Craven v. Williams

• Decision Date: 13 August 1969
• Docket Number: No. CA/67-807.,CA/67-807.
• Citation: 302 F. Supp. 885
• Parties: Samuel C. CRAVEN, Plaintiff, v. Martha Seele WILLIAMS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

302 F. Supp. 885

Samuel C. CRAVEN, Plaintiff, v. Martha Seele WILLIAMS, Defendant.

No. CA/67-807.

United States District Court D. South Carolina, Charleston Division.

August 13, 1969.

Coming B. Gibbs, Jr., Charleston, S. C., for plaintiff.

Edward D. Buckley, Bailey & Buckley, Charleston, S. C., for defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and ORDER

DONALD RUSSELL, District Judge.

This is a suit for specific performance of an alleged contract of sale covering approximately eighty-three (83) acres of land located at Lincolnville, near Summerville, South Carolina.

The complaint is in the usual form. The defendant, in resisting specific performance, denied the existence of a completed contract and, in the event the Court finds a contract, she pleads inadequacy of consideration, coupled with other "incidents", and violations by the plaintiff of certain rules applicable to real estate agents under the laws of South Carolina, as bars to the relief of specific performance.

Defendant also filed a cross-complaint asking that she be declared the sole owner of the property involved herein, but she withdrew it at the trial of the case.

On this state of the pleadings, the action came on for trial before me without a jury at Columbia, South Carolina, on May 7, 1969. After hearing the testimony and after due consideration of the depositions, taken by the parties and introduced without objection as a part of the record, I make the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The plaintiff is a lawyer practicing in Charleston, South Carolina. He grew up in the general area where the land involved in this action is located. Real estate in that area has been increasing markedly in value in recent years. Plaintiff was familiar with this development. He has accordingly actively sought for several years prior to his dealings with the defendant to purchase land in the area, intending generally to resell it advantageously on the advancing market. Plaintiff's purchases were normally made for his own account, though other members of his family were similarly engaged in seeking to acquire land in this general area. For instance, the plaintiff purchased from an owner living in Philadelphia a year or two before he began negotiations with the defendant, a tract in the same neighborhood for $25 per acre, which less than a year later he sold for $150 per acre. He indicated, also, that he had made other offers for land in the neighborhood at prices ranging from $100 per acre to $450 per acre.

2. The defendant, who at the time of trial was seventy-two years of age, was born near Charleston, and grew up on the land involved in this action. She was educated at Tuskegee Institute and took special work in dietetics and child care at Pratt and New York Universities. She apparently moved to New York after leaving Tuskegee Institute and has remained there since, returning, if at all, only occasionally to South Carolina. In the early 1950s, she was adjudged incompetent and "confined to a mental institution". She remained so committed until either 1961 or 1962, the plaintiff being uncertain of which year.¹ She was then restored to a status of legal competency, though for a year after her release from confinement, she was required to report monthly to the mental institution from which she had been released. Thereafter she has continued to consult a psychiatrist.

3. The land involved in this action consists of approximately eighty-three (83) acres, located on the edge of the town of Lincolnville, in Charleston County, South Carolina. It was originally owned by the father of the defendant. Upon the father's death, it descended to the mother and at her death to the defendant and her brothers and sisters.² The defendant had some difficulty with her brothers about the property. The land was unoccupied but the brothers, according to the defendant's statement in a letter to the plaintiff, had sold some timber off the property, without making any settlement with the defendant. Taxes became delinquent and the property was sold at a tax sale, where the defendant bid in the land. Defendant's title rests on this tax deed executed June 11, 1938. In her answer the defendant claimed that she has since held the property adversely to all her brothers and sisters, nieces and nephews; no proof of such adverse possession was offered at trial.

4. So far as the record shows, the defendant had not visited the property in several years prior to her negotiations with the plaintiff; she consulted no knowledgeable person on its value and seems to have acted largely on intuition as to its value in any negotiations with plaintiff.

