Cramer v. State of Fla.
| Decision Date | 24 July 1997 |
| Docket Number | 95-2850,95-2859,Nos. 95-2660,s. 95-2660 |
| Citation | 117 F.3d 1258 |
| Parties | 7 A.D. Cases 115, 23 A.D.D. 22, 10 NDLR P 195, 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 232 Earl L. CRAMER, an individual, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated; and, Robin Kessler, an individual, and on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE OF FLORIDA; Lawton Chiles; Shirley O. Gooding; Gerald A. Lewis; Broedell Plumbing Supply, Inc., a Florida corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Russell ARQUETTE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SARASOTA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, a Sarasota County government agency, and Riscorp Management Services, Inc., a Florida corporation d/b/a Sarasota International Risk and Insurance Services, Inc., Defendants-Appellees. James E. MORRISON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JANSEN AND SONS OF FLORIDA, INC., a Florida Corporation and Florida Employers Insurance Service Corporation, a Florida Corporation, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Alex Lancaster, Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., Lancaster & Eure, Sarasota, FL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Stephanie A. Daniel, Office of the Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, FL, for State of Florida, Shirley O. Gooding, Lawton Chiles, and Gerald A. Lewis.
David A. Wallace, Frazer F. Hilder, John V. Cannon, III, Williams, Parker, Harrison, Dietz & Getzen, Sarasota, FL, for Broedell Pl., FCCI, and FL Empl. Ins. Serv. Corp.
Frank E. Brown, Zinober & McCrea, Tampa, FL, Shane T. Munoz, Brown, Clark & Walters, Sarasota, FL, for Winn-Dixie, Crawford & Co.
H. Jack Klingensmith, Brown, Clark and Walters, Sarasota, FL, for Defendants-Appellees in No. 95-2850.
A. Lamar Matthews, Jr., Arthur S. Hardy, Matthews, Hutton & Eastmoore, Sarasota, FL, Frank E. Brown, Zinober & McCrea, Tampa, FL, Shane T. Munoz, Brown, Clark & Walters, Sarasota, FL, Stephanie A. Daniel, Office of the Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, FL, for Sarasota County School Board.
John V. Cannon, III, Frazer F. Hilder, David A. Wallace, Williams, Parker, Harrison, Dietz & Getzen, Sarasota, FL, for Defendants-Appellees in No. 95-2859.
Robert Scott Newman, Joel D. Adler, Marlow, Connell, Valerius, Miami, FL, Stephanie A. Daniel, Office of the Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, FL, Frank E. Brown, Zinober & McCrea, Tampa, FL, Shane T. Munoz, Brown, Clark & Walters, Sarasota, FL, for Florida Employers Ins. Serv. Corp.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Before TJOFLAT and COX, Circuit Judges, and VINING *, Senior District Judge.
These consolidated appeals present the appellants' vague and poorly articulated claims that a myriad of defendants discriminated against them on the basis of their disabilities, in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994), by complying with the terms of Florida's workers' compensation statute. We affirm the district court's dismissal of appellants claims under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for relief. We begin with a discussion of the background leading up to these cases, then turn to an examination of what claims appellants make in their virtually indecipherable complaints, and conclude with an explanation of why we affirm the district court's judgment.
