Cranford v. State

• Decision Date: 09 June 1977
• Docket Number: Nos. 751A and 751B,s. 751A and 751B
• Citation: 36 Md.App. 393,373 A.2d 984
• Parties: Joseph Lindsey CRANFORD v. STATE of Maryland. William Lewis WRIGHT v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 393

36 Md.App. 393

373 A.2d 984

Joseph Lindsey CRANFORD v. STATE of Maryland.

William Lewis WRIGHT v. STATE of Maryland.

Nos. 751A and 751B.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

June 9, 1977.

Joseph A. DePaul and William C. Brennan, Jr., with whom were DePaul, Willoner & Kenkel, P. A., College Park, on the brief, for appellant Cranford.

Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, and Michael R. Malloy, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant Wright.

Arrie W. Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Arthur A. Marshall, Jr., State's Atty. for Prince George's County, Steven Kupferberg and Charles P. Strong, Asst. State's Attys. for Prince George's County, on the brief, for appellee.

Argued before and submitted to THOMPSON, POWERS and MELVIN, JJ.

MELVIN, Judge.

By the first count of an indictment filed 1 October 1975, the Grand Jury of Prince George's County charged the appellants, William Lewis Wright and Joseph Lindsey Cranford II, both age 25, with murdering Mary Ann Bunten, age 51, on or about 25 September 1975. The second count of the indictment charged Cranford with being an accessory after the fact to her murder, alleged in that second count to have been committed by Wright alone. After separate jury trials in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, the appellants were each convicted of second degree murder under the first count of the indictment. Before the jury was sworn for the trial of Cranford (the first to be tried) and over Cranford's objection, the trial court granted the State's motion 'to nol-pros' the second count.

Although tried separately and represented by different counsel, both appeals come to us in one record. We shall consider each appeal separately.

APPELLANT WRIGHT (CASE NO. 751B)

Wright presents a single question in his appeal: 'Did the trial court commit plain error by instructing the jury about the standard for sufficiency of the evidence?'

At the close of all the evidence, appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal was denied. In the course of his advisory instructions to the jury, the trial judge said:

'The test of sufficiency of the evidence has been established as being whether the evidence either shows directly or supports a rational inference of the facts to be proved from which you, the trier of the facts, could fairly be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the Defendant's guilt of the offense charged.'

'To be sufficient in law to justify a conviction, the admissible evidence adduced must show directly or circumstantially or support a rational inference of the facts to be proved from which you, the trier of the facts, could fairly be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the Defendant's guilt of the offense charged.'

The appellant did not object to any of the court's instructions. He, nevertheless, argues that, pursuant to Maryland Rule 756 g, we should recognize the above-quoted portions as 'plain error'. Rule 756 g provides:

'Upon appeal a party assigning error in the instructions may not assign as of right an error unless (1) the particular portion of the instructions given or the particular omission therefrom or the particular failure to instruct was distinctly objected to before the jury retired to consider its verdict and (2) the grounds of objection were stated at that time. Ordinarily no other error will be considered by the Court of Appeals, (but the Court of Appeals) either of its own motion or upon the suggestions of a party may take cognizance of and correct any plain error in the instructions, material to the rights of the accused even though such error was not objected to as provided by section f of this Rule.'

While the now-challenged portions of the instructions correctly state the substance of the legal test to be applied by a trial judge when ruling on a motion for a judgment of acquittal Code, Art. 27, § 593; Williams and McClelland v. State, 5 Md.App. 450, 247 A.2d 731 (1968); Vuitch v. State, 10 Md.App. 389, 271 A.2d 371 (1970), they have no place in instructions to the jury and should be avoided. If this were all the judge told the jury regarding the standard of proof necessary for conviction, we would unhesitatingly take cognizance of and correct the plain error by awarding a new trial even though no exceptions were taken below. To tell the jury that a conviction would be justified if they 'could fairly be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the Defendant's guilt' is obviously not the proper standard for it to apply in determining guilt. A judgment of conviction premised on a finding by the jurors that they could be convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, however reasonable that possibility may be, could never be sustained.