5. In the fall of 1963, a brother of the plaintiff ascertained from the tax books that the defendant owned the property involved here. At the brother's instance, the plaintiff wrote the defendant on October 2, 1963, that he had "a client who is interested in purchasing * * * the entire acreage" and inquired "the amount you desire per acre". The defendant replied by a letter dated September 9, 1963, but postmarked October 8, 1963, in which, disregarding the plaintiff's expression of interest in "the entire acreage" and requesting a price fixed by the acre, she stated that she was "not selling the property by the acre, I am selling it as one parcel". She added that a broker whom she had consulted wanted 10% commission and inquired whether the plaintiff was a broker willing to act for a 6% commission. Immediately, on receipt of this letter, plaintiff answered, restating his "client's" interest "in purchasing the entire tract" and emphasizing that he only wanted "to know the price and how many actual acres that you (she) have (has)." He concluded with the statement that he would be "glad to handle this matter for only 6%" and pressed the defendant to "advise me (him) by return mail as to your price".

6. On October 15, 1963, the defendant wrote the plaintiff that she could not give "a price for the property at this time, as I must have it surveyed". She referred to the fact that she had been sick "for a long time" but did not indicate the nature of her illness. She seemed particularly interested in securing an accounting with her brothers for timber sold off the property and inquired whether the plaintiff as a lawyer would look out for her interests in that regard.

7. A little over a month later, on December 23, 1963, the plaintiff again wrote the defendant. At the outset, he stated he had looked into the recoverability of her claims against her brothers and expressed the opinion that nothing could be realized thereon. He then reiterated his continuing interest in purchasing the land at Lincolnville. In this letter, he, for the first time, indicated obliquely he was the party interested and not a client. He told the defendant that he would arrange for the survey and that all he wanted to know was "the price per acre that you desire for the property", concluding that, when this is arranged, "then all the incidental matters can be worked out". (Italics added) He added that he "personally" felt "a price between $75.00 and $100.00 per acre would be reasonable, under the situation".

8. Immediately on December 27, 1963, the defendant replied that she had "contacted another Lawyer" about her claims against her brothers. She disclaimed any willingness to sell her property for $100 per acre, pointing out that her father paid more than that for the property in 1898. She informed the plaintiff that "five people" had made offers for her property but she expressed no interest in a sale. stating she would "rather sell trees and keep land".

9. Then, on August 4, 1964, the defendant wrote the plaintiff, referring to the latter's interest on behalf of a client in her property, stating her failure to remember the amount of plaintiff's prior offer, and concluding:

"I am asking $150.00 per acre and will take back 1st Mort at 6% monthly or quarterly payments and my Lawyer will draw up Contract."

Two days later, the plaintiff replied that he "accept(ed) your (her) offer of the sale of your (her) land as stated in your letter of August 4th, 1964, for the amount of $150.00 per acre. Please have your lawyer draw the contract * * *." He referred to the fact that her so-called "offer" was for a credit sale but added, "however, you did not set out the amount of down payment, if any." (Italics added)

It is these two letters of August 4 and August 6, which the plaintiff contends created a contract of sale between the plaintiff and the defendant, the specific performance of which is sought in this action.

10. After the exchange of these two letters, which represent the basis of plaintiff's case, there were repeated efforts on the part of the plaintiff to secure from the defendant or her New York lawyer a written contract of sale. In an effort finally to secure a contract with all the terms set forth, the plaintiff himself prepared a contract of sale and forwarded it to the defendant by letter dated September 2, 1964. This form fixed the down payment as ten per cent. of the purchase price. It provided for a purchase money mortgage securing the balance. The property was to be surveyed and the contract was subject to a title check. The plaintiff explained his insistence on a formal contract by observing that he knew some of the complications surrounding titles in the Lincolnville area and "that is why I have gone to the trouble to prepare this Contract, so that everything will be legal and we can begin to check the title." (Italics added)

11. The defendant promptly replied that she had turned the contract prepared by the plaintiff over to her lawyer. About three weeks later, she wrote the plaintiff that her lawyer disliked the contract submitted, especially the provision requiring her to pay plaintiff a broker's fee, and indicated that her lawyer preferred to draw a contract. The plaintiff answered by requesting the defendant to...