Crapps v. State, CR-92-1494

Decision Date11 February 1994
Docket NumberCR-92-1494
PartiesTerrell Norman CRAPPS v. STATE.
CourtAlabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Mac Borland, Jr., Dothan, for appellant.

James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Kenneth Gibbs, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

TAYLOR, Judge.

The appellant, Terrell Norman Crapps, was convicted of murder, a violation of § 13A-6-2, Code of Alabama 1975. He was sentenced to life in prison.

The evidence presented by the prosecution tended to show that the appellant killed his wife, Sara Chadwick Crapps, by shooting her in the neck with a 20-gauge shotgun. On June 27, 1992, law enforcement officers were called to the Crapps residence in Houston County, Alabama. The appellant was armed and was with his wife in a small camper that was parked next to his house.

Witnesses testified that they heard gunshots inside the camper and that the appellant said that he had "blowed the motherfucking bitch's brains out." When the appellant was removed from the camper, the victim's body was found inside with a shotgun wound to the neck.

I

On appeal, the appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of murder. Specifically, he contends that the only evidence presented by the state was circumstantial and that that evidence, therefore, could not support a conviction of murder.

" 'Circumstantial evidence is not inferior or deficient evidence. See Linzy v. State, 455 So.2d 260 (Ala.Cr.App.1984). 'Circumstantial evidence is entitled to the same weight as direct evidence, provided it points to the guilt of the accused.' Casey v. State, 401 So.2d 330, 331 (Ala.Cr.App.1981). 'Whether circumstantial evidence tending to connect the defendant with the crime excludes, to a moral certainty, every other reasonable hypothesis than that of the defendant's guilt is a question for the jury and not the court.' Cumbo v. State, 368 So.2d 871, 875 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 368 So.2d 877 (Ala.1979).' "

Holder v. State, 584 So.2d 872, 875-76 (Ala.Cr.App.1991).

Furthermore, he contends that the state failed to prove that he possessed the requisite specific intent to kill the victim because, he says, he was voluntarily intoxicated at the time. "The degree of intoxication necessary to reduce a charge from murder to manslaughter when the intoxication is voluntary must be so great as to 'amount to insanity.' " Owen v. State, 611 So.2d 1126, 1128 (Ala.Cr.App.1992). The court instructed the jury on the law applicable to intoxication. Whether the appellant was so intoxicated that he could not form the intent to kill was a question for the jury's determination.

There was sufficient evidence presented by the state from which the jury could conclude that the appellant, "[w]ith the intent to cause the death of another person, ... cause[d] the death of that person...." § 13A-6-2, Code of Alabama 1975.

II

The appellant also contends that the court erred in denying his motion to approve funds for an evaluation by an expert in the field of alcoholism. In order for an indigent defendant to be entitled to funds for expert assistance, he must show both the need for and the relevance of the assistance.

" 'The threshold question requires the showing of a need for the requested services. Ex parte Argo, 42 Ala.App. 546, 547, 171 So.2d 259 (1965). We recognized in Gwin v. State, 425 So.2d 500, 508 (Ala.Cr.App.1982), cert. quashed, 425 So.2d 510 (Ala.1983), that before determining whether fundamental fairness requires that an accused be afforded the opportunity to have an expert of his choosing examine a piece of 'critical evidence whose nature is subject to varying expert opinion,' it should first be determined that the evidence is 'critical.' Evidence is 'critical' for purposes of the due process clause if it could induce a reasonable doubt in the...

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3 cases
  • Jackson v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • March 31, 2000
    ...(Ala.Cr.App.1996), aff'd, 710 So.2d 1350 (Ala.1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 929, 118 S.Ct. 2325, 141 L.Ed.2d 699 (1998); Crapps v. State, 646 So.2d 698 (Ala.Cr.App.1994). Although there was some evidence— found in Jackson's statement to police— that Jackson had been drinking alcohol and smo......
  • Ex parte Mason
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • March 6, 1998
    ...in this case and in other circumstantial-evidence cases. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 651 So.2d 1128 (Ala.Cr.App.1994); Crapps v. State, 646 So.2d 698 (Ala.Cr.App.1994); and Holder v. State, 584 So.2d 872 In Linzy, before quoting from Cumbo the sentence that is set out above, the Court of Crim......
  • Crapps v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • April 3, 1998
    ...the petition was filed on April 15, 1996, within the two-year limitations period of Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R.Crim.P. See Crapps v. State, 646 So.2d 698 (Ala.Cr.App.1994). The record, however, does contain a document entitled "Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis," which was filed by th......

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