Crawford v. Barker

Decision Date09 June 2011
Docket NumberNo. SC09–1969.,SC09–1969.
Citation64 So.3d 1246
PartiesLinda CRAWFORD, Petitioner,v.Jannie BARKER, etc., Respondent.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

James L. Weintraub, Boca Raton, FL, for Petitioner.Thomas F. Pepe of Pepe and Nemire, P.A., Coral Gables, FL, for Respondent.PARIENTE, J.

Linda Crawford seeks review of the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Barker v. Crawford, 16 So.3d 901 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), on the ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Smith v. Smith, 919 So.2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The conflict issue, which is one of contract interpretation, is whether language in a marital settlement agreement, which specifically refers to a beneficiary-designated policy, plan, or account (such as a deferred compensation fund or life insurance policy), but does not state who is or is not to receive the death benefits and does not specify the beneficiary, trumps the predissolution beneficiary designation on the policy, plan, or account.

For the reasons explained below, we hold that absent the marital settlement agreement providing who is or is not to receive the death benefits or specifying who is to be the beneficiary, courts should look no further than the named beneficiary in the separate document of the policy, plan, or account. General language in a marital settlement agreement, such as language stating who is to receive ownership, is not specific enough to override the plain language of the beneficiary designation in the separate document. The spouse, who owns the policy, plan, or account following the dissolution of marriage, is otherwise free to name any individual as the beneficiary; however, if the spouse does not change the beneficiary, the beneficiary designation in the separate document controls. Accordingly, we quash the Third District's decision below and approve the Fifth District's decision in Smith.

FACTS

Manuel Crawford and Linda Crawford were married in 1984. In 1993, Manuel opened a deferred compensation fund and listed Linda as the beneficiary. Then in August 2005, Manuel filed for divorce. During the divorce proceedings, Manuel was represented by an attorney, but Linda was not. The circuit court referred the parties to mediation. At mediation, the parties reached an agreement as to the distribution of their assets, including Manuel's pension plan, deferred compensation fund, and annuity. The issue in this case pertains only to the death benefits of the deferred compensation fund. The signed Amended Family Mediation Unit Agreement provided in relevant part: “Husband shall retain retirement money with the Town of Surfside and the Deferred Compensation Fund f/ka/ [sic] Pepsco.”

The agreement also provided that the husband “shall retain annuity with Pacific Life.” The agreement did not contain a general waiver provision or any other provision referencing the pension, annuity, or the deferred compensation fund at issue in this case.

Manuel Crawford died approximately one year after the divorce was final. Prior to his death, he did not change the named beneficiary on the deferred compensation fund. His daughter, Jannie Barker, was appointed as personal representative of his estate. Barker filed an emergency motion for civil enforcement of the final judgment in the family law division of the circuit court.1 Specifically, she asserted that Linda Crawford had failed to comply with the final judgment because Linda made claims on property given to Manuel in the divorce proceedings, including retirement money. The circuit court referred the matter to a general magistrate.

The general magistrate held hearings but did not take evidence. During the hearing, the magistrate called the Town of Surfside human resources department, which indicated that the Town of Surfside pension plan had been paid to Barker.2 Prior to and at the hearings, the parties reached an agreement on all of the disputed property except for the deferred compensation fund with Nationwide Retirement Solutions at issue in this case, which the record indicated is the deferred compensation fund referred to in the agreement. The stipulation provided that Barker waived any claim to the Pacific Life annuity account and that those proceeds would be distributed to Linda Crawford as the listed beneficiary.

Following the hearings, the general master filed a report and recommendation finding that the death benefits of the deferred compensation fund with Nationwide Retirement Solutions should be paid to Jannie Barker, not Linda Crawford. The general magistrate found as follows:

5. The amended mediated settlement agreement that is incorporated into the final judgment of dissolution of marriage between the parties provides that “Husband shall retain retirement money with ... the Deferred Compensation Fund f/ka/ [sic] Pepsco.” The Deferred Compensation Fund with Pepsco is one and the same as the Deferred Compensation Fund with Nationwide Retirement Solutions which fund is at issue in this case.

