Crawford v. Bukowski
| Decision Date | 30 January 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 10-CV-2242 |
| Parties | ALPHONSO CRAWFORD, II , Plaintiff, v. TIMOTHY BUKOWSKI, and JAMES STEVENSON, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
This case is about whether a state correctional institution is required to provide a prisoner with meals in accordance with his religious dietary needs. The case is before the court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [37]. While being detained before trial at the Cook County Jail, Plaintiff requested and was given vegan meals. He was then transferred to the Jerome Combs Detention Center (JCDC) for about a month. While at the JCDC, Plaintiff requested but was denied vegan meals. In fact, the JCDC readily admits that it has budgeted only so much for inmate meals, and vegan meals do not fit within that budget. In a series of admirably well-researched and well-drafted pleadings, Plaintiff challenges the JCDC's refusal to accommodate his religious dietary restrictions by providing him with vegan meals.
This court has carefully and thoroughly reviewed the arguments of the parties and the documents provided, including the exhibits provided and the transcript from Petitioner's deposition. Following this careful consideration, Defendants' Motion [37] is GRANTED.
1. Plaintiff is currently in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections. ([38] ¶ 2). At the time he filed the complaint, he was at the Cook County Jail [17], but has since been transferred to the Dixon Correctional Center (Text Order of August 25, 2011).
2. On July 24, 2010, Plaintiff was transferred from the Cook County Jail to the JCDC. [17].
3. Between July 24, 2010 and August 21, 2010, Plaintiff was held as a pre-trial detainee at the Jerome Combs Detention Center (JCDC) in Kankakee County, IL. [17].
4. There, the intake officers asked Plaintiff what his religious preference was. Plaintiff self-identified as a Hebrew-Israelite. Plaintiff requested vegan meal trays due to his religious beliefs. Plaintiff indicated to JCDC staff that he previously received vegan trays at the Cook County Jail and provided a document indicating so. The intake officer was not sure who was responsible for dietary requests. ([17] p. 4).
5. Defendant Bukowski was, at all relevant times, the Kankakee County Sheriff. [38] exh. B ¶ 1, hereinafter "Bukowski Aff."). Defendant Bukowski was not involved in JCDC operations. (Bukowski Aff. ¶ ¶ 2-3).
6. Plaintiff did not speak, correspond, or otherwise interact with Defendant Bukowski regarding his request for vegan meals. ([38], exh. A, 53:15-54:5, hereinafter "Dep.").
7. JCDC operations, including the processing of grievances, are handled by Chief of Corrections Michael Downey and his staff. (Bukowski Aff. ¶¶ 6-9; [38] exh. C ¶¶ 1-2, hereinafter "Downey Aff.").
8. Defendant Stevens was the Program Director at JCDC, and as such, was responsible for planning and coordinating social services, including group religious worship or study. ([38], exh. D, ¶¶ 1-3, hereinafter "Stevens Aff.").
9. Defendant Stevens was not involved in the making or implementation of the food and meal policies, and has no authority to grant an inmate's request for an alternative diet. (Downey Aff. ¶ 4; Stevens Aff. ¶¶ 4-6.)
10. Plaintiff is forbidden from eating any meat or meat products, including milk, dairy, egg, cheese, or fish, according to the dietary laws of his religion. He is only permitted to eat fruits, vegetables, nuts, seeds, and grains. (Dep. 37-38).
11. On July 25, 2010, Plaintiff filed a written request to receive vegan meal trays. ([17] p. 4).
12. JCDC's food service provider does not provide a vegetarian or vegan meal for any inmate detained at JCDC due to the cost restrictions. ([38] exh. E, ¶ 14, hereinafter "Lowe Aff.").
13. Plaintiff's request for vegan meals was denied. (Dep. 56).
14. While he was in custody at JCDC, Plaintiff ate only the grains, fruits, and vegetables off the standard meal trays. That portion of the meal tray was not enough food to fill Plaintiff so he was constantly hungry. (Dep. 55-56). Other inmates did not give Plaintiff portions of their meals. (Dep. 57).
15. Plaintiff suffered from emotional distress from being hungry and from being "really down because [he] wasn't able to eat normal like everyone else was." (Dep. 55 ¶ 21-23).
