Crawford v. Baker

• Decision Date: 26 September 1952
• Docket Number: No. 2,No. 34156,34156,2
• Citation: 86 Ga.App. 855,72 S.E.2d 790
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Parties: CRAWFORD v. BAKER et al

Page 790

72 S.E.2d 790

86 Ga.App. 855

CRAWFORD v. BAKER et al.

No. 34156.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 2.

Sept. 26, 1952.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. A decree in a court of equity is conclusive on all questions raised or which could have been raised, relating to the subject matter afffected by such decree, and the same will be a good cause of bar of an action subsequently brought between the same parties upon the same subject matter in a court of competent jurisdiction.

2. Where the pleadings and decree in a suit for injunctive relief, relating to a contract between the plaintiff and one of the defendants, is proved to sustain a plea of res adjudicata interposed by the defendants in a subsequent proceeding at law in the same court based upon the same subject matter and between the same parties--that is, for compensatory and punitive damages sustained by the plaintiff and flowing from this contract and which might have been included in the original injunctive proceeding, the trial court properly directed a verdict in favor of the defendants on said plea of res adjudicata, and did not err in overruling the plaintiff's motion for a new trial, assigning error upon the direction of such verdict.

On December 18, 1950, Mrs. J. M. Crawford brought suit in the Superior Court of Fulton County against J. E. Baker, The American Oil Company, H. C. Posey, and Fred J. J. Baker, as the Stratford Coal Company, a partnership, and Mrs. J. E. (Enola) Baker, in which she sought to recover as compensatory and punitive damages the sum of $25,000. This action was based upon an alleged contract between her and the defendant, J. E. Baker, whereby the plaintiff, who was a tank truck dealer for The Texas Company for a portion of Atlanta and the surrounding territory, engaging in the wholesale distribution of Texaco petroleum products, agreed to furnish and install certain equipment for the operation of a gasoline filling station owned and operated by J. E. Baker located at 2879 Gordon Road, Atlanta, Georgia, and to other dealers to whom he might lease the premises during the term of the contract, which was seven and one-half years. It was set up that the defendants, said Bakers and Posey, were about to breach said contract and that The American Oil Company had advised J. E. Baker and H. C. Posey and Fred J. Baker that the contract was void and not enforceable, thereby attempting to induce such defendants to breach said contract and enter into a contract with the said defendant, The American Oil Company. It was further set out that such statements and inducements were made for the purpose of maliciously inducing said defendants, J. E. Baker, H. C. Posey and Fred J. Baker, to breach said contract with the plaintiff and that such inducements were made without legal justification or excuse, and same constituted a malicious interference with her contractual rights. The plaintiff set up that during the sixty-six months the contract had run, she had made a net profit of $80 a month and that she had every reason to believe that she would have made a minimum of $80 monthly during the remaining thirty-six months before the expiration of the contract, and prayed that she be awarded compensatory damages therefor, and also punitive damages by reason of the 'tortious conduct of the defendants complained of' which was 'of an aggravated character of both the act and the intention' on the part of the individual defendants in breaching said contract with her and as to the said American Oil Company in maliciously causing this contract to be breached. This contract was attached to and made a part of this suit.

To this action all of the defendants interposed a plea of res adjudicata, the basis of the plea being that the plaintiff was concluded by the verdict and decree of the court in an action which she had brought against the same defendants in said court based on said contract, and in which she sought injunctive relief against all of said defendants. In the equitable petition, the plaintiff alleged that the Bakers and Posey were about to breach said contract between the plaintiff and J. E. Baker, and that the defendant oil company 'advised the defendant J. E. Baker and the defendants H. C. Posey and Fred J. Baker that the contract attached hereto was void and unenforceable, thereby attempting to induce the defendants, J. E. Baker, H. C. Posey, and Fred J. Baker to breach said contract and enter into a contract with the said defendant, The American Oil Company.' The plaintiff further alleged that 'such statements and inducements were made for the purpose of maliciously inducing said defendants, J. E. Baker, H. C. Posey, and Fred J. Baker, to breach said contract with the petitioner and that such inducements were made without legal justification or excuse.' The plaintiff then alleged that she would suffer irreparable damage unless the defendants were enjoined from breaching said contract made between her and said J. E. Baker and unless the defendant, The American Oil Company, was enjoined from causing said contract to be breached. The plaintiff further set up that she had no complete and adequate remedy at law. The plaintiff prayed that the defendants be temporarily and permanently enjoined from using the plaintiff's equipment on the property on Gordon Road; that the American Oil Company be temporarily restrained from inducing the defendants, H. C. Posey, Fred J. Baker and J. E. Baker, to breach said contract with her and that she have other relief, as to the court might seem proper. It appeared that the defendants demurred generally to the plaintiff's petition, and also filed answers thereto. On the hearing, the trial court sustained the general demurrer and dismissed the plaintiff's petition, and the plaintiff sued out her bill of exceptions to the Supreme Court of Georgia, where that judgment was reversed. See Crawford v. Baker, 207 Ga. 56, 58, 60 S.E.2d 146, where the facts in the equitable proceeding are fully set forth.

It appeared that thereafter Mrs. J. E. (Enola) Baker was made a party defendant, and the case proceeded with such defendant as a party. The case was then tried in Fulton Superior Court before a jury and on December 15, 1950, a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff as follows: 'We, the jury, find in favor of the plaintiff and direct that an injunction be directed against the following defendants: J. E. Baker, H. C. Posey, Fred J. Baker, Mrs. J. E. (Enola) Baker, The American Oil Company.' The court thereupon rendered the following judgment and decree: 'This case coming on for a hearing before a jury and the jury having found for plaintiff against all the defendants, it is hereby ordered and decreed that the defendants, J. E. Baker, H. C. Posey, Fred J. Baker, Mrs. Enola Baker and The American Oil Company be permanently enjoined as prayed.'

The trial court overruled a general demurrer interposed by the plaintiff to the plea of res adjudicata of said defendants, and to this judgment the plaintiff filed her exceptions pendente lite.

The issues formed by said plea of res adjudicata were tried before the court and a jury and the entire record, including the verdict and decree fo the court, in said equitable proceedings, were introduced in evidence. Thereupon the defendants moved that a verdict be directed by the court in favor of the defendants on said plea of res adjudicata, and the trial court accordingy directed a verdict in favor of all the defendants. The plaintiff thereupon moved for a new trial, which the court overruled, and she excepts to this court.

McKenzie & Kaler, Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Barrett & Hayes, T. J. Long, Atlanta, for defendant in error.

GARDNER, Presiding Judge.

'A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue, or which under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered, until such judgment shall be reversed or set aside.' Code, § 110-501. There is no dispute relative to the fact that the two actions involved were between the same parties and also that the decree in the equitable action was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. So the matter resolves itself into a determination whether the same subject matter was involved in the two proceedings and whether in the equitable proceeding the plaintiff put in issue, or, under the rules of law, could have put in issue all matters now involved. Each action was predicated entirely upon and grew out of the contract between the plaintiff and J. E. Baker. In the first proceeding, which was an action in equity for injunctive relief, the plaintiff sought to prevent certain of the defendants from breaching the contract, which had already run sixty-six months and which had thirty-six months to run, and to prevent the defendant, The American Oil Company, from interfering with her contractual rights under this agreement by inducing and persuading the other defendants to breach the same by telling them that the agreement was invalid and was not...