Crass v. Memphis & C.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 27 July 1892
• Citation: 96 Ala. 447,11 So. 480
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: CRASS ET AL. v. MEMPHIS & C. R. CO.

11 So. 480

96 Ala. 447

CRASS ET AL. v. MEMPHIS & C. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Alabama

July 27, 1892

Appeal from city court of Decatur; W. H. SIMPSON, Judge.

Bill by the Memphis & Charleston Railroad Company against John F Crass and others. From a decree ordering them to interplead defendants appeal. Reversed.

R A. McClellan and Kyle & Skeggs, for appellants.

Humes & Sheffey, for appellee.

COLEMAN J.

The bill was filed by the appellee to enforce a common carrier's lien upon certain property which had been transported by it, and which was then in its possession, and also to require the defendants (appellants) to interplead as to the ownership of the property. Certain causes of demurrer to the bill were overruled by the court, and, before answers were filed or decree pro confesso taken, the court decreed that the defendant should interplead. From this decree the appeal is prosecuted. The bill shows that the Bethlehem Iron Company, a corporation organized under the laws of Pennsylvania, shipped and consigned to the Decatur & Nashville Improvement Company, to be delivered at Decatur, Ala., a large quantity of rails, bolts, spikes, and fish plates, particularly described in Exhibit A to the bill, and that, while said property was in the possession of the complainant as a common carrier, the Bethlehem Iron Company exercised the right of stoppage in transitu, on the ground that the Decatur & Nashville Improvement Company had become insolvent, and notified and demanded of complainant that the property should be delivered to the Bethlehem Iron Company. The bill then avers that John F. Crass sued out an attachment against the Decatur & Nashville Improvement Company, and claimed to have acquired a lien upon the property by the levy of the attachment, that the attachment suit was prosecuted to judgment, and, by virtue of a writ of venditioni exponas, the sheriff, after advertisement, sold the property, and John F. Crass became the purchaser, and as such claims the property. After stating in the bill that, at the sheriff's sale, the Bethlehem Iron Company gave notice of its claim to the property, it proceeds as follows: "The complainant avers that said writ of attachment never was in fact levied upon the property described in paragraph one of the bill and Exhibit A, herewith filed, and that said sheriff never did have possession, custody, or control of said property, nor did complainant ever surrender possession or release its control and custody of said property to any one." The bill set up a lien upon the property in favor of complainant for $10,392.02, claimed "on account of unpaid freight charges and demurrage," and the prayer of the bill is that the decree for the delivery of the property to the proper owner be conditioned upon the payment of this sum to complainant, and, in default of its payment, that the lien be declared, and the property sold by a decree of the court for its payment. To entitle a party to the benefit of a bill of interpleader, he must negative any interest in himself in the matter in controversy, and show that he is a mere stakeholder; that there is a doubt to whom the debt is due or duly belongs, so that he cannot safely pay or render to the one without risk of being liable for the same debt or duty to the other. In such case the plaintiff only asks that he be at liberty to pay the money to the party to whom it of right belongs, and may thereafter be protected against the claims of both. 2 Daniell, Ch. Pl. §§ 1561, 1571; 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1320; Story, Eq. Pl. § 291; Conley v. Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co., 67 Ala. 475. As stated by Mr. Pomeroy, section 1325: "He must stand entirely indifferent between the conflicting claimants, and be ready and willing to surrender the thing in dispute or pay the debt. He cannot mingle up a demand of his own upon the property or thing with the demand that the other persons shall interplead. The interest, however, which will defeat the relief must be in the very thing or fund itself, which is the subject-matter of the controversy and of the suit. *** Nor, it seems, [he adds] will a charge, lien, or claim upon the very thing or fund itself, which is admitted to be valid by both the defendants," defeat the relief. Italics are ours. The complainant sets up a right to hold the property and a lien upon it for over $10,000, cost and expenses for freight and demurrage. The bill does not show that the defendants assent to the correctness of this charge and claim; and the prayer of the bill is that the decree for the delivery of the property be conditioned upon its payment, and, if not paid, that the property be sold for the satisfaction of this lien.

It is contended, however, that this is a bill in the nature of a bill of interpleader, and that such a bill lies by a party in interest to ascertain and establish his own rights, where there are other conflicting rights between third persons. This rule is thus stated in 2 Daniell, Ch. Pr. § 1571; Story, Eq. Pl. § 291; and Mr. Pomeroy, supra; but the cases cited in support of the text, and the general principles declared by the text and authorities, do not authorize the application of the rule to cases like the present, where the complainant seeks to mingle up and enforce a demand of his own upon the property or thing, with the demand that the other persons shall interplead. There can be no bill of interpleader, or bill in the nature of a bill of interpleader, when the defendants contest and litigate with the plaintiff himself as to the validity and allowance of a claim set up by himself. Such a rule is at variance with the very nature and purpose of a bill of interpleader. Under such circumstances, the complainant has a personal interest in the result of the suit, directly antagonistic to that of respondents. We find a case cited in Lozier's Ex'rs v. Van Saun, 3 N. J. Eq. 325, where "the complainant, who was a stakeholder, offered to pay into court the amount in his hands, deducting the duty and commission which he estimated at a sum certain. The right to this deduction was disputed, and therefore the vice chancellor said there was a personal question between the complainant and one of the defendants. He was not an indifferent stakeholder." Mitchell v. Hayne, 2 Sim. & S. 63. We need not go so far in the present case. The offer in the present case to deliver the property is made upon the condition that complainant's claim be admitted and paid, and in default that the property be sold. We make the further suggestion, if the property is sold by the decree of the court to satisfy the plaintiff's demand, and a stranger becomes the purchaser, as he may, of what avail is the bill as a bill of interpleader for the protection of the plaintiff? Nothing will have been accomplished by the respondents impleading each other.

The bill is objectionable as a bill of interpleader for another reason. It is the danger of injury to the complainant, from the doubtful rights and conflicting claims of the defendants to the fund, or to the thing or duty to be performed, which authorize him to call upon the claimants to interplead. The bill must show he cannot safely pay or render the duty without risk of being subsequently made liable again. When from complainant's own showing, there...