Crane Hollow, Inc. v. Marathon Ashland Pipe Line

• Decision Date: 06 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99CA16,99CA17 and 99CA18.,99CA16
• Citation: 740 NE 2d 328,138 Ohio App.3d 57
• Parties: CRANE HOLLOW, INC. et al., Appellants, v. MARATHON ASHLAND PIPE LINE, LLC et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

138 Ohio App.3d 57

740 NE 2d 328

CRANE HOLLOW, INC. et al., Appellants, v. MARATHON ASHLAND PIPE LINE, LLC et al., Appellees.

Nos. 99CA16, 99CA17 and 99CA18.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Hocking County.

Decided June 6, 2000.

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Mark R. Riegel and D. Joe Griffith, for appellants.

John P. Lavelle, for appellees.

Nan M. Still, for amicus curiae in favor of appellants.

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KLINE, Presiding Judge.

Crane Hollow, Inc., the Metropolitan Park District of Columbus ("Metro Parks"), and a group of Hocking County landowners appeal the Hocking County Court of Common Pleas' decision and judgment entry in favor of Marathon Ashland Pipe Line, LLC and Ohio River Pipe Line, LLC (collectively "Marathon"). Crane Hollow, Metro Parks and the other landowners assert that the trial court's judgment regarding the width of the Marathon's easement is against the manifest weight of the evidence and that its finding that the easement was not abandoned is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree, because the record contains some competent, credible evidence supporting these findings. Crane Hollow, Metro Parks and the other landowners also assert that the trial court abused its discretion by expanding the width of the easement in some areas. We disagree, because the trial court acted pursuant to its equitable jurisdiction and did not act arbitrarily, unreasonably, or unconscionably. Finally, Crane Hollow, Metro Parks, and the landowners assert that the trial court erred in determining that the Cooperative Agreement between Marathon and Metro Parks did not apply to the easement. We disagree, because the contract is ambiguous as a matter of law and because the trial court's factual determination that the parties did not intend to include the easement in the Cooperative Agreement is supported by some competent, credible evidence.

Accordingly, we overrule each of Crane Hollow, Metro Parks, and the other landowners' assignments of error and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I

Marathon recently acquired an existing easement, originally granted to the Ohio Fuel Supply Company, that crosses the properties of Crane Hollow, Metro Parks, Big Brothers/Big Sisters Association of Greater Columbus, Michael Daniels, Kirk and Debra Pierce, Larry Menchhofer, Barbara Holt, Julie Guda, Dennis Savage, Barbara Andreas, and Thomas and Teresa Amerine (collectively, "the landowners"). The grant provides the easement owner with "the right to lay a pipeline, and maintain, operate, repair, replace, and remove the same * * * and change the size of its pipes * * *." The grant requires the easement owner to pay for any damages to crops or fences arising from its exercise of this right. The grant further provides the easement owner with "the right at any time to lay, maintain, operate, repair, replace and remove a second line of pipe along side of the first line, upon the payment of a like consideration, and subject to the same conditions * * *." The granting document does not describe the easement's width. The Ohio Fuel Supply Company acquired the easement in approximately 1916 and installed the buried pipeline known as the FR-25.

The FR-25 was used for the transportation of natural gas from 1916 until 1986, when its owner and Marathon's direct predecessor in interest, Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation, capped off portions of the FR-25 due to deterioration. When Marathon acquired the FR-25 easement from Columbia, it notified the landowners of its intent to replace the FR-25 with a modern pipeline capable of carrying liquid petroleum. Marathon further notified the landowners that it would remove all trees within seventy-five feet of the FR-25 in order to replace it, and that it would maintain a fifty-foot clearing for maintenance purposes.

The ensuing dispute prompted the parties to file three separate lawsuits in the trial court, each seeking injunctions or declaratory relief. The trial court consolidated the three actions and conducted a bench trial.

At trial, the landowners presented evidence of numerous large trees growing within seventy-five feet of the FR-25. They also presented evidence that portions of the FR-25 had not been used since 1986, and that it had rust holes in it. Additionally, they presented evidence that Columbia executed an agreement with Metro Parks (the "Cooperative Agreement") that altered and limited the rights associated with the FR-25 on a few properties.

Marathon submitted historical evidence that large trees were used as forms for putting fire bends in pipes and as leverage anchors for moving heavy sections of pipe when the FR-25 was constructed. Large groups of men assisted by teams of oxen and horses constructed the FR-25. The construction process required a great deal of space to accommodate the men, animals, materials, and equipment.

