Crauswell v. State
Decision Date | 12 February 1993 |
Citation | 638 So.2d 11 |
Parties | Steven Dale CRAUSWELL v. STATE. CR 91-1191. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
James R. Morgan, Birmingham, for appellant.
James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Robert Ward, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Steven Dale Crauswell was convicted of criminally negligent homicide and was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment (split with two and one-half years to serve in prison and three years' probation) as a habitual offender. He raises four issues on this appeal from that conviction.
We adamantly reject the appellant's argument that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. With regard to this alcohol-related vehicular homicide, the appellant argues that "there was no evidence presented which would show that the Appellant was driving at a reckless or excessive speed ..., there was no evidence that the Appellant's driving was improper or incorrect in any manner, there was no evidence presented which could establish that the Appellant did not have the signal, and there was absolutely no evidence presented which suggested that the accident could have been avoided by the Appellant." Appellant's brief at 18. Contrary to the appellant's allegation that there was no evidence of any of these facts, the record shows that conflicting evidence was presented on each of these facts. The questions of whether the appellant was speeding, whether he was driving under the influence of alcohol, whether he ran a yellow light or a red light, and whether the accident was avoidable were all questions of disputed fact for the jury's consideration.
The victim was 67-year-old Verna Garner. The accident occurred at approximately 1:00 on the afternoon of Sunday, June 30, 1991, at the intersection of the Decatur Highway and Central Avenue in Fultondale, Alabama. The evidence is undisputed that the appellant had been drinking alcohol, that he entered the intersection at least against a yellow caution traffic light, and that his automobile crashed into the driver's door of Mrs. Garner's automobile. There is some evidence from which the jury could have concluded that Mrs. Garner proceeded prematurely into that intersection. However, there is also both ample and credible evidence that the appellant was speeding and exceeding the speed limit by ten miles per hour; that he was intoxicated and driving under the influence of alcohol and Valium; that approximately one hour after the collision, the appellant's blood-alcohol level was .146%; that he was driving even though his driver's license had been suspended; that he did, in fact, run a red light; that he made no attempt to stop and took no evasive action; and that he had a history of erratic driving while under the influence of alcohol and narcotics.
The indictment charged the appellant with reckless murder in violation of Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-6-2(a)(2). A jury convicted him of the lesser included offense of criminally negligent homicide. "A person commits the crime of criminally negligent homicide if he causes the death of another person by criminal negligence." Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-6-4(a). Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-2-2(4). Contributory negligence is not a defense to a prosecution for criminally negligent homicide. Russo v. State, 610 So.2d 1206 (Ala.Cr.App.1992).
"[I]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must view the circumstantial evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether the jury might reasonably have found that the evidence excluded every reasonable hypothesis except guilt." Ex parte Bailey, 590 So.2d 354, 357 (Ala.1991). Granger v. State, 473 So.2d 1137, 1139 (Ala.Cr.App.1985).
Clearly, the question of the appellant's guilt or innocence was properly submitted to the jury. The evidence is amply sufficient to support the appellant's conviction for criminally negligent homicide. See Black v. State, 586 So.2d 968, 969-70 (Ala.Cr.App.) (evidence of intoxication and running stop sign), cert. denied, 586 So.2d 970 (Ala.1991); Pollard v. State, 549 So.2d 593, 597 (Ala.Cr.App.1989) ( ); Humphries v. State, 346 So.2d 45, 50 (Ala.Cr.App.1977) ( ). See also Broxton v. State, 27 Ala.App. 298, 300, 171 So. 390, 392 (1936) ( ).
On cross-examination of Fultondale police officer Louis Snow, defense counsel elicited the officer's testimony that he estimated that the appellant was traveling "[a]pproximately 60 miles per hour" at the point of impact. R. 76. Defense counsel then attempted to impeach the officer on this estimate and in doing so specifically elicited the officer's testimony that his estimate was based on "[d]amage and so forth, what the witnesses said, and stuff like that." R. 80.
On redirect examination, the State was properly permitted to elicit the officer's testimony that the witnesses to the collision told him that the appellant "appeared to be speeding," and that "[t]hey said it looked like he was speeding." R. 81-82. The trial court properly found that the appellant had "opened the door" for such testimony.
The State, on redirect examination, may question a witness with regard to matters brought out by the defendant on cross-examination. Jones v. State, 22 Ala.App. 141, 142, 113 So. 478 (1927).
Sistrunk v. State, 596 So.2d 644, 647 (Ala.Cr.App.1992). See also Leonard v. State, 551 So.2d 1143, 1145 (Ala.Cr.App.1989); Campbell v. State, 508 So.2d 1186, 1189 (Ala.Cr.App.1986). "This is but common fairness and an application of the rule permitting the admission of evidence by reason of the admission of similar evidence of the adverse party." White v. State, 344 So.2d 1270, 1273 (Ala.Cr.App.1977).
The State introduced testimony of the appellant's history for driving while under the influence of alcohol and controlled substances. Over the objection of defense counsel, the State was permitted to introduce the following evidence: 1) On March 17, 1989, the appellant was driving erratically and was arrested for driving under the influence of a marijuana. 2) On April 1, 1989, the appellant was traveling 62 mph in a 40 mph zone, was "weaving," and was arrested for speeding and for the unlawful possession of a controlled substance. There was testimony that on this occasion the appellant was under the influence of "some kind of narcotics." R. 153. 3) On January 14, 1984, when the appellant was seventeen years old, he was "weaving" and intoxicated, and he was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol.
These prior incidents were relevant and admissible in this case because they demonstrated a relatively recent and consistent pattern of reckless disregard for the probable consequences of his actions and the safety of others. The trial court verbalized this in sentencing the appellant:
The appellant was 25 years old at the time of the charged homicide.
In a prosecution for vehicular homicide, evidence of the defendant's prior history regarding drugs, alcohol, and driving may be admissible in order to prove that the defendant had been drinking or using drugs prior to the accident, the defendant's intent, or the defendant's reckless indifference to the probable consequences of his acts, regardless of whether the prior arrests...
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