As stated by the Court of Appeals in State v. Grady, 276 Md. 178, 345 A.2d 436 (1975), 'it is not always appropriate to quote from appellate decisions in jury instructions since the language employed in a particular opinion may not adequately inform jurors of their responsibility (citations omitted)'. 276 Md. at 186, 345 A.2d at 440. In this case, however, both before and after the offending portions of the instructions, the trial judge carefully and fully 'inform(ed) the jurors of their responsibility' not to 'convict the accused unless, after weighing all of the evidence, including the evidence of good character, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was guilty of the crime charged'; that the burden was upon the State 'to prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty the guilt of an accused', that '(e)very accused is entitled to every inference in his favor which can reasonably be drawn from the evidence'; that 'where there are two inferences which may be drawn from the same fact or set of facts, one consistent with guilt and one consistent with innocence, the accused is entitled to the inference consistent with innocence'; and that '(n)o greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct, for, in either case, you, the trier of the facts, must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused'.

Although we think it was technical error to include the now-challenged portions in the advisory instructions, when the instructions are viewed in their entirety, we do not think the error was so 'plain' or 'material to the rights of the accused' as to invoke the exercise of our discretion to correct it under Rule 756 g. See, Dimery v. State, 274 Md. 661, 338 A.2d 56 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1074, 96 S.Ct. 857, 47 L.Ed.2d 84 (1976); Brown v. State, 14 Md.App. 415, 287 A.2d 62 (1972). See, also, United States v. Brown, 522 F.2d 10 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Christy, 444 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 1971).

The judgment in case no. 751B will be affirmed.

APPELLANT CRANFORD (CASE NO. 751A)

At the close of all the evidence, Cranford's motion for judgment of acquittal was denied. In this appeal, he contends that the ruling on the motion was in error. We disagree.

In reviewing the refusal of the trial judge to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal in a jury case, it is our limited function to determine whether the evidence shows directly or supports a rational inference of the facts to be proved, from which the jury could fairly be convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant's guilt of the offense charged. Vuitch v. State, 10 Md.App. 389, 271 A.2d 371 (1970). In other words, we must review the relevant evidence and determine whether it is legally sufficient to sustain Cranford's conviction of second degree murder.

The Evidence

At approximately 11:15 A.M. on 26 September 1975, the partially nude body of Mary Ann Bunten was found on the side of Church Road near Bowie, Maryland. The Assistant State Medical Examiner testified that the cause of death was a stab wound that had severed the left iliac artery in the area of the vagina and rectum, thus causing her to bleed to death 'in a matter of minutes'. There was also evidence that the alcohol content of the victim's body was .39%, '. . . and (that) one could possibly be comatose with this degree of alcohol'.

As a result of information obtained from those who had seen Mrs. Bunten during the 24 hour period preceding the discovery of her dead body, Cranford and his brother-in-law, William Lewis Wright, were questioned by the police. Each gave written statements concerning their contacts with Mrs. Bunten. Cranford's statement was introduced in evidence by the State. Wright's statement was not offered by either party.

According to Cranford's statement and his testimony at trial, the following occurred during the evening of 24 September and the early morning hours of 25 September: Cranford and Wright began the evening by attending Cranford's young son's birthday party, where they drank several beers. After the party they went to a restaurant and had more beer. After purchasing a six pack of beer each, they left that restaurant and went to Wilson's Tavern in Cranford's car. As they arrived at Wilson's, at approximately 9:00 P. M., they noticed Mrs. Bunten walking up the roadway near the tavern parking lot. Wright approached her and began talking to her, while Cranford entered the tavern and began 'socializing' and drinking more beer. Some minutes later Wright entered the tavern and asked Cranford for the keys to his car. Wright and Mrs Bunten then left in Cranford's car. Cranford remained inside the tavern 'socializing' and drinking until approximately 1:30 A.M. when he went outside to wait for Wright to return with his car.

When Wright and Mrs. Bunten returned, Mrs. Bunten got in the back seat, Wright got in the front passenger seat, and Cranford got behind the wheel. Cranford asked Mrs. Bunten, whom he had never met before, where she lived. She mumbled an address and the three drove off to find her house. Before leaving the parking lot, however, Wright 'reached between the two seats and took' Mrs....