Crawford v. Commonwealth

Docket Number19 EAP 2022,J-44-2023
Decision Date20 November 2024
PartiesSTANLEY CRAWFORD, TRACEY ANDERSON, DELIA CHATTERFIELD, AISHAH GEORGE, RITA GONSALVES, MARIA GONSALVES-PERKINS, WYNONA HARPER, TAMIKA MORALES, CHERYL PEDRO, ROSALIND PICHARDO, CEASEFIRE PENNSYLVANIA EDUCATION FUND, AND THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellants v. THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, THE PENNSYLVANIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, JOANNA MCCLINTON, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND KIM WARD IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SENATE, Appellees
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

ARGUED: September 13, 2023.

Appeal from the Order of Commonwealth Court entered on May 26, 2022 at No. 562 M.D. 2020.

TODD C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ.

OPINION

BROBSON, JUSTICE

Gun violence is taking lives and destroying families in all parts of this Commonwealth. Appellants in this case do not believe that our state government has done or is doing enough to curtail it.[1] They believe local governments should be permitted to pass and enforce certain local firearms ordinances that Appellants contend will address and reduce gun violence in their communities. Faced with what they believe to be an inadequate response at the state level, Appellants, in a Petition for Review (Petition) addressed to the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction, ask the judiciary to declare as unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful two statutory provisions that they contend hamper their ability to enact local legislation on the subject: (1) Section 6120 of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995 (UFA),[2] 18 Pa. C.S. § 6120, and (2) Section 2962(g) of the Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law (Home Rule Law),[3] 53 Pa. C.S. § 2962(g). These provisions, generally speaking, prohibit local governments from enacting or enforcing ordinances that regulate the ownership, transportation, possession, or transfer of firearms. Appellants refer to these provisions as firearms preemption laws or FPLs.

A divided en banc panel of the Commonwealth Court sustained preliminary objections and dismissed the Petition for failure to state claims upon which relief could be granted (demurrer). Appellants sought review of that decision by this Court. After careful consideration of the parties' arguments[4] and for the reasons that follow, we affirm the Commonwealth Court's order dismissing the Petition with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Underlying Legal Landscape

To put the issues presented before us today into better context, we set forth a review of various pertinent legal concepts, beginning with the preeminent role of our General Assembly in the lawmaking arena. Our state's Constitution vests the General Assembly with "[t]he legislative power of this Commonwealth." Pa. Const. art. II, § 1. This power, "in its most pristine form[,] is the power 'to make, alter[,] and repeal laws.'" Blackwell v. State Ethics Comm'n, 567 A.2d 630, 636 (Pa. 1989). This power is also plenary, save for limitations imposed by our state and federal constitutions. See Luzerne Cnty. v. Morgan, 107 A. 17, 17 (Pa. 1919) ("The legislature may do whatever it is not forbidden to do by the federal or state Constitution.").[5] Moreover, encompassed within the General Assembly's powers is the so-called "police power," which this Court has defined as, inter alia, the broad and flexible "power 'to promote the public health, morals[,] or safety and the general well-being of the community'" and the "inherent power of a body politic to enact and enforce laws for the promotion of the general welfare." Nat'l Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Dep't of Env't Res., 414 A.2d 37, 42 (Pa. 1980) (quoting Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., 306 A.2d 308, 316 (Pa. 1973); Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker, 371 A.2d 461, 465 (Pa. 1977)). This police power is not only "one of the most essential powers of government," but also one of the least limitable. Adams Sanitation Co., Inc. v. Dep't of Env't Prot., 715 A.2d 390, 395 (Pa. 1998). In this regard, the General Assembly may exercise its far-reaching police power in the public interest in a manner that affects constitutional rights, though any such exercise is itself subject to constitutional limitations and judicial review. Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567, 575 (Pa. 2020).

Indeed, we emphasize that, while it is the role of the General Assembly to enact laws, it is left to the courts to determine ultimately whether the General Assembly's exercise of legislative power transgresses constitutional bounds. Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 13 A.2d 67, 69 (Pa. 1940). This delineation of roles emanates from the well-recognized separation of powers doctrine, which "is inherent in the Pennsylvania Constitution" and "is essential to our tripartite governmental framework" consisting of a legislative, judicial, and executive branch. Renner v. Ct. of Common Pleas of Lehigh Cnty., 234 A.3d 411, 419 (Pa. 2020). The doctrine "makes manifest that the three branches of government are co-equal and independent[] and divides power accordingly," with the underlying rationale of the doctrine being that it "prevents one branch of government from exercising, infringing upon, or usurping the powers of the other two branches." Id. This prohibition is also "related to the system of checks and balances, which prevents one branch from acting unchecked." Id. at 420.

