On August 5, 1991, the Hancock County Child Support Enforcement Agency (the "agency") filed a motion on behalf of Cramer seeking, among other relief, an order adjudging Petrie in contempt of court for failing to obey the court's July 10, 1974 order. The parties did not appear before the court but instead agreed to the following course of action: (1) Petrie would seek employment (after being unemployed during the entire year 1991) and report to the agency each Friday on his progress; (2) Petrie would execute a wage assignment as appropriate and pay child support in the amount of twenty dollars per week, plus poundage; and (3) a hearing would be set in ninety days to review Petrie's employment progress.

The hearing was held on January 7, 1992. By this time Petrie's son had reached the age of majority. See R.C. 3109.01 (persons of the age of eighteen years or more "are of full age for all purposes"). Following the hearing, the court of common pleas found Petrie to be in contempt of court for failing to make child support payments as previously ordered (including failing to make any payments since Petrie's earlier agreement to do so). As a result, the court sentenced Petrie to a term of sixty days in the Hancock County Justice Center, with fifty of the days suspended.

Petrie appealed on the grounds that the court of common pleas had no authority to hold contempt hearings after the emancipation of his son. Petrie claimed that imposing a jail sentence for unpaid support for a child who was emancipated amounted to imprisonment for a debt, which is contrary to Section 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.

The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the court of common pleas.

The court of appeals, finding its decision to be in conflict with the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Twelfth District in Clermont County in Thompson v. Albers (1981), 1 Ohio App.3d 139, 1 OBR 446, 439 N.E.2d 955, and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth District in Franklin County in Bauer v. Bauer (1987), 39 Ohio App.3d 39, 528 N.E.2d 964; Crigger v. Crigger (1991), 71 Ohio App.3d 410, 594 N.E.2d 67; and Martin v. Martin (1992), 76 Ohio App.3d 638, 602 N.E.2d 772, certified the record of this case to this court for review and final determination.

Sandra M. Cramer, pro se.

John A. Kissh, Jr., Toledo, for appellee Hancock County Child Support Enforcement Agency.

Firmin, Sprague & Huffman Co., L.P.A., and Thomas P. Kemp, Findlay, for appellant.

Lee I. Fisher, Atty. Gen., and Karen Lazorishak, Asst. Atty. Gen., urging affirmance for amici curiae, State of OH and OH Dept. of Human Services.

Michael Patterson, Perrysburg, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, OH Human Services Directors' Ass'n.

Kimberly C. Newsom, Newark, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, OH CSEA Directors' Ass'n WRIGHT, Justice.

The sole issue in this case is whether a court may hold a parent in contempt and impose a jail sentence for the parent's failure to comply with an order to pay child support when the child who is the subject of the order is emancipated. We hold that a court may use its contempt powers in such a manner even if the child is emancipated. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

Appellant notes that when a child is emancipated, a parent's legal obligation to support that child ends. See R.C. 3103.03. Appellant argues that when a parent's obligation to support a child no longer exists, a court may not use contempt proceedings to enforce an order directing the parent to pay child support. In this respect, appellant's argument concerns the court's jurisdiction to hold contempt proceedings.

We hold that a court has jurisdiction to hold contempt proceedings in such a situation for the reasons that follow. First, courts have inherent authority--authority that has existed since the very beginning of the common law--to compel obedience of their lawfully issued orders. Indeed, the phrase "contemptus curiae " has been a part of English law since the Twelfth Century. See Borrie & Lowe's Law of Contempt (2 Ed.1983) 1. Fundamentally, the law of contempt is intended to uphold and ensure the effective administration of justice. Of equal importance is the need to secure the dignity of the court and to affirm the supremacy of law. 1 For these reasons, a court's order must be obeyed. Accordingly, when a court finds that a father is legally obligated to pay an amount for child support and issues an order directing the father to do so, the father must either pay the amount due or show cause why he cannot. The father cannot--as appellant has apparently done--ignore the court's order and follow his own convictions.

Furthermore, we see no reason why a court's inherent authority to enforce a lawfully issued child support order must end when the child is emancipated. More is at stake than the mere nonpayment of support. Also at stake is the court's strong interest in seeing, as a general matter, that its orders are not disobeyed with impunity. This interest exists independently of the child who is the subject of the order because it concerns the exercise of the court's judicial functions and ultimately the public's confidence in the judicial system.

Second, aside from a court's inherent authority to hold contempt proceedings, the General Assembly has expressly granted courts jurisdiction to hold contempt proceedings after the obligation to support a child has ended. R.C. 2705.031 provides:

"(B)(1) Any party who has a legal claim to any support ordered for a child, spouse, or former spouse may initiate a contempt action for failure to pay the support.

" * * *

"(E) * * * The court shall have jurisdiction to make a finding of contempt for the failure to pay support and to impose the penalties set forth in section 2705.05 of the Revised Code in all cases in which past due support is at issue even if the duty to pay support has terminated * * *." (Emphasis added.)

In addition, R.C. 3113.21(M)(1) provides:

"The termination of a support obligation or a support order does not abate the power of any court to collect overdue and unpaid support or to punish any person for a failure to comply with an order of the court or to pay any support as ordered in the terminated support order."

It is certainly not surprising that the General Assembly has codified a court's authority to enforce orders to pay child support even after the child is emancipated. The state has a strong interest in improving the enforcement of child support because the public fisc is at stake. Ohio has elected to participate in the Aid for Dependent Children ("ADC") program established by Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, Section 601 et seq., Title 42, U.S.Code. As a condition to receiving federal funding for ADC, the state is obligated to obtain and enforce child support orders against noncustodial parents.

In 1975, Congress removed the child support program from Title IV-A and created a separate child support program in Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. Section 651 et seq., Title 42, U.S.Code (88 Stat. 2351). Title IV-D allows states, including Ohio, to receive federal financial assistance if they operate efficient and cost-effective child support enforcement programs. Ohio is periodically audited by the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services to determine whether it has complied with the numerous requirements of Title IV-D, requirements that have as their goal the enforcement of child support orders. If the audit reveals that Ohio has not met the federal requirements, federal financial assistance is decreased, thereby indirectly increasing the state's financial burden.

In addition, Ohio has a direct financial interest in the enforcement of child support orders. Families receiving ADC are required to...

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