Cravens v. Inman, 1-90-1124

CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois
Citation223 Ill.App.3d 1059,166 Ill.Dec. 409,586 N.E.2d 367
Docket NumberNo. 1-90-1124,1-90-1124
Parties, 166 Ill.Dec. 409 Janice CRAVENS, Special Administrator of the Estate of Joleen Cravens, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David INMAN and Rita Inman, Defendants-Appellees.
Decision Date19 December 1991

Baskin, Server, Berke & Weinstein (Perry M. Berke and John R. Malkinson, of counsel) Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

Hinshaw & Culbertson (Joseph J. O'Connell, Joshua G. Vincent and Gary J. Bazydlo, of counsel), Chicago, for defendants-appellees.

Richard F. Mallen (Richard F. Mallen, of counsel), Chicago, for amicus curiae.

Justice McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:

Joleen Cravens, the minor daughter of Janice Cravens (plaintiff), died from injuries sustained in an automobile accident which occurred while Joleen was a passenger in a motor vehicle driven by her friend, Rita Lenzi (Lenzi), also a minor. Plaintiff filed suit against Lenzi, David and Rita Inman (defendants), and other persons not parties to this appeal. In counts II and III of her complaint, plaintiff alleged that the defendants negligently served Lenzi alcohol at a social gathering at the defendants' home, allowed Lenzi to become intoxicated and leave the social gathering in an automobile, and that Lenzi thereafter drove the car in a reckless manner resulting in a crash that caused the death of the plaintiff's daughter. The trial court dismissed counts II and III against defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Because we conclude that counts II and III of plaintiff's complaint were sufficient to state claims for which relief may be granted based upon common law principles of negligence, we reverse and remand.

The allegations of plaintiff's second amended complaint, which we accept as true for the purpose of review (Ziemba v. Mierzwa (1991), 142 Ill.2d 42, 153 Ill.Dec. 259, 566 N.E.2d 1365), alleged the following. On or about October 31, 1987, defendants held a housewarming party at their New Lenox, Illinois home. The defendants invited adult guests and various minor friends and acquaintances of their son. These minors included Lenzi and plaintiff's daughter, Joleen. The complaint alleges that Joleen and Lenzi were under 16 years of age on the date of the party.

Plaintiff alleged that the defendants knowingly served beer and alcohol to all guests, without supervision, and without determining or observing whether minors were consuming these beverages. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that many, if not all, of their guests arrived at the housewarming party by automobile, that the guests intended to leave by the same method, and that consumption of alcoholic beverages by their guests, including the minors, could and would affect their mental faculties as well as their ability to safely and properly operate a motor vehicle.

Plaintiff alleged that although defendants knew that many of their guests were minors and that alcohol was being served to all guests, the defendants served liquor, and entrusted and permitted their minor son to serve liquor, to the minor son's friends, including Lenzi, throughout the course of the party. Plaintiff alleged that defendants continued to do so after the defendants knew or should have known that such alcohol consumption by the minor guests was causing the minors to become intoxicated and to show "the effects of said intoxication."

According to plaintiff's complaint, defendants permitted Lenzi to continue her alcohol consumption at the housewarming party even after Lenzi had reached a "state of intoxication." Plaintiff alleged that as a result of this intoxication, Lenzi's judgment, senses and faculties became totally impaired, thereby preventing her from appreciating and having an awareness of her condition. Plaintiff alleged that defendants made no effort to determine the manner in which Lenzi was planning on leaving their premises nor her physical condition at the time she in fact left the premises.

Plaintiff alleged that Lenzi left the defendants' home with other guests, including plaintiff's minor daughter, in an automobile owned by another minor who attended the party, Gerard Neauveau (Neauveau). Thereafter, Lenzi took control of the motor vehicle in which the daughter was a passenger. Plaintiff alleged that at this time, Lenzi drove in an uncontrolled and reckless manner, including the avoidance of police pursuit, until Lenzi lost control of the vehicle and it crashed, thereby causing plaintiff's daughter to sustain injuries resulting in her death.

