Crawford & Company v. Apfel

Decision Date14 December 2000
Docket NumberNo. 99-2201,Docket No. 98-00065-CV-ORL-18C,99-2201
Parties(11th Cir. 2000) CRAWFORD & COMPANY, FLEETWOOD HOMES OF FLORIDA, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellant. D. C
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida

Before ANDERSON, Chief Judge, DUBINA and HILL, Circuit Judges.

HILL, Circuit Judge:

The merits of this appeal present a novel issue of first impression under Title II, 42 U.S.C. 405, of the Social Security Act (Act) and its applicable regulations, 20 C.F.R. 404.932 and 416.1432.1 The merits of the federal law issue presented in this case are juxtaposed against the backdrop of a state statute, Florida's Workers' Compensation Law, Fla. Stat. Ch. 440 (1994).

The Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) appeals from an eighteen-word handwritten order of the district court. By this squib notation, written in the left-hand margin of the report and recommendation (R&R) of the magistrate judge, the district court rejected the R&R, finding that the court had subject matter jurisdiction and that the plaintiff corporations could intervene as proper parties to an individual claimant's social security disability hearing.2 For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the district court.

I. Factual Background

The underlying facts are not in issue and are pertinent only to set the stage for this appeal. In 1994, Deborah D. Scott, while employed by Fleetwood Homes of Florida (Fleetwood) as an assistant foreman, was injured on the job.3 In 1995, Scott filed an application for federal social security disability insurance benefits and an application for supplemental security income.4 She also filed a state claim in Florida for workers' compensation seeking permanent total disability (PTD) benefits.

II. Procedural Background

The underlying procedural background of this appeal is germane. In 1996, Fleetwood, and Crawford & Company, Inc. (Crawford), described as Fleetwood's workers' compensation insurance carrier, filed a motion to intervene in Scott's social security disability case, pending before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). They contended that their rights would be "adversely affected" by the decision of the ALJ making them proper parties to the hearing under 20 C.F.R. 404.932(b).5 They argued that Scott might, without their presence in the federal forum, receive a finding of "catastrophic injury" from the ALJ. This ruling could in turn be relied upon by the Florida Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) to support an award of PTD benefits in the state forum, payable by responsible parties Fleetwood and Crawford to Scott, perhaps for the rest of her life.6

Using a rationale supported by Fed. R. Civ. P. 24, the ALJ found that Fleetwood and Crawford were not proper parties to Scott's hearing, and denied their motion to intervene.7 He reasoned that, under Florida law, it was not mandatory, only discretionary, for a JCC to consider a decision by an ALJ. Therefore the outcome of Scott's federal case was not legally binding, nor necessarily even considered, in her state case. The ALJ concluded that Fleetwood and Crawford would have an opportunity to protect their interest in Scott's state case; this was their sole remedy.

Fleetwood and Crawford then filed its first petition in district court challenging the ALJ ruling. The magistrate judge dismissed their petition for lack of jurisdiction on the basis that there was no final decision to review.8 Upon motion for reconsideration, the magistrate judge reconfirmed its original disposition, granting Fleetwood and Crawford leave to seek review by the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration (SSA) in order to exhaust their administrative remedies and to obtain a final decision of the Commissioner.

So Fleetwood and Crawford filed a petition for review with the Appeals Council. Finding that Fleetwood and Crawford had "not claimed any benefits or other rights provided under Title II or XVI of the Act and ha[d] not established that such rights would be adversely affected," the Appeals Council dismissed their request for review "because they [were] not a proper party" under the regulations. See 20 C.F.R. 404.932; 416.1432.9

Now armed with a final decision, Fleetwood and Crawford returned to district court with a second petition for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 405(g).10 The Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition for lack of standing and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The magistrate judge recommended that the motion be granted on the basis that 405(g) did not confer jurisdiction upon the court.

