Crawford's Adm'r v. Turner's Adm'r

• Decision Date: 17 May 1910
• Citation: 68 S.E. 179,67 W.Va. 564
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: CRAWFORD'S ADM'R v. TURNER'S ADM'R et al.

68 S.E. 179

(67 W.Va. 564)

CRAWFORD'S ADM'R

v.TURNER'S ADM'R et al.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

May 17, 1910.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. Equity (§§ 87, 219^*)—Legal Demand-Limitations.

Whenever a mere legal demand is properly cognizable by suit in equity, the statute of limitations will be observed in relation to it by the equity court; and if the bill discloses the bar of the statute, a demurrer thereto will be sustained.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. §§ 242-244, 498; Dec. Dig. §§ 87, 219.*]

2. Limitation of Actions (§ 82*)—Claims to Decedent's Estate.

As to a demand which accrues to a decedent's estate after his death, the statutory period of limitation of suit is counted from the time his personal representative qualifies, if that is within five years after his death; but if there is no qualification of a personal representative within five years after his death, then the period is counted from the end of that five years.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Limitation of Actions, Cent. Dig. §§ 425, 427; Dec. Dig. § 82.*]

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County.

Bill by J. Garland Hurst Sheriff, as administrator with the will annexed of David Crawford, deceased, against W. F. Turner's administrator and others. Decree for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Forrest W. Brown, for appellant.

Joseph Trapnell and Benj. Trapnell, for appellees.

ROBINSON, P. This suit was once before in this court on appeal. The decision then announced is reported in 58 W. Va. 600, 52 S. E. 716, 112 Am. St. Rep. 1014. A reference to it suffices to disclose the original character of the suit. By that decision the bill was held to be bad, and the cause remanded with leave to amend. Then amendments of the bill were made in the court below. But the court sustained a demurrer to the bill as amended and dismissed it From the decree in the premises, the plaintiff brings this appeal. Let us here observe that what we shall say must be read in the light of the former opinion. We shall not iterate what is already in the reports.

The bill as amended charges a personal liability against Ellen Beirne Saunders, one of the heirs of William F. Turner, deceased, and, through the attachment formerly issued in the suit, seeks to enforce the same against land purchased and owned by her in this state. It seeks to collect from her a debt originally due from the estate of the ancestor from whom she inherited other real estate. The liability is charged against her on the ground that she inherited real estate from that ancestor which she sold for a sum largely in excess of the debt demanded. The real estate inherited by her was situate in Illinois. Under the law of that state, she was personally liable to the creditors of the ancestor from whom she inherited the real estate, to the amount of the value thereof, provided the personal assets of the ancestor were insufficient to pay his debts.

As the case comes to us, our consideration is directed wholly to the sufficiency of the bill as amended. Many of the objections to this amended bill need not be noticed. They are precluded from discussion by a single point that is so decisive in showing insufficiency as alone to justify the decree sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the bill. We shall pass upon no other point in relation to the amended bill's sufficiency. Even if the allegations and proceedings are sufficient in other particulars to fix a liability on Ellen Beirne Saunders, and to call for enforcement of that liability against the land attached, the amended bill is fatally bad and unsustainable, because on its face it plainly discloses that the liability alleged against her was barred at the time the suit was instituted. This insufficiency did not appear on the former appeal. The bill then under consideration was uncertain in its allegations relative to the source from which it sought payment. That bill did not plainly aver from whom it was seeking to collect the debt, or upon what land it sought to charge the same. If the original bill related to land owned by Ellen Beirne Saunders which she had inherited from Turner subject to his debts, or related to a demand against Turner's ad-ministrator, the debt may not have been barred as against his estate for all that appeared from the original allegations. But now, with the amendment seeking clearly to make a case of personal liability against Ellen Beirne Saunders, the bar appears on the face of the bill as amended. No facts are set forth to take the case out of the statute— to excuse the plaintiff for delay beyond the legal period. The statute of limitations is applicable on demurrer to a bill in equity. 9 Enc. Dig. Va. & W. Va. Rep. 445.

The demand alleged in the amended bill is purely a pecuniary one. A personal debt is demanded from Ellen Beirne Saunders. Though the jurisdiction for this suit in equity on that alleged personal debt may be well founded, the claim is nevertheless of the character of those ordinarily cognizable at law. It is in fact a mere legal demand. Therefore, the legal statue of limitations is applicable. That statute will be followed by the equity court. Sibley v. Stacey, 53 W. Va. 202, 44 S. E. 420. It bars the claim in five years from the time it begins to run. And notwithstanding the liability arose in Illinois, yet in the enforcement of it our courts will apply our own law of limitation of suit, because that law really refers to the remedy for collection and not to the liability itself. The Illinois law ordaining the liability does not particularly apply...