Crandall v. Great N. Ry. Co.
| Citation | 86 N.W. 10,83 Minn. 190 |
| Parties | CRANDALL v. GREAT NORTHERN RY. CO. |
| Decision Date | 10 May 1901 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Minnesota (US) |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from district court, Stevens county; F. J. Steidl, Judge.
Action by Lucretia Crandall, administratrix of John Crandall, deceased, against the Great Northern Railway Company. Verdict for plaintiff. From an order overruling a demurrer, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
1. The courts of Minnesota do not take judicial notice of the common law of a sister state.
2. The common law of a sister state, in the absence of pleading and proof to the contrary, will be presumed to be the same as in the state of the forum.
3. In pleading the common law of another state it is sufficient to state as a fact what the law is, without setting out decisions of the courts. Decisions, opinions, and customs constitute the evidence of the law.
4. A complaint contained the following allegations as to the law of North Dakota: ‘That for a long time, to wit, continuously during all the times since before the said injury occurred to said deceased, as hereinafter stated, it was the law of North Dakota that railroad companies running and operating railroads should be liable and responsible for injuries occurring to their servants through negligence and carelessness of fellow servants engaged in the same employment and in the same work.’ Held to be a sufficient pleading as to the common law of that state.
5. A complaint stated it to be the custom of a railway company to operate its freight trains fully equipped with air brakes; that the company negligently placed a ‘jack’ car (one not furnished with air attachments) in the middle of a train, thereby disconnecting the air-brake system, so that in rounding an abrupt curve the coupling of the ‘jack’ car broke, and the train divided; that when the first part of the train was brought to a stop, and while a brakeman was, in the performance of his duties, uncoupling the engine and the first car, the rear portion collided with the forward part, thereby causing the injury. Held, that the complaint states a cause of action, and that the proximate cause of the injury lay in thus segregating the automatic system, leaving the end of the train beyond the control of the engineer. W. E. Dodge and E. L. Sutton, for appellant.
Lewis C. Spooner and Marshall A. Spooner, for respondent.
The complaint alleges that John Crandall, plaintiff's intestate, was in defendant's employ as a brakeman on one of its freight trains; that it was the custom of defendant to use automatic air brakes upon all of its freight trains, and in making up trains to provide that cars not so equipped be placed in the rear; that upon this occasion, contrary to its rule, defendant placed a certain freight car, not so provided, in the middle of a freight train made up of about 40 cars, which was otherwise completely equipped with automatic air brakes; that the effect of placing such car, known as a ‘jack’ car, midway in the train, was that in rounding a sharp curve the coupling of this car broke, dividing the train into two parts; that, when the engineer brought the front portion of the train to a standstill, Crandall, in the performance of his duties as brakeman, was required to go between the engine and first car for the purpose of uncoupling the same, and while so engaged the rear portion of the train came on, colliding with and driving the front portion against the engine, causing the injuries from which death ensued. The specific act of negligence charged against appellant is the breaking of its system of air attachments on the train, by reason of which, when rounding the curve, the back portion broke loose from its forward part,...
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