Crane v. Reeder

• Decision Date: 10 July 1872
• Citation: 25 Mich. 303
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Walter Crane v. Edwin Reeder and another

25 Mich. 303

Walter Crane v. Edwin Reeder and another

Supreme Court of Michigan

July 10, 1872

Heard May 17, 1872

Error to Wayne Circuit.

Judgment reversed, with costs, and a new trial ordered.

Samuel T. Douglass, William P. Wells and George E. Hand, for plaintiff in error.

D. B & H. M. Duffield, Henry M. Cheever and Theodore Romeyn for defendants in error.

OPINION

Cooley, J.

The plaintiff in this case claims the lands in controversy under a purchase of the same from the State of Michigan, as lands which had escheated to the territory of Michigan by reason either of the alienage of John Harvey, the patentee of the lands, or, if he was a citizen, then by reason of his death or the death of his only child, Maria Yorke Harvey, without heirs-at-law. The lands lie in the vicinity of Detroit. Harvey's patent bore date in 1811, but it was issued to give complete effect to the confirmation to him of a claim which he had purchased from a prior occupant in 1801, and which was confirmed by the Land Board in 1807. It is conceded that John Harvey was an Englishman by birth, but the period of his emigration to this country was in dispute. The defendants claimed that he was resident at Detroit on the 19th day of November, 1794; the plaintiff denied this, and claimed to have shown by evidence that he came to this country several years later. The time was important, inasmuch as it was insisted, on behalf of the defense, that John Harvey, being a resident of Detroit before and at the time of the evacuation of the Territory of Michigan under the provisions of Jay's treaty, and continuing to reside there afterwards for many years, without having declared his intention to remain a British subject thereby became a citizen of the United States, by force of the provisions of that treaty.

The disputed question of fact, whether John Harvey resided in the Territory of Michigan as early as the defendants claimed was determined by the jury in the affirmative; and assuming this to be established, and that he continued to reside there afterwards, without at any time prior to June 1, 1797, declaring his intention to remain a British subject, we have no doubt he became, ipso facto, for all purposes, an American citizen. The second article of Jay's treaty of 1794, provided that his Britannic Majesty should withdraw all his troops and garrisons from all posts and places within the boundary lines assigned by the treaty of peace to the United States, on or before the first day of June, 1796; that all settlers and traders within the precincts or jurisdiction of the said posts, should continue to enjoy, unmolested, all their property of every kind, and be protected therein; that they should be at full liberty to remain there, or to remove with all or any part of their effects, and that it should also be free to them to sell their lands, houses, or effects, or to retain the property thereof, at their discretion; that such of them as should continue to reside within the said boundary lines should not be compelled to become citizens of the United States, or to take any oath of allegiance to the government thereof, but they should be at full liberty to do so, making and declaring their election within one year after the evacuation aforesaid. And all persons who should continue there, after the expiration of the said year, without having declared their intention of remaining subjects of his Britannic Majesty, should be considered as having elected to become citizens of the United States. The language of this article seems to be plain and its meaning evident; and we do not understand the parties to disagree at all concerning its construction. Its purpose was to secure to the residents within that portion of the Territory conceded to the United States by the treaty of peace, the same right to elect their allegiance which they would have had if possession had been surrendered to the United States immediately on the conclusion of peace. The election to become citizens of the United States, which would be evidenced by their remaining within the Territory for the time limited without declaring a different intent, made them citizens immediately, without any formality or ceremony whatsoever. As regards this Territory, the revolution in government was not complete until such evacuation; and the right of election, which exists in all such cases (Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. 122), could not sooner have been exercised.

The parties do disagree, however, concerning the effect of this treaty, and the naturalization of John Harvey under the same, upon the alienage of Maria Yorke Harvey, the daughter of John Harvey, begotton before he emigrated from England, and born in that country before the 14th day of April, 1802. The disputed question here arises under the fourth section of the act of Congress of the date last mentioned, which is as follows: "The children of persons duly naturalized under any of the laws of the United States, or who, previous to the passing of any law on that subject, by the government of the United States, may have become citizens of any one of the said States, under the laws thereof, being under the age of twenty-one years, at the time of their parents being so naturalized or admitted to the rights of citizenship, shall, if dwelling in the United States, be considered as citizens of the United States; and the children of persons who now are or have been citizens of the United States, shall, though born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, be considered as citizens of the United States: Provided," etc.

The section of the act of Congress which we have quoted is not so clear in its meaning as might be desirable, and there is some difficulty in satisfying ourselves precisely what classes were meant to be provided for by it. The difficulty, however, does not arise under the first clause of the section. That clause takes up the case of persons "duly naturalized under any of the laws of the United States," or who, previous to the passing of any law on that subject by the government of the United States, had become citizens of any of the States under its laws, and makes their children residing within the United States and under twenty-one years of age at the time of the parent's being so naturalized or admitted to citizenship, citizens also. Maria Yorke Harvey did not become a citizen under this clause, because she did not reside in this country, and never had, up to the first day of June, 1797, when her father became a citizen, if he ever did. If her residence had been here, I see no reason why she would not have been naturalized under this law, if her father became a citizen under Jay's treaty. Of this there could be no question, unless the expression, "duly naturalized under any of the laws of the United States," is to have a construction which shall confine its operations to those who became citizens through the forms of naturalization under an act of Congress. But a treaty is just as much a "law of the United States" as an act of Congress (Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199); and there is nothing in the language here used, or in the nature of the case, which would lead to the inference that this provision of the act of 1802 was intended to apply to those made citizens under statutory laws only. On the other hand, the language is not only broad enough to embrace treaties, which by the constitution are declared to be, equally with statutes, the law of the land, but there was every reason why the naturalization of the head of the family should embrace his minor children resident within the country, in the one case just as much as in the other. The purpose of the provision was broad and liberal, and it should not have a narrow and limited construction, even if its language would admit of it, which we do not think is the case.

The question remains, whether Maria Yorke Harvey became a citizen under the second clause of this fourth section of the act of 1802, assuming that her father became a citizen under Jay's treaty. That clause is, "The children of persons who now are or have been citizens of the United States, shall, though born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, be considered as citizens of the United States." The proposition admits the citizenship of John Harvey at the passage of this act, and it is conceded that the daughter was born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States. Maria Yorke Harvey, it is therefore claimed, is within the terms of this provision. But does this clause embrace the case of children born abroad to alien parents, even though their parents became citizens subsequently? Attention to its terms will show that it contains no restriction as to the age of the child, and none as to its residence within the country; so that if it embraces the case of children born abroad to aliens subsequently naturalized, it may make citizens of those who were never domiciled in the country, and who, being of an age to act and judge for themselves, have never desired such citizenship. There is no reason whatever for conferring this right upon such persons: the previous clause, which made the naturalization of the parents confer citizenship upon their children under age and residing in this country, was sufficiently liberal; but there was good reason why the accident of being born abroad should not deprive the children of citizens, of the rights which would have been theirs had they been within the country. The first naturalization law--that of 1790--had provided for their case in these words: "And the children of citizens of the United States that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States shall be considered as natural born citizens." The...