Cran v. Rankins

• Decision Date: 27 December 2016
• Docket Number: CV156057426S
• Citation: Cran v. Rankins, CV156057426S (Conn. Super. Dec 27, 2016)
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Doreen Cran et al. v. Mylaiah Rankins et al

Doreen Cran et al. v. Mylaiah Rankins et al

No. CV156057426S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Haven, New Haven

December 27, 2016

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#130)

Robin L. Wilson, J.

FACTS

This action arises out of a motor vehicle accident involving the plaintiffs, Doreen Cran and Dorothy Buonanni, and the defendants, Eustaquio Montalvo, Mylaiah Rankins, and Transportation General, Inc.^[1] On September 28, 2015 the plaintiffs filed a six-count complaint against the defendants for negligence and alleged the following facts. On September 22, 2013, Cran was driving on Lewis Avenue in Meriden, Connecticut, with Buonanni as a passenger, when their vehicle was struck from behind by Rankins' vehicle which caused Cran's vehicle to move forward and strike Montalvo's vehicle. Montalvo's vehicle had been fully stopped in the travel lane prior to the accident occurring. Transportation General, Inc., was Montalvo's employer at the time of the accident, and Montalvo was operating his vehicle within the scope of his employment. The plaintiffs each suffered injuries resulting from the defendants' negligence and carelessness. The plaintiffs seek money damages for the injuries sustained from the accident.

On February 17, 2016, the defendants served the plaintiffs with a request for admissions. The plaintiffs failed to respond to the request within the required thirty days as set forth in § 13-23(a) of the Practice Book and, therefore, the matters for which an admission was requested were deemed admitted.^[2] The referenced admissions state in relevant part: " 3. That the vehicle [being] operated by Mr. Montalvo either came to a complete stop in front of Doreen Cran or slowed his vehicle down while still on the travel portion of the roadway"; " 4. That when Doreen Cran saw the vehicle being operated by Mr. Montalvo slow down or stop, she came to a complete stop behind the Montalvo vehicle without making any contact to the vehicle"; " 5. That after the vehicle being operated by Doreen Cran came to a stop she was then hit from behind by a vehicle being operated by Mylaiah Rankins" " 6. That after being hit by the Rankins vehicle, the vehicle being operated by Ms. Cran moved forward and made contact with the vehicle being operated by Mr Montalvo"; " 7. That the first time that the Cran vehicle made contact with the Montalvo vehicle was after it was hit from behind by the Rankins vehicle"; " 8. That the Cran vehicle did not make any contact with the Montalvo vehicle before it was hit by the Rankins vehicle"; and " 9. That Doreen Cran was watching the road in front of her and had time to safely stop her vehicle after the Montalvo vehicle either came to a stop or slowed down without making any contact to it." See Defs.' Mem. of Law, #131, pp. 8-9. The court notes that the plaintiffs do not ask the court to set aside these admissions.

On May 25, 2016, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment as to counts two, three, five, and six of the plaintiffs' complaint, and attached a supporting memorandum of law and a copy of the plaintiffs' responses to the request for admissions. On June 6, 2016, Rankins filed an objection to the defendants' motion for summary judgment with a memorandum of law, and on June 7, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, attaching an affidavit of Cran. On June 21, 2016, the defendants filed a reply to the objections. The matter was heard at short calendar on September 12, 2016.

DISCUSSION

" A court shall render summary judgment if the pleadings affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., 286 Conn. 390, 402, 944 A.2d 925 (2008). " A material fact is one that will make a difference in the result of the case." Trotta v. Branford, 26 Conn.App. 407, 412, 601 A.2d 1036 (1992).

" The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent . . . When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue . . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).

" A cause of action in negligence is comprised of four elements: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lawrence v. O& G Industries, Inc., 319 Conn. 641, 649, 126 A.3d 569 (2015). " Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fogarty v. Rashaw, 193 Conn. 442, 446, 476 A.2d 582 (1984). " Summary judgment procedure is especially ill-adapted to negligence cases, where . . . the ultimate issue in contention involves a mixed question of fact and law, and requires the trier of fact to determine whether the standard of care was met in a specific situation . . . [T]he conclusion of negligence is necessarily one of fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Michaud v. Gurney, 168 Conn. 431, 434, 362 A.2d 857 (1975).

In the present action, the defendants argue that summary judgment is appropriate because there is no genuine issue of material fact that the elements of duty and causation cannot be established and, therefore, the plaintiffs will be unable to form a prima facie case of negligence as a matter of law. The defendants rely on evidence in the form of the request for admissions, which state that the plaintiffs' vehicle could safely stop behind the defendants' vehicle without making any contact.^[3] The defendants did not submit additional evidence. The plaintiffs do not dispute the admissions offered by the defendants, but counter that there are genuine issues of material fact as to causation, and argue that had Montalvo's vehicle not been stopped in the travel lane, Cran's vehicle would not have been brought to a stop, resulting in Rankin's vehicle striking the plaintiffs from behind.

I Duty of Care

In the present case, the defendants argue that they owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs. The defendants rely on the request for admissions. Specifically, the defendants claim that because (1) the plaintiffs admitted that Cran was able to safely stop her vehicle behind Montalvo, and (2) Cran's vehicle only hit Montalvo's vehicle after being struck from behind by Rankins' vehicle, the defendants did not owe the plaintiffs a duty of care.

" [T]he issue of whether a defendant owes a duty of care is an appropriate matter for summary judgment because the question is one of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mozeleski v. Thomas, 76 Conn.App. 287, 290, 818 A.2d 893, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 904, 823 A.2d 1221 (2003). " [O]nly if such a duty is found to exist does the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant violated that duty in the particular situation at hand . . . If a court determines, as a matter of law, that a defendant owes no duty to a plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot recover in negligence from the defendant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sic v. Nunan, 307 Conn. 399, 407, 54 A.3d 553 (2012).

" Negligence occurs where one under a duty to exercise a certain degree of care to avoid injury to others fails to do so." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bennett v Connecticut Hospice, Inc., 56 Conn.App. 134, 137, 741 A.2d 349 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 938, 747 A.2d 2 (2000). " Duty is a legal conclusion between individuals, made after the fact, and imperative to a negligence cause of action." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hargrove v. Roman, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-12-6032427-S (August 20, 2015, Wilson, J.) (60 Conn.L.Rptr. 887, 889, ).

Our courts have established that " a driver is entitled to assume that other users of the highway will obey the law, including lawful traffic regulations, and observe reasonable care, until he knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that the assumption has become unwarranted." Gross v. Boston, W.& N.Y.S. Ry. Co., 117 Conn. 589, 596, 169 A. 613 (1933); see also Riley v. Connecticut Co., 129 Conn. 554, 557, 29 A.2d 759 (1943); Sic v. Nunan, supra, 307 Conn. 408; Hargrove v. Roman, supra, 60 Conn.L.Rptr. 890, .

The defendants rely solely on the request for admissions to prove the nonexistence of a duty of care. The defendants do not provide any case law to support their argument. Our courts have established the opposite--a driver is entitled to assume that other drivers will obey the law and observe reasonable care, and that as such, a driver has a duty to drive in such a manner.

Although the defendants base their argument that they are entitled to summary judgment on whether initial contact was made between their vehicle and the plaintiffs' vehicle, they fail to acknowledge that the allegations made against them arise from Montalvo's stoppage of his vehicle in the travel portion of the roadway, or in the alternative his sudden...