Craver v. Spaugh

• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Citation: Craver v. Spaugh, 226 N.C. 450, 38 S.E.2d 525 (N.C. 1946)
• Decision Date: 05 June 1946
• Docket Number: 741
• Parties: CRAVER et al. v. SPAUGH.

38 S.E.2d 525

226 N.C. 450

CRAVER et al. v. SPAUGH.

No. 741

Supreme Court of North Carolina

June 5, 1946

Civil action heard on motion under G.S. s 1-220 to set aside final judgment entered at a former term.

Plaintiffs instituted this action on three alleged causes of action: (1) for personal services to the defendant's intestate, (2) for the value of certain securities delivered to defendant, and (3) for services rendered defendant. The defendant, answering, denies the material allegations in the complaint and pleads the bar of the statute. G.S. s 28-112. The plaintiffs in reply admit their claim was filed and that they waited until August 8, 1945 to institute an action on their claim, but allege there was no agreement to refer and defendant agreed not to plead any statute of limitations.

The suit instituted August 9, 1945 was dismissed by judgment of voluntary nonsuit at the September Term 1945. This action was instituted November 21, 1945. It was calendared for trial January 21, 1946 and was called January 30, 1946. After some discussion it was continued to be set at the next term. The cause was then calendared for trial during the first week and also the third week of the February Term. Counsel for plaintiffs received a copy of the calendar and noted the setting during the third week but failed to note the first week setting. They advised their clients to prepare for trial during the third week.

The case was duly reached and called for trial during the first week. The court made a diligent effort to contact counsel for plaintiffs but was unable to do so for the reason that he was necessarily out of the State on other business. It proceeded to trial and entered judgment that plaintiffs recover nothing.

Upon his return, counsel, discovering that judgment had been entered in his absence, promptly filed this motion to vacate for excusable neglect.

Upon the hearing the court upon the evidence offered found and concluded: (1) that the neglect of plaintiffs was not excusable, and (2) plaintiffs do not have a meritorious cause of action. It thereupon entered judgment denying the motion, and plaintiffs appealed.

Walser & Wright, of High Point, for plaintiff-appellants.

Ratcliff Vaughn, Hudson & Ferrell, of Winston-Salem, for defendant-appellee.

BARNHILL Justice.

We have held that it is the duty of a litigant to keep himself advised as to the time his cause is calendared for trial and, when it is so calendared, he is fixed with notice thereof. Cahoon v. Brinkley, 176 N.C. 5, 96 S.E 650. Even so, plaintiffs here employed well-known and capable counsel who regularly practice in the courts of Forsyth County. They were notified by counsel that the cause was calendared for the third week. They relied on this information. So then, it might well be conceded that the oversight of counsel is not to be held against them.

But that is not the decisive fact here. The defendant offered evidence tending to show that plaintiffs, on July 21, 1942, filed with him a verified statement of their claim; that on July 25, 1942 plaintiffs were notified in writing of the rejection thereof; that the claim was not referred, G.S. s 28-111, and that plaintiffs did not institute suit on said claim until November 21, 1945, more than six months after written notice of the rejection thereof. This evidence tends to establish a complete plea in bar. G.S. s 28-112. The burden of proof was on the plaintiffs. Yet they did not attempt to refute this testimony. Nor did they offer any evidence of an agreement by defendant not to plead the statute, G.S. s 28-112, other than the bare statement contained in their reply, although defendant went on the stand and swore he made no such agreement. Upon this and the other evidence offered, the court below found and concluded: 'Plaintiffs do not have a meritorious cause of action, and have no reasonable hope of successfully prosecuting their alleged claims.'

Existence of a meritorious cause of action is a prerequisite to relief on the motion to vacate the former judgment. Roediger v. Sapos, 217 N.C. 95, 6 S.E.2d 801; Garrett v. Trent, 216 N.C. 162, 4 S.E.2d 319; Cayton v. Clark, 212 N.C. 374, 193 S.E. 404; Hooks v. Neighbors, 211 N.C. 382, 190 S.E. 236; Parham v. Hinnant, 206 N.C. 200, 173 S.E. 26; Parham v. Morgan, 206 N.C. 201, 173 S.E. 27; Bowie v. Tucker, 197 N.C. 671, 150 S.E. 200; Cahoon v. Brinkley, supra.

The finding that plaintiffs have no meritorious cause of action is supported by competent evidence and is conclusive on appeal. Kerr v. Bank, 205 N.C. 410, 171 S.E. 367; Carter v. Anderson, 208 N.C. 529, 181 S.E. 750; Crye v. Stoltz, 193 N.C. 802, 138 S.E. 167; Allen v. McPherson, 168 N.C. 435, 84 S.E. 766. It is binding on us. Turner v. Grain Co., 190 N.C. 331, 129 S.E. 775; Gaster v. Thomas, 188 N.C. 346, 124 S.E. 609.

On motions of this kind the movant is out of court by judgment entered. He is seeking to have the court exercise its discretionary power to relieve him of the results of his own or his counsel's negligence. He must then and there satisfy the judge that he has a cause of action or defense upon which he should be heard. While the verified complaint may be used as evidence on this point, the allegations therein are not conclusive or irrebuttable. Neither will they override a finding of the judge made on conflicting testimony. The judge...