Crane v. Utah Dep't of Corr.
Decision Date | 28 September 2017 |
Docket Number | Case No. 2:16-CV-1103 DN |
Parties | JANET CRANE, as Administrator of the Estate of BROCK TURNER, Plaintiff, v. UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ALFRED BIGELOW, RICHARD GARDEN, DON TAYLOR, OFFICER COX, BRENT PLATT, SUSAN BURKE, FUTURES THROUGH CHOICES, INC., UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., and JEREMY COTTLE, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Utah |
Plaintiff, Janet Crane, as Administrator of the Estate of Brock Turner, filed a pro se civil-rights complaint, see 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (2017). The case stems from BrockTurner's suicide while in state custody.
Defendants Futures Through Choices (FTC) and Jeremy Cottle have moved separately to be dismissed from the case. The se motions are granted, but on grounds different than those argued in the motions.1 These grounds are raised sua sponte by the court.
In evaluating the propriety of dismissing a defendant for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, all well-pleaded factual assertions are taken as true and regarded in a light most advantageous to the plaintiff. Ridge at Red Hawk L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007). Dismissal is appropriate when, viewing those facts as true, the plaintiff has not posed a "plausible" right to relief. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247-48 (10th Cir. 2008). "The burden is on the plaintiff to frame a 'complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest' that he or she is entitled to relief." Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1247 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). When a civil rights complaint contains "bare assertions," involving "nothing more than a 'formulaic recitation of the elements' of a constitutional . . . claim," the Court considers those assertions "conclusory and not entitled to" an assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-55). In other words, "the mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims." Red Hawk, 493 F.3d at 1177 (italics in original).
The Fourth Claim for Relief in the Amended Complaint (at p. 30) lumps together several defendants, including FTC and Cottle, as Utah Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) Defendants. Otherwise, there are few allegations directly stated against FTC and Cottle.
In identifying FTC, the Amended Complaint states:
Defendant [FTC] is a private 501(c)(3) corporation, located in Bountiful, Utah. At all relevant times, FTC was operating under contract with DCFS, received juveniles via in-custody detention, and was acting under color of law. At all relevant times, FTC employed the staff member(s) who physically assaulted Brock while Brock was involuntarily confined at its facility in 2008.
(See Docket Entry # 39, ¶ 30.)
Regarding Cottle, the Amended Complaint reads:
[Defendant Cottle], at all relevant times, was the CEO and Managing Director of Provo Canyon School, who failed to provide adequate mental health treatment to Brock, failed to provide reasonably safe conditions of confinement, failed to adequately train and supervise the staff, and further failed to protect Brock from being subjected to inhumane conditions as well as from being physically attacked by staff members.
(See id., at ¶ 16.) Other than this, Defendant Cottle is not mentioned by name in the Amended Complaint.
No individual FTC staff members are named in the Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint does allege in the Factual Background and Fourth Claim for Relief that individual FTC staff members attacked Brock (Amended Complaint, at ¶¶ 14, 31, and 132) and but never names them.
(See Amended Complaint, at ¶ 123.)
The allegations against FTC and Cottle fail, for different reasons.
FTC was contracted by a state agency, DCFS; so, this Order assumes, without deciding, that FTC is named in the Amended Complaint as an arm of the State of Utah. Otherwise, this private entity could not be sued under § 1983 ( ).
As to claims against the State, generally, the Eleventh Amendment prevents "suits against a state unless it has waived its immunity or consented to suit, or if Congress has validly abrogated the state's immunity." Ray v. McGill, No. CIV-06-0334-HE, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51632, at *8 (W.D. Okla. July 26, 2006) (unpublished) (citing Lujan v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 F.3d 1511, 1522 (10th Cir. 1995); Eastwood v. Dep't of Corrs., 846 F.2d 627, 631 (10th Cir. 1988)). Plaintiff asserts no basis for concluding that the State has waived its immunity or that its immunity has been legislatively abrogated. Because any claims against the State are precluded by Eleventh Amendment immunity, this court has no subject-matter jurisdiction to consider them. See id. at *9. Therefore, the § 1983 claim against FTC must be dismissed.
Defendant Cottle is named only in a passive capacity as director of Provo Canyon School (PCS). There are no assertions that he even knew of Brock or Brock's PCS stay, or had any personalinvolvement with or knowledge of Brock or the assaults. And so Plaintiff's claim against him has no factual support.
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a § 1983 claim must clearly state what each individual defendant did to violate Plaintiff's civil rights. See Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1976) ( ). "To state a claim, a complaint must 'make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom.'" Stone v. Albert, No. 08-2222, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 15944, at *4 (10th Cir. July 20, 2009) (unpublished) (emphasis in original) (quoting Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1250). Moreover, Plaintiff may not name an entity or individual as a defendant based solely on supervisory position. See Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996) ( ). Plaintiff disregarded these tenets in drafting this claim against Defendant Cottle and the claim is therefore dismissed.
The Sixth Claim for Relief alleges a claim against all defendants under Article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution. It states in pertinent part, "Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor." The Tenth Circuit set forth the requirements of such a claim:
Brown v. Larsen, 653 Fed. Appx. 577, 578-579 (10th Cir. 2016).
Plaintiff includes FTC and Cottle in her unnecessary-rigor claim against without alleging they did anything. The true culprits of these allegations are "unknown Defendants." Guerrero v. Crowther, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53803, at *9 (D. Utah Apr. 6, 2017) (quotation marks & citation omitted). Plaintiff's allegations that FTC and Cottle failed to protect Brock from...
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