Under the Florida workers' compensation law ("the Florida law"), an employee who suffers an on-the-job injury that leaves him with a permanent partial bodily impairment is eligible for certain benefits. See Fla. Stat. § 440.15 (1993 & 1994 Supp.). The statutory scheme provides that these benefits are determined by reference to an impairment rating schedule: the higher the employee's impairment rating, as determined by the employee's physician, the more benefits the employee receives. See id. 1
Each of the appellants in these consolidated appeals was injured on the job and suffered a permanent, partial bodily impairment. In each case, the appellant's physician, after concluding that the appellant had reached "maximum medical improvement," assigned an impairment rating pursuant to the statutory scheme. Appellant Earl Cramer was dissatisfied with the level of benefits commensurate to the impairment rating assigned him--9% permanent, partial disability of the body as a whole--and filed a claim for disability benefits with the Florida Division of Workers' Compensation (the "Division"). He asked the Division to grant him benefits "equal to the same as those that were being provided to other disabled workers" on the ground that Title I of the ADA, which makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate against "qualified individuals" on account of their disabilities, effectively requires that all persons entitled to compensation benefits under a state workers' compensation law receive identical benefits. 2 Appellant Robin Kessler, after being assigned an impairment rating of 7% by her physician, also filed a claim with the Division. She sought disability benefits "equal to the eligibility provided to all other disabled workers entitled to 'impairment' benefits." 3 Appellant James Morrison's physician assigned him a 9% impairment rating. Appellant Russell Arquette's physician assigned him a 10% impairment rating. It is unclear from the complaint whether or not Morrison and Arquette filed claims in the Division challenging the level of benefits accorded to them on the basis of these disabilities.
While Cramer and Kessler's claims were pending before the Division, those appellants, having obtained right-to-sue letters from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, filed in the district court the lawsuit now before us in appeal number 95-2660. They named as defendants their respective employers, their employers' workers' compensation insurers and/or insurance servicing agents, 4 as well as the State of Florida, the Governor of Florida, the Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner of Florida, the Florida Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment Security, and the state Comptroller (the ). All of these defendants are appellees.
Although the complaint Cramer and Kessler filed does not inform us of the Division's disposition of their claims, we now know that the Division rejected Cramer's claim; that Cramer appealed its decision to the First District Court of Appeal; and that that court certified to the Supreme Court of Florida the same issue Cramer now raises: Whether the Florida law's use of impairment ratings violates Title I of the ADA. Cramer v. Brodell Plumbing Co., 661 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1st. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). We also know that the supreme court answered the question in the negative, holding that the Florida law's use of impairment ratings to determine benefits does not violate the ADA. Cramer v. Broedell Plumbing Supply, 675 So.2d 118 (Fla.1996) (citing Barry v. Burdines, 675 So.2d 587 (Fla.1996)). The Division's rejection of Cramer's claim was therefore affirmed. 5 Cramer did not petition the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari; accordingly, the individual claim he presents here has been disposed of once and for all. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1315, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 150, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923).
Cramer and Kessler's complaint is a rambling "shotgun" pleading that is so disorganized and ambiguous that it is almost impossible to discern precisely what it is that these appellants are claiming. The complaint states, in its first paragraph, that "[t]he jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under the provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act ... 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq., and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq., for the purpose of determining the question of actual controversy between the parties as herein more fully appears." 6 By citing these statutory provisions, Cramer and Kessler informed the district court that they were prosecuting ADA discrimination claims--claims that their employers had discriminated against them on account of their disabilities. The remaining defendants, they alleged, were liable for such discrimination because they "conspired" with the employers; that is, their employers discriminated against them pursuant to a conspiracy entered into by all of the defendants.
Cramer and Kessler asked that the court enter judgment "granting [them] eligibility for 'wage loss' and 'impairment disability' benefits based upon their respective disabilities and not merely upon impairment ratings." 7 What such eligibility would mean in terms of benefits was not set forth, but we presume that it would mean that appellants would receive benefits equal to those that the statutory schedule provided for the highest impairment rating. 8
Cramer and Kessler also asked the district court to enter an order modifying the impairment rating scheme of the Florida law. They contended that any benefits paid pursuant to a state workers' compensation law must be paid on the basis of the ADA definition of disability: "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of [a person's] major life activities ...; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Thus, according to the complaint, anyone meeting this definition would be entitled to the same level of benefits--that accorded the highest impairment rating. Because the appellants had not received that level of benefits, they also asked the court to order the appellees to pay them the difference between the benefits they actually received and the benefits they would have received if they had been accorded the highest impairment rating.
Perhaps sensing that the district court lacked either the capacity or the authority to modify the Florida law, Cramer and Kessler also asked the court to enter a judgment declaring that the Florida law's impairment...
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