Crampton v. Logan

• Decision Date: 25 February 1902
• Citation: 63 N.E. 51,28 Ind.App. 405
• Parties: CRAMPTON et al. v. LOGAN.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

28 Ind.App. 405

63 N.E. 51

CRAMPTON et al.

v.LOGAN.

Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 1.

Feb. 25, 1902.

Appeal from circuit court, Howard county; W. A. Mount, Judge.

Proceedings by Susan E. Logan against Ruth J. Crampton and others, administrators. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Gregory, Silverburg & Lotz, Reasoner & O'Hara, and Kirkpatrick, Morrison & McReynolds, for appellants. Blacklidge, Shirley & Wolf and Mitchell, Antrim & McClintock, for appellee.

BLACK, J.

This was an action upon a claim of the appellee, Susan E. Logan, against the estate of Isaac Crane, deceased, represented by the appellants, upon an account for services as housekeeper from August 12, 1865, to April 19, 1897, at various amounts per week at different periods; the whole account, as shown by the statement of claim, amounting to $9,110, with credits thereon, stated as amounting to about $995.50 (the credits being made by the claimant), for money received at various times from 1875 to 1895, and, as to a small portion of the credits, at dates which she said she could not state. The cause was commenced in 1897 in Miami county, and the venue was changed to the court below, where there was a trial by jury; a verdict being returned in favor of the appellee for $4,115.

It appeared in evidence that the appellee was the sister of the wife of the intestate, and went to his home at a time when he was building a new brick dwelling house, and his wife wanted some assistance; the appellee being then an unmarried woman about 20 years of age. The intestate had one child, that died in infancy. When the appellee had been so at the residence of the intestate about 2 months, his wife died. The intestate was not thereafter married again. The appellee, remaining unmarried, continued to live at the residence of the intestate, acting as his housekeeper and performing domestic services in that capacity for nearly 32 years, and until his death, at an advanced age, in August, 1897, leaving no children surviving him. In 1894 he had a stroke of paralysis, and during the latter part of his life the appellee gave him increased care and assistance. In 1897 a guardian was appointed for him, as a person of unsound mind. No services rendered after the appointment of a guardian are embraced in appellee's claim. During all the period of her service on which her claim is based she had charge of the household affairs, assuming the responsibilities and performing the labors of a housekeeper or female head of a farmer's household. No express contract between the parties relating to the appellee's services appears in evidence.

A considerable portion of the argument here has been devoted to the question as to the sufficiency of the evidence. In view of the scope of the argument and the earnestness of counsel, it may not be improper, before further reference to the facts in evidence, to state some elementary principles involved in the case: An action will not lie to recover for services, though they be beneficial, if voluntarily rendered, without expectation at the time of the performance thereof that they will be paid for; and the fact that the services have been rendered with the hope or the design on the part of the person performing them that they will be gratuitously rewarded or paid for, through the generosity of the person for whom they have been rendered, will not take the case out of the rule. It is also a general rule that where one does work or performs services for another at his request, or which he knowingly permits, availing himself thereof and accepting benefit therefrom, an agreement is implied that the latter shall pay the former what the work or services are reasonably worth. But where the person rendering services and the person for whom they are rendered are members of a family, living together as one household, and the service appertains to such condition, an implication of a promise on the part of the recipient to pay for the services does not arise from the mere rendition and acceptance thereof, but the services will be presumed to be gratuitous; and, to support a recovery therefor, the burden will be upon the plaintiff, who rendered the services, to show an express contract for compensation, or such circumstances of the services as manifest a reasonable expectation on his part of compensation therefor. This presumption affecting members of a household applies to all who actually live together as a family, however related, or whether related, or not, by blood or affinity, though the presumption may be strengthened or weakened by the closeness or distance of the relation and intimacy of the parties, as a circumstance of the case. The fact that the services were rendered, without express contract, while the parties were members of a family, living together as a household. It is sometimes said, rebuts the presumption or implication that compensation was intended for the accepted services, and raises a presumption that they were gratuitous, which may be rebutted by proof of circumstances such as justify an inference that compensation was intended. Or it may properly be said that for the services of the member of the family the law will not, as in ordinary like cases of requested or accepted services, raise an implied promise to pay, but recovery therefor may be had upon proof either of an express contract, the terms of which will control, or of an implied contract, and that to establish an implied contract the evidence must show circumstances of such potency as to overcome the prima facie presumption that the services were rendered gratuitously. The relation between members of the family in the conferring and receiving of benefits and the rendering and accepting of services appertaining to that relation is not contractual, but such benefits and services are presumed to be bestowed and rendered in the performance of duty or the manifestation of affection or kindly regard, for which remuneration is not contemplated and should not be expected by either party, being the products, as we may presume, of higher motives or impulses than desire of pecuniary reward; and for the recovery of compensation for services rendered by a member of a family, as in all other cases of recovery for services, a contract must be shown, either express or implied; and if the circumstances authorized the person rendering the services reasonably to expect payment therefor, by way of furtherance of the intention of the parties, or because reason and justice require compensation, the law will imply a contract therefor. The question as to whether or not there was either an express contract or an implied contract to pay for the services is matter of fact for the jury to determine upon the evidence; and this court, in passing upon evidence in such cases, must be guided by the well-established rule applicable in all cases, that the province of the jury to determine questions of fact must not be invaded, and their determination therein will not be disturbed if there was evidence tending to support the verdict. Hill v. Hill, 121 Ind. 255, 23 N. E. 87;Smith v. Denman, 48 Ind. 65;Cauble v. Ryman, 26 Ind. 207;Wallace v. Long, 105 Ind. 522, 5 N. E. 666, 55 Am. Rep. 222;Adams v. Adams' Adm'r, 23 Ind. 50;House v. House, 6 Ind. 60;Hays v. McConnell, 42 Ind. 285;Pitts' Adm'r v. Pitts, 21 Ind. 309;Lockwood v. Robbins, 125 Ind. 398, 25 N. E. 455;Schoonover v. Vachon, 121 Ind. 3, 22 N. E. 777;Story v. Story, 1 Ind. App. 284, 27 N. E. 573;Chamness v. Cox, 2 Ind. App. 485, 28 N. E. 777;James v. Gillen, 3 Ind. App. 472, 30 N. E. 7;Knight v. Knight, 6 Ind. App. 268, 33 N. E. 456.

The evidence, the substance of some of which we have stated, was voluminous, and in some respects conflicting. After the appellee went to live at the home of the intestate,she received about $400 for her portion of the estate of her father. This money she loaned at interest. In 1883 she purchased 20 acres of land for $750. She then received for that purpose $400 from the intestate, she at the time having other money out at interest. One of the credits given by her upon her...