Citing 405(b)(1)11, he stated:

Petitioners are corporations, not individuals. Congress has taken great care to specifically name each individual who may seek an administrative determination of entitlement to disability benefits . . . Because Congress limited benefit determinations to individuals . . . Congress had no need to allow anyone other than an individual to seek judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision . . . [It] did not allow corporations to seek judicial review from the Commissioner's decision that [Fleetwood and Crawford] are not proper parties to a hearing because Congress envisioned only listed individuals as requesting, or intervening in, hearings.

In a footnote, the magistrate judge noted that, from examining the record, there was no indication: (1) that the Florida JCC would be bound to follow the determination of the Commissioner, nor (2) that the Florida JCC would not allow Fleetwood and Crawford an opportunity to present their evidence in the state workers' compensation proceeding.

The district court rejected the R&R by this handwritten notation: "The recommendation is rejected. The Court finds that plaintiffs are proper parties and therefore have subject matter jurisdiction." In response to the Commissioner's motion to clarify, the district court again made a handwritten notation across the top of the motion: "Granted. The Court's decision was based on the memo in opposition to the magistrate R&R [filed by Fleetwood and Crawford and treated as a motion for rehearing]." Six weeks later, the ALJ determined that Scott was entitled to social security disability benefits. The district court stamp- granted Fleetwood and Crawford's motion for final judgment, with the hand-written notation across the top: "Final Judgment. Petitioners are proper parties." The Commissioner filed this appeal.

III. ISSUES ON APPEAL

Three issues are presented on appeal:

A. Whether the `Final Judgment' of the district court finding that Fleetwood and Crawford are proper parties to Scott's social security disability hearing is immediately appealable?

B. If the order is immediately appealable and this court has jurisdiction, whether this appeal is moot, as Scott's state workers' compensation proceeding is now final?

C. If this appeal is not moot, whether Fleetwood and Crawford are proper parties under the Act and applicable regulations to Scott's social security disability hearing before the ALJ?

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The decisions by the district court that subject matter jurisdiction was present, 42 U.S.C. 405(g), to review the final decision of the Commissioner that Fleetwood and Crawford were not proper parties to Scott's social security disability hearing, 42 U.S.C. 401(b)(1), raise pure questions of law that we review de novo. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta v. Thomas, 220 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 2000).

V. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction

We raised the issue of jurisdiction sua sponte. The parties responded in supplemental briefings.

The jurisdiction of this court in social security proceedings is limited to final orders of the district courts. 28 U.S.C. 1291. A final order is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute its judgment." Huie v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1986)(citations omitted). Generally, an order of a district court remanding a case to the Commissioner is not an appealable order.12 Id. However the Supreme Court has held a judgment of the district court that reverses the decision of the Commissioner and orders a remand to the SSA is final and appealable under 1291 when entered under the fourth sentence of 405(g).13 Forney v. Apfel, 118 S.Ct. 1984, 1986-87 (1998).

The Commissioner argues that jurisdiction is present under the fourth sentence of 405(g). Fleetwood and Crawford argue it is not, although both sides appear to agree that this is an jurisdictional issue of first impression.14 We need not address whether jurisdiction is present under 405(g), as we conclude, after reviewing the briefs of the parties, that the precedential authority of this circuit establishes that the judgment of the district court, even if not "final" per se, is reviewable under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 69 S.Ct. 1221 (1949). Huie, 788 F.2d at 701- 02. "[T]he Cohen doctrine allows appeals to be taken from orders that (1) finally determine claims entirely collateral to and separable from the substance of other claims in the action, (2) require review because they present significant, unsettled questions, and (3) cannot be reviewed effectively once the case is finally decided." Id.

This appeal satisfies all three prongs of Cohen. First, the issue of whether third-party corporations not claiming benefits may participate in an individual claimant's disability hearing is a structural matter unrelated to the merits of the individual's disability claim. Id. Second, the issue is important as the broad mandate of the district court would create a fundamental change in the social security disability hearing and would be unprecedented in nature. Id. Third, the issue would be otherwise unreviewable.15 Id. We therefore find jurisdiction present...

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