Crandall v. Woodard
| Citation | 206 Va. 321,143 S.E.2d 923 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Virginia |
| Decision Date | 10 September 1965 |
| Parties | W. W. CRANDALL v. William W. WOODARD, Jr., et al. |
George E. Allen, Richmond, Allen, Allen, Allen & Allen, Richmond, on brief, for plaintiff in error.
L. Paul Byrne, Richmond, (George F. Tidey, Bremner, Merhige, Byrne, Montgomery & Baber, Richmond, on brief), for defendant in error.
Before EGGLESTON, C. J., and SPRATLEY, BUCHANAN, SNEAD, I'ANSON, CARRICO, and GORDON, JJ.
The plaintiff, W. W. Crandall, instituted this action by a motion for judgment, seeking to recover from the defendants, William W. Woodard, Jr. and Le-Wood Homes, Incorporated, damages in the sum of $75,000.00. He alleged that defendants had wilfully and maliciously destroyed certain of his personal property, that is, a continuous laminating press and its necessary attachments and accessories.
The defendants, jointly and severally, filed an answer denying that they were indebted to the plaintiff in any amount. They averred further that they intended 'to rely upon any and all proper proof of defense' and reserved 'the right to alter, amend or modify such pleadings as they may be advised, up to and including the day of trial.'
A jury was empaneled, and at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, a motion of the defendants to strike the evidence, and enter judgment in their favor, on the ground that plaintiff had failed to show that he had either title, or the right of possession, to the personal property involved, was overruled. At the conclusion of all the evidence, defendants renewed their motion to strike, upon the same ground, and the motion was sustained. Summary judgment was then entered for defendants.
The sole assignment of error by plaintiff is that the court erred in its ruling, 'since the evidence was entirely sufficient to require it to submit the issue of liability to the jury.'
In his brief, plaintiff argues that the evidence was sufficient to present to the jury the question whether he had title to, or such interest in, the property involved as made it subject to a bailment.
The facts are without material conflict:
The Crandall Corporation of Virginia, of which plaintiff was President, was the owner of certain real estate, with improvements thereon, together with certain personal property, constituting its manufacturing plant at Doswell, Virginia. Small Business Administration, [SBA] an agency of the Federal Government, was the holder of a note evidencing a loan made to the Crandall Corporation, which note was secured by a deed of trust executed by that corporation, conveying its real and personal property to a trustee. The corporation failed to pay the note at its maturity, and at the request of SBA, the trustee, after due advertisement, held a foreclosure sale of the property conveyed in the deed of trust.
The sale, held on November 20, 1961, was conducted by auctioneers employed by the trustee. Prior to the sale, they furnished prospective purchasers with a brochure setting out the terms and conditions thereof. On the day of the sale, they further read aloud to the persons assembled the provisions of the brochure.
The terms and conditions required 'a deposit of 25% of the purchase price payable in currency or certified check payable to the order of the auctioneers at the time of recordation of highest offer, balance payable in a similar manner within twenty-four hours after ratification of sale and/or sales.'
The brochure further stated:
Crandall and W. W. Woodard, Jr., President and agent of Le-Wood Homes, Inc., were present at the sale. The real property was knocked down to Woodard for the sum of $68,000.00. He immediately made the required down payment of 25%. Crandall was the highest bidder on five lots of personal property. One lot included the laminating press with its attachments and accessories. His total bids aggregated $6,320.00, which included $4,000.00 bid on the press. He promptly made a down payment of 25% or $1,580.00 on the day of sale.
Crandall testified that prior to the purchase of the personal property by him and of the real estate by Woodard, he asked Woodard that, if he [Woodard] purchased the real estate, and he [Crandall] purchased the personal property, would Woodard permit him to leave the press in the plant until he [Crandall] could make arrangements to remove it. He said that Woodard replied that:
Woodard denied that he had any such conversation with Crandall prior to the sale, or that he had ever made any agreement with the latter as to the disposition of any personal property which might be purchased by Crandall. There is no claim that the two men discussed the matter after the auction sale.
On November 21, 1961, twenty-four hours after his bids were accepted, Crandall did not comply with the terms and conditions of the sale by paying the balance of 75% due on the property upon which he was the successful bidder.
On November 22, 1961, two days after the sale, G. D. Holden, trustee, and Chief of the Regional Financial Assistance Division of SBA, wrote to Crandall by certified mail, called the attention of the latter to his failure to make the payment in question, and demanded the 'immediate full payment of the balance due.'
Crandall, by letter of the same date, November 22, 1961, requested SBA to allow the balance due from him 'to be paid on a deferred basis.' On November 28, 1961, he was advised by letter from SBA that his request could not be granted.
On November 29, 1961, the trustee again wrote Crandall, saying that (Emphasis added.)
On December 11, 1961, Edwin J. Slipek, counsel for SBA, wrote plaintiff, enclosing copies of the trustee's letters of November 22 and 29, 1961, thereby reaffirming both the election of the trustee to resell the property, and the denial by SBA of the request of Crandall to be allowed to make payment on a 'deferred basis.'
Subsequent to the receipt of the last mentioned letter, Crandall made several fruitless efforts to obtain funds to pay the balance due by him. Finally, he advised Slipek that it was impossible for him to make the payment.
On January 2, 1962, Slipek advised Crandall in a telephone conversation that the real property involved would be conveyed to the purchaser on January 3, 1962; that the trustee was 'restive and anxious' to close the machinery sale; and that the time was fast approaching when Crandall's request for more time could not be heeded.
The defendants had been instructed, immediately after the auction sale, by SBA not to permit any equipment, remaining in the building purchased by them, to be removed without its permission. The key to the building was retained by SBA, the consummation of its sale being delayed by a controversy over taxes due thereon.
The laminating press, with its attachments, was a large, heavy machine used for pressing together three layers of wood 18 feet long. Its length was estimated at from 60 to 70 feet, and picture exhibits showed that it was several yards high and several feet wide.
On January 3, 1962, the trustee conveyed the real estate to Commonwealth Land Corporation, nominee of the defendants, and actual possession of the premises by the grantee was taken on that day.
Defendants advised SBA that while there was no immediate necessity for the removal of the laminating press, they contemplated that the floor space occupied by it would be needed by them in a very short time, possibly two weeks; and they, therefore, desired either to have the machine removed, or to be given permission to remove the same out of the way. Subsequently, defendants made several inquiries of the trustee and SBA about the removal of the machine.
Slipek said that on January 22, 1962, he advised plaintiff that SBA and the trustee ...
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