Austin Cramer, a former Columbia employee who was in charge of maintaining the northern portion of the FR-25 from 1979 through 1995, testified that he cleared small trees and brush in a fifty-foot-wide strip surrounding the FR-25 on a regular basis. Cramer stated that he left large trees in place to avoid damaging the FR-25. Marathon submitted Cramer's detailed daily logbooks in which he recorded his clearing activities. Cramer also testified about his coworker's clearing activities that occurred on the southern portion of the FR-25.

Finally, Marathon presented evidence that the Cooperative Agreement applied only to pipelines that are part of the Crawford Storage Field and that the FR-25, while in the vicinity of the Crawford Storage Field, is not part of the Crawford Storage Field.

The trial court found that Marathon established, based upon its predecessor's use and the landowners' acquiescence, that the easement is fifty feet wide. The trial court further found that the width of the construction easement was established at seventy-five feet based upon use and acquiescence. The trial court also found that Columbia did not abandon the easement when it took the FR-25 out of service. Finally, the trial court found that the Cooperative Agreement did not apply to the FR-25 pipeline.

The landowners appeal, asserting the following assignments of error:

"I. The trial court's decision that the width of the FR-25 easement was 50 feet based upon use and that the line was originally constructed in 1916 using 75 feet was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

"II. The trial court abused its discretion by expanding the width of the easement established by historical use and acquiescence.

"III. The trial court's decision that the FR-25 easement was not abandoned on the property of appellants Daniels, Pierce and Metro Parks was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

"IV. It was plain error for the trial court to conclude that the Cooperative Agreement between Columbus and Franklin County Metropolitan Park District and Columbia Gas did not prohibit or restrict the proposed replacement of the FR-25 line with Clear Creek Metro Park and that the Cooperative Agreement had been surrendered."

II

In their first assignment of error, the landowners assert that the trial court's determinations that Marathon's predecessors (1) maintained the easement at a width of fifty feet and (2) used an area seventy-five feet in width to construct the FR-25 were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

A reviewing court will not reverse a judgment as being against the manifest weight of the evidence when the judgment is supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 8 O.O.3d 261, 376 N.E.2d 578, syllabus. When conducting its review, an appellate court must make every reasonable presumption in favor of the trial court's findings of fact. Myers v. Garson (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 610, 614, 614 N.E.2d 742, 745; Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 10 OBR 408, 410-411, 461 N.E.2d 1273, 1276-1277.

An easement is an interest in the land of another, created by prescription or express or implied grant, that entitles the owner of the easement, the dominant estate, to a limited use of the land in which the interest exists, the servient estate. Alban v. R.K. Co. (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 229, 231, 44 O.O.2d 198, 200, 239 N.E.2d 22, 23-24; Yeager v. Tuning (1908), 79 Ohio St. 121, 124, 86 N.E. 657, 658; Wray v. Wymer (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 122, 130, 601 N.E.2d 503, 508. When an easement is created by an express grant, the extent and limitations upon the dominant estate's use of the land depend upon the language in the grant. Alban at 232, 44 O.O.2d at 200-201, 239 N.E.2d at 24; Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. v. Bennett (1990), 71 Ohio App.3d 307, 318, 594 N.E.2d 1, 7-8.

The grant of an easement includes the grant of all things necessary for the dominant estate to use and enjoy the easement. Day, Williams & Co. v. RR. Co. (1884), 41 Ohio St. 392, 1884 WL 137; Roebuck v. Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. (1977), 57 Ohio App.2d 217, 224, 11 O.O.3d 256, 259-260, 386 N.E.2d 1363, 1368; Turner v. Nichols (Nov. 20, 1998), Washington App. No. 97CA41, unreported, 1998 WL 833588. Thus, in determining the nature and extent of an easement, the court should construe the easement in a manner that permits the dominant estate to carry out its purpose. Alban at 233, 44 O.O.2d at 201, 239 N.E.2d at 24-25. "Permission to lay pipes includes the right to enter and dig the land to lay them." Roebuck at 224, 11 O.O.3d at 260, 386 N.E.2d at 1368. Where the dimensions of the easement are not expressed in the granting instrument, the court determines the dimensions from (1) the language of the grant, (2) the circumstances surrounding the transaction,...