Cranford Co. v. City of New York, 112.
Decision Date | 10 February 1930 |
Docket Number | No. 112.,112. |
Citation | 38 F.2d 52 |
Parties | CRANFORD CO. v. CITY OF NEW YORK. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Kellogg & Rose, of New York City (Franklin Nevius and Asa B. Kellogg, both of New York City, of counsel), for appellant.
Arthur J. W. Hilly, Corp. Counsel, of New York City (J. Joseph Lilly, Joseph T. Flynn, and Cornelius Bregoff, all of New York City, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.
Before MANTON, L. HAND, and MACK, Circuit Judges.
Both parties to this action appeal from a judgment entered by plaintiff for breach of contract. The parties contracted for building a subway railroad in the city of New York. Two items are brought into question here on the plaintiff's appeal, and an item of interest, allowed on the jury's award, is complained of by the defendant. After the judgment was entered, the city of New York stipulated to and did pay the award, except the interest item, and it was agreed that the payment and its acceptance would be without prejudice to the defendant's right to a review of the ruling allowing interest, and also the plaintiff's right to review rulings of the trial judge disallowing two items of plaintiff's claims.
The first of these was a claim for payment for concrete laid under permanent street surface and curbs, in the amount of $14,325.20; the second was for quantities of excavation at contract schedule unit prices, for which the claim is made in addition to the quantities allowed in the final certificate. The amount of this claim is $209,984.93. Interest was awarded in the court below in view of section 480 of the Civil Practice Act of the state of New York, chapter 623 of the Laws of 1927. It provides:
"In every action now pending or hereafter brought wherein any sum of money shall be awarded by verdict, report or decision upon a cause of action for the enforcement of or based upon breach of performance of a contract, express or implied, other than a contract to marry, interest shall be recovered upon the principal sum whether theretofore liquidated or unliquidated and shall be added to and be a part of the total sum awarded."
The contract was entered into July 14, 1914, and was to be performed in 30 months. The contract work was completed in January, 1919. At the trial, it was found that the plaintiff was delayed unduly by the defendant. The amount of damages found by the jury, as resulting from this delay, has been acquiesced in by the defendant in the payment thereof.
The first item of plaintiff's appeal is based on the claim of payment for concrete base laid under the asphalt covering in repaving or restoring the streets after the subway construction work had been finished. Payments were made, under the contract, on a unit basis. Item 30 covered the item prices for restoration of street surface and reads:
Item 6 of the contract, providing for payment for concrete masonry, provides for payment of concrete masonry on the basis of $7 per cubic yard. The argument of the plaintiff is that it should be paid for having laid a concrete base under the asphalt on the basis of item 6. Article 10 of the contract provides that it would be necessary to take up and relay the sidewalks and roadway pavements or other surface material, and further that the contractor must When the plaintiff laid the concrete and rested thereon either asphalt or granite rock, it but restored the surface "to a condition similar to and equally as good as that existing previous to the commencement of construction," and section 423 of the contract provides for payment for surface restored in the prices stipulated under schedule item 30. It is necessary, in restoring pavement, to lay the concrete base, and the parties stipulated that payment therefor was to be made under item 30, and not under item 6.
It is conceded that the plaintiff has been fully paid under item 30, and, since that item of the contract between the parties fully expresses the agreement as to payment for the work, the objection to the introduction of evidence, tending to show it to be the custom that in paving and repaving with asphalt pavement in other contracts there is specified a price per square yard for the asphalt pavement as such and payment made separately for concrete foundation, was properly sustained.
As to the second of the plaintiff's claims, under the contract, the plaintiff was to be paid for earth excavation under items 1 and 2, and it claimed a failure to estimate and pay for 68,399 cubic yards at $3.07 per cubic yard. Article 38 of the contract required the engineer to certify in writing to the commission the quantities of work performed by the contract from actual measurements and also the prices under and in accordance with the terms of the contract. Article 24 made the engineer final and conclusive in the determination and estimate of quantities in case any question touching the contract arose between the parties, and required a determination and estimate in favor of the contractor as a condition precedent to receiving any money under the contract. Sections 88, 89, and 91 of the contract provide:
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