Craven v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice

• Decision Date: 30 May 2001
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 3:99-CV-1349L.,CIV.A. 3:99-CV-1349L.
• Citation: 151 F.Supp.2d 757
• Parties: Mary L. CRAVEN, Plaintiff, v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE — INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

151 F.Supp.2d 757

Mary L. CRAVEN, Plaintiff, v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE — INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV.A. 3:99-CV-1349L.

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.

May 30, 2001.

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Ronald E. Harden, Harden Law Office, Terrell, TX, for plaintiff.

John Cornyn, Atty. Gen. of Texas, Andy Taylor, First Assist. Atty. Gen., Michael T. McCaul, Deputy Atty. Gen. for Criminal Justice, Phillip E. Marrus, Chief, Law Enforcement Defense Div., Cari G. Bernstein, Assist. Atty. Gen., Office of Texas Atty. Gen., Austin, TX, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LINDSAY, District Judge.

Before the court are Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed September 1, 2000; Defendants' Motion to Stay Order to Mediate, filed September 12, 2000; Plaintiff's Motion for Approval and Appointment of Mediator, Motion to Extend Deadline for Conducting Mediation, and Motion for Sanctions (hereinafter "Motion re: Mediation"), filed September 29, 2000; Defendants' Motion to Stay Revised Scheduled Order, filed May 1, 2001; Defendants' Motion for Leave to File Pre-trial Order Out of Time, filed May 2, 2001; and Defendants' Motion to Exclude Evidence, filed May 2, 2001.

After careful consideration of the motion, response, reply, briefs, evidence submitted by the parties, and applicable law, the court grants Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The court denies, with respect to the request for sanctions, and denies as moot, with respect to all other requested relief, Plaintiff's Motion re: Mediation, and denies as moot Defendants' Motion to Stay Order to Mediate, Motion to Stay Revised Scheduled Order, Motion for Leave to File Pre-trial Order Out of Time, and Motion to Exclude Evidence.

I. Factual and Procedural Background¹

Plaintiff Mary L. Craven ("Craven") was employed by Defendant Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ")² in April 1995 as a Correctional Officer at the Hutchins State Jail Facility in Dallas, Texas. In August 1997, Craven was a Correctional Officer III assigned to the third shift (from 10:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m.) in "D" building, which housed inmates assigned to the Substance Abuse Therapeutic Program ("SATP"). SATP offenders were segregated from the remaining prison populace, and attended drug counseling on a full-time basis. Working with the SATP offenders required more skill and training than other Correctional Officer positions.

During this time, there was an opening on the first shift (from 6:00 a.m. until 2:00 p.m.). Policy required a formal application for a shift transfer, but common practice was to accept an Inter-Office Communication ("IOC") detailing the applicant's qualifications. Applicants would then be interviewed for the position. On October 11, 1997, Craven submitted an IOC requesting transfer to the first shift in "D" building. No interviews were conducted, but another officer, Cheryl Jackson ("Jackson"), was selected for the opening on first shift, effective October 23, 1997. Jackson was at that time working on the second shift (from 2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.) in "D" building. She had submitted an IOC on April 16, 1997, well before Craven's IOC, requesting a transfer to first shift. Jackson's request, however, specified a transfer to "K" building (which houses prisoners who are a danger to officers, other prisoners, or themselves; who present a risk of escape; or who are affiliated with a gang) rather than "D" building.³ Craven is white; Jackson is African-American. The supervisor over the position in question reported to Major Allen Brown ("Brown"), also African-American. Accordingly to Craven, Brown guaranteed Jackson the position although she had not specifically requested "D" building and had not detailed her qualifications. Craven complained about the selection of Jackson for the vacancy and requested that she be assigned to the position instead. After her request was denied, she filed a grievance on October 24, 1997.

On October 29, 1997, Craven allegedly violated facility regulations by failing to maintain the security of the "picket" in "D" building — leaving it unlocked and allowing another correctional officer to sleep underneath a table in the control picket while she worked inside. She was charged with substandard duty performance and, after a disciplinary hearing during which she denied the allegation, received a written reprimand on November 12, 1997. Warden Elvis Hightower, an African-American, inquired about the status of her complaint over the shift transfer on the same day he imposed the discipline. As a result of the disciplinary action, she was moved from the SATP facility to working with "general population" inmates. As a result of the reprimand, however, she was not formally demoted and was subjected to no loss of pay, benefits, or other conditions and privileges of employment. She was subjected to various other alleged acts of harassment:

She was variously assigned to mobile patrol, security gates, assisting in other areas in a security role, was given contradictory orders by supervising Sergeants and Lieutenants thus exposing her to further potential discipline, was subjected to invasion of her personal life by Lt. Smith, an African-American, and on the date of resignation, Defendants attempted to serve her with discipline after she had tendered her resignation.

Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Response at 4.

On January 7, 1998, approximately three months after her initial request, Craven was transferred to the SATP first shift after another vacancy opened up.⁴ She subsequently filed charges with the Texas Commission on Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on March 12 and March 17, 1998 respectively, alleging discrimination based on race and retaliation for complaining of such. An amended charge was filed on April 23, 1998. The charge cited, as the retaliation to which she was subjected, only the written reprimand of November 12, 1997. Craven resigned on August 14, 1998, asserting in an IOC that "the hostile working environment and constant retaliation towards me, makes it intolerable for me to continue employment with the Hutchins State Jail." Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Exclude Evidence, Exhibit A.

After receiving a "right to sue" letter, Craven filed this lawsuit on June 14, 1999, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. She alleges discrimination based on race in the denial of her transfer request and retaliation for complaining of such. She was granted leave to amend her complaint on December 30, 1999 to add additional defendants. The only retaliatory incident mentioned in the original Complaint or her First Amended Complaint was the written reprimand of November 12, 1997. She alleges that the unlawful employment practices were committed intentionally and/or with malice. She seeks injunctive relief, compensatory damages (including back wages and damages for mental anguish and pain and suffering), and costs and attorney's fees.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment shall be rendered when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir.1998). A dispute regarding a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view all inferences drawn from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458.

Once the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. Mere conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment evidence, and thus are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir.1996). Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not competent summary judgment evidence. See Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871, 115 S.Ct. 195, 130 L.Ed.2d 127 (1994). The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his claim. Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458. Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the court to "sift through the record in search of evidence" to support the nonmovant's opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id., see also Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 & n. 7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832, 113 S.Ct. 98, 121 L.Ed.2d 59 (1992). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing laws will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Disputed fact issues which are "irrelevant and unnecessary" will not be considered by a court in ruling on a summary judgment motion. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106...