Crawford Cnty. Oil, LLC v. Weger

• Decision Date: 15 August 2014
• Docket Number: No. 5–13–0382.,5–13–0382.
• Citation: 15 N.E.3d 978
• Parties: CRAWFORD COUNTY OIL, LLC, and LaCross, Inc., Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. Floyd WEGER, Michael Worthy, Paula Worthy, and Charlene Cornwell, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

15 N.E.3d 978

CRAWFORD COUNTY OIL, LLC, and LaCross, Inc., Plaintiffs–Appellants

v.Floyd WEGER, Michael Worthy, Paula Worthy, and Charlene Cornwell, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 5–13–0382.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

Aug. 15, 2014.

Gregory K. Stewart, Conger & Elliott, P.C., Carmi, IL, for Appellants.

Thomas G. Maag, Maag Law Firm, LLC, Wood River, IL, for Appellees.

OPINION

Justice SPOMER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Upon the motion of the plaintiffs, Crawford County Oil, LLC, and LaCross, Inc., the circuit court of Crawford County certified the following questions for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010):(1) Are factual allegations in a complaint which are not denied deemed admitted? (2) If a fact is deemed admitted in the pleadings, is the admission a judicial admission making it unnecessary for the party to introduce evidence in support thereof? and (3) Does a trial court have discretion to order a defendant, after the close of the plaintiffs' case-in-chief, to make an initial answer to the plaintiffs' complaint when the defendant had not previously answered the allegations in the complaint? For the following reasons, we find that answering the certified questions, as written, will not materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation, and as such, we limit the scope of our answer to these questions to the facts of this case, in which the defendants have not filed an answer at all, and the plaintiffs have sought judicial admission of the allegations of the complaint pursuant to section 2–610 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2–610 (West 2012) ). Under these circumstances, we hold that section 2–610 of the Code is inapplicable in situations where there has been no answer filed, and as such, answer the first question, as we have reframed it, in the negative, rendering the second certified question moot. Furthermore, under these circumstances, where the plaintiffs, on the day of trial, filed a motion pursuant to section 2–610 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2–610 (West 2012) ) seeking to have all of the allegations of the complaint deemed admitted for the failure of the defendants to file an answer, we hold that the circuit court has the discretion to allow the defendants to file an answer, and as such, answer the third certified question, as we have reframed it, in the affirmative. Having answered the certified questions as we have reframed them in order to materially advance the termination of this litigation, in the interests of judicial economy and the need to reach an equitable result, we remand these proceedings to the circuit court with directions that its order be amended to require that the answer be in writing and contain a verification in accordance with section 2–605 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2–605 (West 2012) ).

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 On March 7, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the circuit court of Crawford County against the defendants, Floyd Weger, Michael Worthy, Paula Worthy, and Charlene Cornwell. According to the complaint, the plaintiffs own an interest in oil and gas leases on the defendants' properties and have ceased production on certain wells located on those properties, which requires the plaintiffs, under Illinois Department of Natural Resources (IDNR) regulations, to plug those wells. The complaint alleges that the defendants ejected the plaintiffs from their respective properties while the plaintiffs were attempting to plug the subject wells and continue to deny the plaintiffs access to their properties for this purpose. In the complaint, the plaintiffs request an injunction requiring the defendants to grant them access to the properties so that they may plug the wells. The complaint is verified pursuant to section 2–605 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2–605 (West 2010) ).

¶ 4 On April 8, 2011, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, and on June 28, 2011, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. According to a docket entry dated July 20, 2012, the circuit court entered an order denying the motion for summary judgment, but the record contains no documentation to indicate that the motion to dismiss was ever called for hearing or ruled upon.

