Cranston v. City of Richmond

Citation710 P.2d 845,221 Cal.Rptr. 779,40 Cal.3d 755
Decision Date30 December 1985
Docket NumberS.F. 24834
Parties, 710 P.2d 845 Eric CRANSTON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF RICHMOND et al., Defendants and Respondents.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (California)
[710 P.2d 847] William H. Sortor and Carroll, Burdick & McDonough, San Francisco, for plaintiff and appellant

Malcolm Hunter, City Atty., for defendants and respondents.

GRODIN, Justice.

Appellant Eric Cranston was discharged form his job as a Richmond City Police Officer. The city personnel board sustained the discharge, and the superior court denied a petition for writ of administrative mandamus. The principal question presented by Cranston's appeal is whether a police officer may be disciplined for "conduct unbecoming an employee of the City Service" when, though previously warned about his driving habits and notified that his conduct was being closely observed, he drove his car with inoperative lights in the middle of the night and led fellow police officers on a wild chase over wet and slippery streets at speeds up to 95 miles per hour. Appellant contends that the rule in question is unconstitutionally vague. We conclude that the rule, viewed in the context of other rules and practices pertaining to police service, is not so vague as to preclude discipline for conduct which is so obviously improper for a police officer, and so clearly outside the scope of any substantive legal protection, as the reckless and unlawful conduct in which appellant engaged.

Appellant raises a number of other challenges both to his discharge and to the decision of the superior court. We conclude that these challenges, like appellant's constitutional challenge, are without merit. We therefore affirm the judgment of the superior court denying appellant's petition for writ of administrative mandamus.

FACTS 1

On April 4, 1978, at approximately 1:30 a.m., appellant, an off-duty Richmond police officer, was driving his yellow sports car along a Richmond street. Another off-duty policeman, Officer Mackie, was in the passenger seat. It had been raining very heavily that evening and the roads were wet and slippery. The dashboard lights, running lights, taillights and horn on appellant's car were inoperative. In addition, the frame of appellant's car had been damaged in a recent accident and a mechanic had warned appellant not to drive Richmond Police Officer Samuel Dudkiewicz, while on routine patrol, spotted appellant's car and noticed that the taillights were not working. Unaware that the car was being driven by a fellow police officer, Officer Dudkiewicz began to follow appellant's car with the intent of stopping it and informing the driver that the taillights were not working.

the car at high speeds because the frame might buckle and cause an accident.

As Officer Dudkiewicz accelerated to catch up to appellant's car, appellant entered the freeway and accelerated to a high rate of speed. Officer Dudkiewicz pursued appellant's car onto the freeway and advised police communications that he was trying to catch up to the speeding vehicle.

When Officer Dudkiewicz was within nine or ten car lengths of appellant's car, he activated the patrol car's emergency red lights but did not activate the siren, believing the siren would be ineffective on the freeway. At this time, Officer Dudkiewicz clocked appellant's speed at 85 miles per hour. Instead of yielding to the police car, appellant accelerated to a speed of approximately 95 miles per hour. Officer Dudkiewicz continued to pursue the speeding car and radioed police communications that he was involved in a high speed pursuit and was traveling at about 95 miles per hour.

Eventually, appellant's car slowed down, exited the freeway and came to a stop. Officer Dudkiewicz pulled up behind appellant's car. As appellant and Officer Mackie got out of their car, Officer Dudkiewicz realized for the first time that he had been pursuing a fellow police officer.

Before the chase began, acting Sergeant Pylant had seen appellant and Officer Mackie leaving a bar and had stopped to talk with them. After a brief conversation, appellant and Officer Mackie drove off in appellant's car and Officer Pylant resumed his patrol.

A few minutes later, Officer Pylant heard Officer Dudkiewicz' radio transmission indicating that he was involved in a high speed pursuit. Unaware that the car being pursued was appellant's, Officer Pylant took the nearest on-ramp to the freeway, activated both his emergency lights and siren, and advised police communications that he was joining in the chase. As he accelerated to approximately 90 or 95 miles per hour, Officer Pylant began to lose control of his vehicle on the wet pavement. He regained control, slowed to about 65 miles per hour, and continued the pursuit.

When Officer Pylant caught up with appellant and Officer Dudkiewicz, they had already pulled off the freeway and were standing outside their cars, talking. Officer Pylant got out of his patrol car and joined in the conversation. He told appellant that what he had done "wasn't too cool." Appellant responded that he had thought it was Officer Pylant behind him "playing games." Appellant laughed and "kidded around," and generally treated the matter as something of a joke.

All told, at least five Richmond police officers and one California Highway Patrol car were involved in the chase. Although an internal memorandum to Police Captain Ceballos indicated there was sufficient evidence to establish a violation of Vehicle Code section 23103 (reckless driving) in addition to the obvious speeding violation, no citation was ever issued. However, Officer Pylant testified that if appellant had been a private citizen, rather than a police officer, he would have taken appellant to jail for his conduct.

An investigation of the incident was conducted by the Richmond Police Department Internal Affairs Bureau. Based on the findings of this investigation and appellant's prior history of misconduct, 2 Captain Appellant requested and was granted a hearing before the city's personnel board. At the hearing, appellant testified that his car never exceeded 80 miles per hour during the incident in question and that, contrary to Officer Dudkiewicz' testimony, he did not accelerate when Officer Dudkiewicz first caught up with him. Appellant admitted, however, that because his dashboard light was inoperative, he could not read his speedometer and therefore could not be sure of his speed.

Ceballos recommended [40 Cal.3d 762] that appellant be discharged. On August 2, 1978, appellant was terminated for "conduct unbecoming an employee of the City Service."

Appellant further testified he first became aware that an emergency vehicle was behind him when Officer Mackie saw the flashing red lights through the rear window and informed appellant of what he saw. Rather than slowing down or moving to the right lane, appellant asked Officer Mackie to retrieve the rear view mirror from the glove compartment. 3 Using the mirror, appellant saw two emergency vehicles behind him. According to appellant's testimony, as soon as he saw the vehicles with his own eyes he slowed down, exited the freeway and came to a stop.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the personnel board determined that the charge of "conduct unbecoming an employee of the City Service" was substantiated and unanimously affirmed appellant's dismissal.

Appellant filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus to compel his reinstatement. After making specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, the superior court denied appellant's petition.

DISCUSSION
I. Vagueness Challenge

Appellant was terminated pursuant to Richmond City Personnel rule XII, section 2, subdivision (a) (hereafter Rule XII(2)(a)) which provides that a city employee may be discharged for "[c]onduct unbecoming an employee of the City Service." 4 Appellant argues that Rule XII(2)(a) is unconstitutionally vague.

It is a well-settled principle of constitutional law that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." (Connally v. General Construction Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322.) The policies underlying the proscription against vagueness are equally well established: "Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application." (Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972) 408 U.S. 104, 108-109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-2299, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, fns. omitted; Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. (1982) 455 U.S. 489, 498, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193, 71 L.Ed.2d 362, rehg. den., 456 U.S. 950, 102 S.Ct. 2023, 72 L.Ed.2d 476.) In short, "[t]he root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of fairness." (Colten v. Kentucky (1972) 407 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 1957, 32 L.Ed.2d 584.)

Although "void-for-vagueness" challenges arise most often in the criminal context, "the prohibition against vagueness extends to administrative regulations affecting conditions of governmental employment as well as to penal statutes...." (Bence v. Breier (7th Cir.1974) 501 F.2d 1185, 1188, cert. den., 419 U.S. 1121, 95 S.Ct. 804, 42 L.Ed.2d 821; see also McMurtry v. State Board of Medical...

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