Crampton v. Valido Marble Co.

Citation15 A. 153,60 Vt. 291
PartiesJOHN W. CRAMPTON, ASSIGNEE, v. VALIDO MARBLE COMPANY
Decision Date10 September 1888
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Vermont

JANUARY TERM, 1888 [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

TRESPASS on the case and trover. Trial by jury, March Term 1887, TAFT, J., presiding. Verdict for the plaintiff to recover $ 1,548.11, made up as follows: Pair of oxen, $ 162.76; one dynamo, $ 696.47; marble purchased at West Rutland, Vt., $ 260.28; marble purchased at Salem, N. Y., $ 428.60.

Lawrence & Meldon, for the plaintiff.

OPINION
VEAZEY

One important question in this case is whether the assignee in insolvency became invested under the assignment with the same right to recover the value of the marble that was in Salem, New York, as though that marble had been in Vermont when the defendant took it. It is insisted by the defendant's counsel that the contract as to that marble between the two marble companies, being valid in New York where it was made, the insolvency law of this State cannot "reach to the impairing or avoiding of that contract." Section 1820, R. L., provides: "An assignment under order of a court of insolvency shall vest in the assignee all the property of the debtor, real and personal, which he could have lawfully sold, assigned or conveyed, * * *. And the assignment shall by operation of law relate back to the date of the filing of the petition." * * * Section 1860, R. L., pronounces a transfer like the one in question "void" and gives to the assignee the right to "recover the property or the value thereof from the person so receiving, or so to be benefitted thereby. "

The contention in this case raises the old question whether an assignment in bankruptcy operates as a complete and valid transfer of all the bankrupt's movable property in other jurisdictions as well as at home; and thus give the assignee the same rights against purchasers and attaching creditors, in the one case as the other.

This question and the question as to the effect of a discharge upon non-resident or foreign creditors who have not submitted to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, have received the most careful consideration of English and American courts and of the ablest legal authors of both countries.

The opinions in some American cases contain a review and discussion of all the authorities; as in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; Cook v. Moffat, 5 HOW 295; Marsh v. Putnam, 69 Mass. 551.

The courts of England maintain the doctrine of the universal operation of an assignment upon all movable property, where-ever situated at the time of the assignment. The courts of this country are divided on the question, but the weight of American authority is considered to be in favor of confining the operation of such assignment to the state where the party is declared bankrupt or insolvent. The discussion of this vexed question has been so exhaustive, it would be but repetition to again review the cases, or to present the course of reasoning that has led the most eminent jurists to opposite results.

On examination of the cases of the United States Supreme Court, where naturally questions growing out of bankruptcy and insolvency laws would receive the most searching investigation, it will be found that the case at bar, so far as the decisions of that court are concerned, is a new one. The parties in this case are both residents of this State. The debtor company owned a marble quarry and mill in this State and another mill in Salem, New York, where some of its marble was sawed. On the day the petition in insolvency was filed, the treasurer of the creditor company, this defendant, took a transfer of certain marble and other property at the debtor's mill in this State, to apply on its debt, then having reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent; and the next day he went to Salem and for a like purpose took a like transfer of some of the marble there, and brought it back to his company's premises in this State.

The defendant stands solely on the fact that the contract for the Salem marble was made in New York. No court of that state has intervened. No special law of that state is invoked. No non-resident complains. The controversy is not between residents of different states, nor as to a debt created prior to the enactment of the insolvency law, nor as to the effect of the action of a court in another jurisdiction, touching the same matter. The difference between this case and those in the Federal and Massachusetts reports, is well pointed out in Marsh v. Putnam, 69 Mass. 551.

In many of the cases the contention has been between residents of different states. It was so in Ogden v. Saunders, supra, and the question was whether a discharge of a debtor was valid against a creditor who was a citizen of another state. It was decided in the negative. But in the opinion of Justice JOHNSON he says: "As between its own citizens, what ever be the origin of the contract, there is now no question to be made on the effect of such a discharge." It is to be noted that the court is here invoked to administer a law of this State between its own resident citizens. A quotation from the opinion of Chief Justice TANEY in Cook v. Moffat, supra, is pertinent and, as it seems to me sound: "According to established principles of jurisprudence such (insolvent) laws have always been held valid and binding within the territorial limits of the state by which they are passed, although they may act upon contracts made in another country, or upon the citizens of another nation; and they have never been considered, on that account, as an infringement upon the rights of other nations or their citizens. But beyond the limits of the state they have no force, except such as may be given to them by comity. * * But how far this comity should be extended would be exclusively a question for each state to decide for itself, by its own proper tribunal." This is but stating in substance that states may pass laws having effect within their respective limits, and binding their own courts, leaving the effect in other states to be determined by their own tribunal. If this assignee were seeking this remedy in New York then the question of comity would arise. It would be for the court there to say whether, upon the ground of comity, it would enforce a plain statutory remedy of this State as against a contract executed in that state between citizens of this State.

In Marsh v. Putnam, supra, it was held that a certificate of discharge under the insolvent law of Massachusetts is a bar to an action on a contract between two citizens of that state, though made and to be performed in another state.

In Gardner v. Lewis, 7 Gill 377, the action was trover under a statute like ours, and upon similar facts and the court in a rigorous and learned opinion sustained the plaintiff's right of recovery; holding that their courts were bound to observe and enforce the statutory provisions of their own state, and that a nation will not suffer its own citizens to evade the...

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