Plaintiff sought damages from defendants based upon common law negligence (count II), breach of statutory duties giving rise to common law negligence (count III), and violation of the Illinois Dram Shop Act (count IV). Plaintiff also alleged negligence claims against Lenzi (count I) and against Neauveau (count V). We note that in count V, directed against Neauveau, plaintiff alleged that when the group initially left the housewarming party, Neauveau was driving the automobile. Plaintiff further alleged that Neauveau stopped at a gas station, got out of the car, and left the motor running and the keys in the ignition. At this point, Lenzi got behind the wheel and began driving the car. Plaintiff alleged that neither Lenzi nor her daughter was of lawful age to drive a motor vehicle, and that neither possessed a license to operate an automobile.

Upon defendants' motion under section 2-615(a) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 110, par. 2-615(a)), the trial court dismissed counts II, III, and IV for failure to state claims for which relief could be granted (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 110, par. 2-615), and found no just reason to delay enforcement of or appeal from this ruling. (134 Ill.2d R. 304(a).) Plaintiff appeals from the dismissal of counts II and III of her second amended complaint.

The fundamental question presented for our review is whether the facts alleged give rise, under Illinois common law, to claims for defendant's negligence liability with respect to the injuries sustained by plaintiff and her deceased daughter. Relying on stare decisis, the defendants claim that we should adopt the view of prior Illinois appellate court decisions that have declined to recognize social host liability for the provision of alcohol to a minor resulting in injury, on the ground that such liability is preempted by the Illinois Dram Shop Act, and requires consideration of factors best resolved by the Illinois legislature or the Illinois Supreme Court. Plaintiff responds that Illinois jurisprudence does not prevent recognition of plaintiff's common law negligence claims, and that this court should adopt the view of other jurisdictions that have recognized social host liability under facts similar to those presented herein.

I. Civil Liability for Alcohol-Related Injuries

In Illinois, a commercial vendor's civil liability for alcohol-related injuries is governed by the Dram Shop Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 43, par. 135.) Subsection (a) of the Act currently states in pertinent part:

"Every person who is injured within this State, in person or property, by any intoxicated person has a right of action in his or her own name, severally or jointly, against any person, licensed under the laws of this State or of any other state to sell alcoholic liquor, who, by selling or giving alcoholic liquor, within or without the territorial limits of this State, causes the intoxication of such person." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 43, par. 135(a).)

Subsection (a) further provides that an "action shall lie for injuries to means of support caused by an intoxicated person or in consequence of the intoxication of any person resulting as hereinabove set out." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 43, par. 135(a).) The Act limits recovery (1) for injury to the person or property to a maximum of $30,000 for each person incurring damages, and (2) for loss of means of support to a maximum of $40,000. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 43, par. 135(a).) Subsection (b) of the Act provides in pertinent part that "[o]nly causes of action arising under subsection (a) * * * may be asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him or her is based upon this subsection." Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 34, par. 135(b); see generally Ogilvie, "History and Appraisal of the Illinois Dram Shop Act," 1958 U.Ill.Law Forum 175; Comment, "The Continuing Search for Solutions to the Drinking Driver Tragedy and the Problem of Social Host Liability," 82 N.W.L.Rev. 403 (1988); Comment, "Social Host Liability: Right Without a Remedy," 19 John Marshall L.Rev. 735 (1986); Comment, "Reconsidering the Illinois Dram Shop Act: A Plea for the Recognition of a Common Law Action in Contemporary Dram Shop Litigation," 19 John Marshall L.Rev. 49 (1985).

Certain provisions of the Liquor Control Act of 1934 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 43, par. 93.9 et seq.) pertain to the provision of alcohol to a minor. Section 6-20 explicitly forbids the consumption of alcohol by anyone under 21 years of age, and prohibits the furnishing of alcohol to an under-age person. This section only permits under-age alcohol consumption when it occurs "in the performance of a religious service or ceremony, or * * * under the direct supervision and approval of the parents or parent or those persons standing in loco parentis of such person under 21 years of age in the privacy of a home * * *." (ILL.REV.STAT.1989, ch. 43, par. 134a.) Violation of this provision is a Class C misdemeanor.

Section 6-16(c) of the Liquor Control Act prohibits a minor's consumption of alcohol at a social gathering:

"(c) Any person shall be guilty of a petty offense where he or she knowingly permits a gathering at a residence which he or she occupies of two or more persons where any one or more of the persons is under 18 years of age and the following factors also apply:

(1) the...

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