Craven v. Apfel
Decision Date | 12 July 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 98Civ. 7326 (LAP)(AJP).,98Civ. 7326 (LAP)(AJP). |
Citation | 58 F.Supp.2d 172 |
Parties | Hannah CRAVEN, Plaintiff, v. Kenneth APFEL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Josephine Gottesman, New York City, for plaintiff.
Susan D. Baird, Asst. U.S. Atty., New York City, for Defendant.
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Hannah Craven brings this action pursuant to section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 45 U.S.C. § 405(g), challenging the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her disability benefits. Both parties cross-moved for judgement on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). On May 18, 1999, Magistrate Judge Peck issued a report and recommendation (the "Report"), which recommended that I grant plaintiff's motion to the extent that the case be remanded to the Commissioner for further development of the record, and that the Government's motion be denied. Plaintiff submitted her objections to the Report on May 27, 1999, and on June 14, 1999 the Court received the Government's response to plaintiff's objections.
Having reviewed the Report de novo pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), as well as having considered plaintiff's objections thereto and the defendant's response, I find the Report well-reasoned and thoroughly grounded in the law. I agree with the Magistrate Judge that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") failed to "affirmatively develop the record," see Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 774-75 (2d Cir.1999), and that further development is required. Specifically, I agree with the Magistrate Judge that additional medical evidence is necessary and that the ALJ should have questioned the plaintiff more fully on her subjective inability to concentrate or to complete tasks in a timely, work-like manner. (See Report at 28-31). In short, I find that the extent of plaintiff's injuries is not clear from the record and that the ALJ failed to develop the record sufficiently to make an appropriate decision in either direction. See Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 82-83 (2d Cir.1999). Accordingly, plaintiff's objection that I should reverse the Commissioner's final decision and remand solely for the calculation of benefits is without merit, as are her other objections.
Having reviewed the Report thoroughly and finding it well reasoned and grounded in law, and finding plaintiff's purported objections to be without merit, it is hereby ORDERED that the report and recommendation is adopted in its entirety.
Plaintiff's motion on the pleadings is therefore granted to the extent it requests a remand to the Commissioner for further fact-finding, and the Commissioner's motion is denied. The Clerk of the Court shall mark this matter as closed and any pending motions denied as moot.
Plaintiff Hannah Craven brings this action, pursuant to section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), challenging the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") to deny her disability benefits. Both parties have cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c).
For the reasons set forth below, because the Administrative Law Judge failed to adequately develop the medical record, I recommend that the Court grant Craven's motion for judgment on the pleadings to the extent of remanding the case to the Commissioner to further develop the record, and deny the Commissioner's cross-motion.
On October 12, 1996, Craven filed an application for Social Security Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits. Craven's application was denied on November 29, 1996, and again on reconsideration on May 29, 1997. (R. 51-52, 56-57.) At Craven's request (R. 58), a hearing was held before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") on October 8, 1997. (R. 28-48.) On December 29, 1997, the ALJ issued his decision finding that Craven was not disabled. (R. 11-19.) The ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied Craven's request for review on August 19, 1998. (R. 5-7.) This action followed.
On October 8, 1997, the ALJ held a hearing on Craven's SSI application. (R. 28-48.) Present at the hearing was Craven and her brother Alex Craven, who was there "partly for moral support" and to represent Craven, although he had no knowledge of Social Security regulations. (R. 30.) Craven waived her right to an attorney at the hearing because she had been unable to find an attorney. (R. 30-31.)
At the time of the hearing Craven was 43 years old. (R. 34.) Craven had a Bachelor of Science degree from City University. (R. 34.) Craven claimed that her disability began on December 31, 1992. (R. 31.)
Craven worked at the Marine Midland Bank from 1981 to 1992 and was able to sustain her position because although she could only perform once in a while, in the 1980's the bank could afford to overstaff, and she installed "some computer programs that were very useful, it was worth it to them." (R. 41, 77, 83.) However, when the bank transferred Craven to sales, she "didn't do anything for two years," and was fired for not selling bank products and because she did not get along with her supervisor. (R. 36, 41, 77, 83.) The year before Craven was transferred to sales work, she had her own office and could close the door, but she "fell asleep at work quite a bit." (R. 36-37.) She would (R. 37.)
The year after Craven was fired, in 1993, Craven earned $9,861.41 in severance pay; in 1995 and 1996 she earned $2,469.50 and $4,215.00 respectively from part-time work. (R. 32-33, 67.)
At the time of the hearing, Craven had a part-time job at Hunter College, from which she had been fired when her boss was on vacation, but was rehired when her boss returned. (R. 44-45, 147.) Craven's boss did not give Craven her old job back, but gave Craven the chance to train a new person and was going to give her some projects to work on as long as Craven's "mood stays calm." (R. 45.)1 Craven also was taking courses part-time at Hunter College. (R. 77, 104.)
Craven stated that she wanted to work and can work part time, but that with "Manic Bipolar" she has "good days and bad days," so she cannot always work. (R. 33, 38-39.) She has "computer skills," "financial skills," and "economic skills" and felt that without her psychological problems she could be "making a lot of money." (R. 38.) But "some days [her] brain doesn't even work," so she has "to have employers who can't rely, don't rely on [her] every single day of the week." (R. 33.)
Craven's "biggest problem is fatigue [a]nd it doesn't prevent [her] from working at all." (R. 34.) Craven explained that she is (R. 36.)
Craven's other problem is that she "never know[s] when [she is] going to be hit with things like rage, or disorientation, or [her] brain doesn't go to work." (R. 35.) Craven said that (Id.) She gets "hysterical" and starts (Id.)
Craven stated on her SSI application that her condition keeps her from working because she (R. 73, 90, 97.) She also stated that she (R. 73.)
When the ALJ asked Craven why she could not work in a secluded setting she replied that she could under certain conditions:
That's the best thing—is for me to work in a secluded section and to make my own hours. In other words, to — Sometimes I'm, I can work at 10:00 at night. Sometimes I can work at 6:00[in] the morning. It really depends. And not to have somebody rely on me being at a certain time....
....
If, if I could do certain things that let me work when I can work, and have my own computer, and have privacy, and nobody bothering me, and I don't change the system once I set it up, and if they need me on a certain day and I'm not able to go in on that certain day — I'm not even going to function on that certain day, they don't say, "Oh, shoot," you know, "...
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