16. JCDC provides three non-pork meals per day, totaling at least 2,400 calories. These meals are designed to be nutritionally adequate by JCDC's food service provider. (Downey Aff. ¶ 14; Lowe Aff. ¶¶ 1-3, 8).
17. Individualized meals are not provided to inmates unless otherwise ordered by a physician for medical reasons. (Downey Aff. ¶ 15).
18. JCDC's food service contract has budgeted $3.05 per meal per inmate. (Downey Aff. ¶ 10; Lowe Aff. ¶ 9).
19. The cost of providing a nutritionally adequate vegetarian meal is at least $5 per meal and exceeds the per-meal budget by 64%. (Lowe Aff. ¶ 11)
20. The cost of providing a nutritionally adequate vegan meal is at least $10 per meal and exceeds the per-meal budget by 228%. (Lowe Aff. ¶ 12).
21. Defendants aver that providing a standardized dietary plan promotes administrative and staff efficiencies in that the same meal is purchased and served to all inmates at the same time. (Downey Aff. ¶ 16).
22. Defendants aver that providing a standardized dietary plan avoids jealousy among inmates and therefore promotes jail order and security. (Downey Aff. ¶ 17).
23. Inmates are allowed to supplement their provided meal through the commissary, which offers several vegan and non-vegan food items. (Downey Aff. ¶ 23).
24. Funds to purchase meals for inmates are provided by the Kankakee County Board. (Downey Aff. ¶ 9).
25. Muslim inmates participating in Ramadan receive the same pork-free meals as the other inmates, but at different times. (Downey Aff. ¶ 29).
26. The JCDC has denied inmate requests for Halal, Kosher, vegetarian, and vegan diets since 2006. (Downey Aff. ¶ 21).
27. Plaintiff was permitted to read his Book of Yahweh, pray in his cell during the day, pray over meals, study his religion, and celebrate his religious holidays. (Dep. 58:10-20; Downey Aff. ¶ 7).
28. On August 21, 2010, Plaintiff was transferred back to the custody of the Cook County Sheriff's Department. (Downey Aff. ¶ 6).
On January 28, 2011, Plaintiff Alphonso Crawford, II filed his Amended Complaint [17]. As per this court's Order of January 21, 2011, Defendant correctly removed all the unidentified "John Doe" defendants in the Amended Complaint [17]. The Amended Complaint [17] named Sheriff Timothy Bukowski, "Doctor Tom", and "Mr. Stevenson". At a Merit Review screening held pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915A on May 13, 2011, this court allowed Plaintiff to proceed with his First and Eighth Amendment claims. (Text Merit Review Order of May 13, 2011). Defendants filed their Answer on August 9, 2011 [31]. On March 21, 2012, Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting memorandum with seven exhibits. ([37], [38]). On April 9, 2012, Petitioner filed his Response [40]. On April 16, 2012, Defendants filed their Reply [42]. This case being fully briefed, the court will now rule on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [37].
Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a district court has one task and one task only: to decide, based upon the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial. Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). In making this determination, the court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529, 533 (7th Cir. 2010). However, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If it is clear, based upon the undisputed facts, that a plaintiff will be unable to satisfy the legal requirements necessary to establish his case, summary judgment is not only proper, but mandated. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Padula v. Leimbach, 656 F.3d 595, 600-01 (7th Cir.2011).
Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages for alleged violations of his First and Eighth Amendment rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment also addresses the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-274, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc ("RLUIPA"). While Plaintiff made a RLUIPA claim in his complaint, this court did not explicitly permit him to pursue that cause of action in its Merit Review Order of May 13, 2011. In the interest of thoroughness, the present opinion will also analyze Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim.
There are two named defendants, Sheriff Timothy Bukowski and James Stevenson. Both are state employees. As per this court's instruction on May 13, 2011, the Eleventh Amendmentbars Plaintiff from recovering monetary damages from Defendants while acting in their official capacity. Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 2001); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985). Suits for injunctive or declaratory relief, however, may proceed.
Plaintiff was held as a pretrial detainee. As such, he may not be subjected to any form of punishment for the crime for which he is charged. Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1002-03 (7th Cir. 1999). To do so would be to deny the precept that a person is innocent until after a judicial determination of guilt. Nevertheless, "a person lawfully...
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