¶ 5 On March 12, 2013, a bench trial commenced and both parties affirmed that they were ready to proceed with the trial. Prior to beginning their case-in-chief, the plaintiffs requested leave of court to read the allegations of the complaint into the record as judicial admissions pursuant to section 2–610 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2–610 (West 2010) ), because the defendants failed to file an answer. In response, the defendants noted that there was no order directing that an answer be filed by a specific date. In addition, the defendants argued that the allegations of the complaint should be considered, at most, evidentiary admissions that could be rebutted by contrary evidence, rather than judicial admissions. In addition, the defendants offered to orally answer the complaint by admitting or denying each allegation on the record. After a recess, the circuit court ruled that it had discretion to consider the allegations of the complaint as evidentiary admissions rather than judicial admissions, citing Hecht v. Hecht, 49 Ill.App.3d 334, 7 Ill.Dec. 169, 364 N.E.2d 330 (1977). Because the circuit court wished to decide the case on substance, rather than procedure, the circuit court announced it would exercise its discretion to allow for the introduction of evidence to rebut the allegations of the complaint.

¶ 6 The plaintiffs limited their case-in-chief to providing evidence that they had no adequate remedy at law for the defendants' refusal to allow them access to the wells. The plaintiffs introduced testimony from an attorney who specialized in mineral law, as well as the plaintiffs' corporate representatives, explaining that as the holders of the permits from IDNR to operate the wells on the defendants' properties, IDNR holds them responsible for compliance with IDNR regulations regarding the plugging of unused wells regardless of the surrounding circumstances. According to the testimony, because the defendants will not permit the plaintiffs to enter their properties to plug the wells, the IDNR can issue a “permit block” against the plaintiffs for violating IDNR regulations, essentially forcing the plaintiffs out of business. In addition, until the wells are plugged, according to the plaintiffs' witnesses, the plaintiffs are subject to indefinite liability in the form of civil penalties and potential liability for environmental damage. On cross-examination, the witnesses admitted that if the plaintiffs chose to transfer the leases on the unplugged wells to another operator, and IDNR chose to issue permits to the transferee operator, the plaintiffs would cease to have liability. Following the testimony of these witnesses, the plaintiffs rested their case-in-chief and court was recessed for the day.

¶ 7 On the next day of the bench trial, the plaintiffs made a motion to reconsider the circuit court's ruling that the allegations of the complaint stand as evidentiary admissions rather than judicial admissions based on the defendants' failure to file an answer to the complaint. The plaintiffs argued that the circuit court's reliance on Hecht was misplaced because the ruling in that case was based on provisions of the Divorce Act, then in effect, which provided that the court shall not grant a divorce unless it is satisfied that the cause of the divorce has been fully proven. 49 Ill.App.3d at 339–40, 7 Ill.Dec. 169, 364 N.E.2d 330 (citing Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 40, ¶ 9). The circuit court granted the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider, but granted the defendants leave to read an answer into the record.

¶ 8 The defendants' counsel read an admission or denial of each allegation of the complaint into the record, and called corporate representatives to provide verification of the answer under oath. In response, the plaintiffs requested a continuance, explaining to the court that based on what had transpired, they would have to conduct discovery that they had not previously conducted due to what they characterized as the defendants' admissions by failure to plead. The circuit court granted the continuance.

¶ 9 On March 25, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider the circuit court's ruling granting the defendants leave to orally answer the complaint after they had rested their case-in-chief, or in the alternative, to certify questions for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). On April 15, 2013, the circuit court denied the motion to reconsider but granted the plaintiffs leave to draft proposed certified questions for approval by the circuit court. On July 26, 2013, the circuit court entered an order pursuant to Rule 308, certifying the aforementioned certified questions for our review, and we subsequently granted the plaintiffs' petition for leave to appeal.

¶ 10 ANALYSIS

¶ 11 Because this appeal concerns questions of law certified by the circuit court pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010), our standard of review is de novo. In re M.M.D., 213 Ill.2d 105, 113, 289 Ill.Dec. 616, 820 N.E.2d 392 (2004). Although the scope of our review is generally limited to the questions that are certified by the circuit court, if the questions so certified require limitation in order to materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, such limitation is proper. See De Bouse v. Bayer AG, 235 Ill.2d 544, 557, 337 Ill.Dec. 186, 922 N.E.2d 309 (2009). In addition, in the interests of judicial economy and the need to reach an equitable result, we may consider the propriety of the circuit court order that gave rise to these proceedings. Id. at 558, 337 Ill.Dec. 186, 922 N.E.2d 309 (citing Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v. Haas, 226 Ill.2d 334, 354, 314 Ill.Dec....