Crane v. Crane

Citation57 Ala.App. 685,331 So.2d 699
PartiesGeorge W. CRANE v. Frances Watts CRANE. Civ. 714.
Decision Date05 May 1976
CourtAlabama Court of Civil Appeals

E. Farley Moody, II, Birmingham, for appellant.

W. S. Pritchard, Jr., Birmingham, for appellee.

BRADLEY, Judge.

This is an appeal by the husband from a property division contained in a divorce decree. The divorce was granted on the ground of incompatibility by the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, subsequent to a hearing at which oral testimony was taken.

The decree granted the wife the family residence, originally costing $24,750, and all furniture, fixtures and equipment located therein, subject to the oustanding mortgage of $8,234.78, and a 1969 Oldsmobile. The husband was awarded $3,000 cash to be paid by the wife for the husband's interest in the property.

In addition the parties kept some personal property not disposed of by the decree: the wife kept $2,000 in a personal checking account and $2,500 in a savings account; the husband kept $800 in a checking account and a Buick automobile. In addition the husband kept two insurance policies worth $6,000; however, the record is not clear as to whether this is the face or cash value of the policies.

On appeal the husband argues that the award is inequitable in that the wife received a disproportionately large share of the property in a no-fault divorce.

A division of property in a divorce proceeding does not have to be equal; it should be equitable, Hicks v. Hicks, 52 Ala.App. 586, 296 So.2d 180. Examination of the record convinces us that the trial court's decree was not lacking in equity.

Since the outset of the marriage, the parties have maintained a joint checking account. The parties deposited into this account substantially all of their net earnings, except on certain occasions described below. Out of this joint checking account were paid the mortgage, premiums on insurance policies, household expenses, and personal expenses of the parties. The inference to be drawn from the testimony in the record is that, for the most part, this joint checking account was the conduit through which the parties translated their wages and earnings into the accumulated property disposed of by the decree now on appeal.

Contributions of funds to the joint account have, with few exceptions, been commensurate with the respective incomes earned by the parties at their jobs. The wife had worked constantly throughout the years of marriage, except for two years in the early 1950's when the only child was born. The husband, a salesman, worked regularly until 1971. In that year the company he worked for changed ownership and he was terminated in the resultant general shake-up by the new management. Between 1971 and 1974 he worked intermittently for several employers. Since September 1974 he has not worked at all. No income records are in evidence for the pre-1971 period. However, documentary evidence shows that since 1971 the wife has earned $33,432.02 while the husband's net earnings were $15,017.58. During two years of this period the wife deposited $2,500 of her earnings into a personal savings account not shared with the husband. It is her testimony that, other than this, she deposited the entire amount of her income into the joint account. The husband testified without elaboration that sometimes the wife did not so deposit her entire income. The husband further testified that he deposited all of his net earnings into the joint account.

An itemized list of deposits and withdrawals from the joint account for the year 1974 shows that the husband deposited $2,767.74 while he withdrew $3,982.96. The withdrawals were primarily for personal expenses including dues at Green Valley Contry Club and a payment of $587.00 to the husband's mother. None of the withdrawals made by the husband were mortgage payments on the family home.

The conclusion which must be drawn from the record is that from 1971 to the present the wife, not the husband, has been the major contributor of funds to the joint account. As noted above, this account provided the revenue which paid for the property accumulated during marriage.

In addition to the approximately $1,200 by which his withdrawals from the checking account exceeded his deposits, the husband cashed in two life insurance policies, the premiums of which were paid out of the joint account. He kept the entire $1,400 proceeds from one policy and deposited the $4,700 received from the other into the joint account. According to the wife the husband used his share of this money for personal and travel expenses. Moreover, the husband has completely retained the two previously referred-to insurance...

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4 cases
  • Nix v. Nix
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • August 3, 1977
    ...be equal but must be graduated to the nature of the case. Dickson v. Dickson, 57 Ala.App. 732, 331 So.2d 740 (1976); Crane v. Crane, 57 Ala.App. 685, 331 So.2d 699 (1976). We have examined the cases cited by able counsel for the husband and do not find this case to be within the category of......
  • Dowdy v. Dowdy
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • June 19, 1985
    ...stated that division of property in a divorce proceeding does not have to be equal, but should be equitable. Crane v. Crane, 57 Ala.App. 685, 331 So.2d 699 (Ala.Civ.App.1976). Further, "[t]he division of property, after consideration of equities and contribution by the parties, is a matter ......
  • Thomas v. Thomas
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • August 20, 1980
    ...53, 134 So.2d 205 (1961). Also, a property division is not required to be equal but it does have to be equitable. Crane v. Crane, 57 Ala.App. 685, 331 So.2d 699 (1976). And such awards made after an oral hearing before the trial court are presumed correct and will be set aside only for gros......
  • Griffin v. Griffin
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • October 20, 1976
    ...source of funds which purchased the property in question and have considered this factor in arriving at the decree. See Crane v. Crane, 57 Ala.App. 685, 331 So.2d 699. Additionally, the husband's problem with alcoholism may well have been a contributory factor in the trial court's conclusio......

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