In recognition of the above precepts, as well as the notion that the dividing lines among the three branches are at times indistinct and difficult to define, Pa. State Ass'n of Jury Comm'rs v. Commonwealth, 78 A.3d 1020, 1032 (Pa. 2013), we also observe the following points relative to the roles of the General Assembly and judiciary when it comes to public policymaking. It is the chief function of the General Assembly to set public policy. Program Admin. Servs., Inc. v. Dauphin Cnty. Gen. Auth., 928 A.2d 1013, 1018 (Pa. 2007). "The domain of the judiciary is in the field of the administration of justice under the law; it interprets, construes[,] and applies the law." Commonwealth v. Sutley, 378 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 1977) (quoting Commonwealth v. Widovich, 145 A. 295, 299 (Pa. 1929)).[6] It is axiomatic that, in exercising our power of judicial review, we cannot use it as a means to substitute our own public policy judgments for those of the General Assembly. Program Admin. Servs., Inc., 928 A.2d at 1018 (quoting Parker v. Children's Hosp. of Phila., 394 A.2d 932, 937 (Pa. 1978)). This is not only because it would violate the separation of powers doctrine to do so,[7] but also because the courts are "at a disadvantage in the substantive lawmaking process"[8] given the adversarial nature of our judicial system and the dearth of resources that are otherwise available to our sister branch.[9] Notwithstanding, we emphasize that, even in the policymaking arena, the General Assembly's actions are subject to constitutional restraints, with the courts serving as a bulwark to ensure that the constitutional rights of our citizens are protected in that context. Torsilieri, 232 A.3d at 583.

Having discussed the delineation of power between the legislative and judicial branches of our state government as is relevant to this appeal, we also take the opportunity to discuss another pertinent area of the law concerning the division of governmental power: the interplay between state and municipal governance. As a general matter, "[m]unicipalities are creatures of the state and have no inherent powers of their own." City of Philadelphia v. Schweiker, 858 A.2d 75, 84 (Pa. 2004) (relying upon Naylor v. Twp. of Hellam, 773 A.2d 770, 773 (Pa. 2001)). The General Assembly's authority over municipalities' powers is "supreme," and, accordingly, municipalities "may do only those things which the [l]egislature has expressly or by necessary implication placed within their power to do." Pa. Rest. & Lodging Ass'n v. City of Pittsburgh, 211 A.3d 810, 816 (Pa. 2019) (quoting Denbow v. Borough of Leetsdale, 729 A.2d 1113, 1118 (Pa. 1999)). Under usual circumstances, then, a municipality does not have "the power to enact ordinances except as authorized by statute, and any ordinance not in conformity with its enabling statute is void." Schweiker, 858 A.2d at 84.

The concept of home rule dispenses with the above paradigm. To begin, "[l]ike the powers of other types of municipalities, the powers of a home rule municipality are largely constitutionally and statutorily determined." Devlin v. City of Philadelphia, 862 A.2d 1234, 1242 (Pa. 2004). The Pennsylvania Constitution grants municipalities the power of self-government through the enactment of home rule charters[10] in Article IX, Section 2, which provides:

Municipalities shall have the right and power to frame and adopt home rule charters. Adoption, amendment or repeal of a home rule charter shall be by referendum. The General Assembly shall provide the procedure by which a home rule charter may be framed and its adoption, amendment or repeal presented to the electors. If the General Assembly does not so provide, a home rule charter or a procedure for framing and presenting a home rule charter may be presented to the electors by initiative or by the governing body of the municipality. A municipality which has a home rule charter may exercise any power or perform any function not denied by this Constitution, by its home rule charter or by the General Assembly at any time.[11]

Pa. Const. art. IX, § 2 (emphasis added). As indicated by Article IX, Section 2, home rule allows a municipality to "legislate concerning municipal governance without express statutory warrant for each new ordinance; [a municipality's] ability to exercise municipal functions is limited only by its home rule charter, the ...

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