6. During the course of the marriage, Linda Crawford—wife” was named as the designated beneficiary of the Deferred Compensation Fund. However, Linda Crawford and Manuel R. Crawford agreed at the time of the signing of the amended mediated settlement agreement that Manuel R. Crawford should get the money from this fund and that he should be the beneficiary. Manuel R. Crawford could have reaffirmed the designation of Linda Crawford had he chosen to do so following the dissolution of marriage. The fact that he did not reaffirm Linda Crawford as the beneficiary of this account confirms his intent that he was the beneficiary of this fund and that the money from the fund remained his at all times following the dissolution.

The general magistrate ordered Linda Crawford to “execute all documents required by the Deferred Compensation Fund and Nationwide Retirement Solutions (‘Nationwide’) for the transfer of the Fund, held by Nationwide in the name of Manuel R. Crawford, to the Estate of Manuel R. Crawford.”

Linda Crawford filed exceptions to the general magistrate's report and recommendation. She argued that no reference was made in the settlement agreement with regard to the disposition of her expectancy interests or her beneficiary rights. Thus, she contended, under this Court's decision in Cooper v. Muccitelli ( Cooper II ), 682 So.2d 77 (Fla.1996), and the Fifth District's decision in Smith v. Smith, 919 So.2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), in the absence of specific reference in the agreement to the proceeds (or death benefits), the recipient is determined by looking only to the designated beneficiary.

The circuit court sustained Linda Crawford's exceptions to the general magistrate's report. The circuit court's order stated: This Court finds that no reference was made in the Amended Family Mediation Unit Agreement incorporated by reference into the Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage to the Respondent's beneficiary rights to the proceeds of the subject deferred compensation account.” Accordingly, the circuit court ordered that Linda Crawford, as the designated beneficiary, was entitled to the proceeds of the deferred compensation fund.

Barker appealed the circuit court's order to the Third District Court of Appeal. The Third District reversed the circuit court, agreeing instead with the general magistrate. The Third District's opinion states in its entirety:

We summarily reverse the trial court's “Order on Respondent's Exceptions to General Master's Report and Recommendations” insofar as it states, This Court finds that no reference was made in the Amended Family Mediation Unit Agreement incorporated by reference into the Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage to the Respondent's beneficiary rights to the proceeds of the subject deferred compensation account.” Instead, we conclude, based upon de novo review, the general master correctly construed the statement in the Amended (Short Form) Family Mediation Unit Agreement that “Husband shall retain retirement money with the Town of Surfside and the Deferred Compensation Fund f/k/a Pepsco,” was sufficient to waive the former husband's pre-dissolution designation of the former wife as a beneficiary.

On this point, the general magistrate stated in his report and recommendation:

During the course of the marriage, Linda Crawford—wife” was named as the designated beneficiary of the Deferred Compensation Fund. However, Linda Crawford and Manuel R. Crawford agreed at the time of the signing of the amended mediated settlement agreement that Manuel R. Crawford should get the money from this fund and that he should be the beneficiary. Manuel R. Crawford could have reaffirmed the designation of Linda Crawford had he chosen to do so following the dissolution of marriage. The fact that he did not reaffirm Linda Crawford as the beneficiary of this account confirms his intent that he was the beneficiary of this fund and that the money from the fund remained his at all times following the dissolution.

We conclude the general master's analysis is the legally correct one. See Cooper v. Muccitelli, 682 So.2d 77 (Fla.1996); Smith v. Smith, 919 So.2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).

Reversed and remanded.

Barker v. Crawford, 16 So.3d 901, 901–02 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). Linda Crawford sought review by this Court.

ANALYSIS

The conflict issue involved in this case is whether language in a marital settlement agreement, which specifically refers to a beneficiary-designated policy, plan, or account, such as a deferred compensation fund, but does not state who is or is not to receive the death benefits and does not specify the beneficiary, trumps the predissolution beneficiary designation in the separate document. The issue in this case is one of contract interpretation and does not involve nuances of family law or a claim that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempts...

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