Crawford v. Crawford

Decision Date07 June 1947
Docket Number36494.
Citation163 Kan. 126,181 P.2d 526
PartiesCRAWFORD et al. v. CRAWFORD et al.
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Rehearing Denied July 2, 1947.

Appeal from District Court, Lincoln County; Roy A. Smith, Judge.

Action by Beulah I. Crawford and others against R. K. Crawford and others to compel an accounting of an alleged partnership. From an adverse judgment, the plaintiffs appeal.

Judgment affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The record examined in an action for an accounting of an alleged partnership, and it is held that the trial court did not err:

A. In its rulings on motions directed against the findings of fact and conclusions of law made and reported to the trial court by the referee to whom the trial of the cause was referred;

B. In its ruling adopting the reported findings of fact and conclusions of law of the referee as the findings and conclusions of the trial court;

C. In rendering judgment;

D. In denying plaintiffs' motion for a new trial.

2. Under G.S.1935, 60-3316, the supreme court on appeal of an action tried in the district court may not receive 'further testimony' offered by either party to the action, concerning which there might be differences of opinion as to the weight to be given such testimony, or from which different conclusions might be drawn, or which is cumulative in character, or for the purpose of controverting or disputing findings of fact made by the trial court or the judgment rendered by it.

Ralph Knittle and W. S. Norris, both of Salina (John J. McCurdy, of Lincoln, James E. Smith, of Topeka, and G. A. Spencer, of Salina, on the brief), for appellants.

LaRue Royce, of Salina (T. M. Metz, of Lincoln, B. I. Litowich, E S. Hampton and H. H. Dunham, Jr., all of Salina, on the brief), for appellees.

THIELE Justice.

This action was commenced February 1, 1939, for the purpose of compelling an accounting of an alleged partnership composed of three brothers, Thomas H. Crawford, Robert K. Crawford and Frank M. Crawford. In the record the Christian names are not usually used, initials only being given, and they are so referred to hereafter. T. H. Crawford died in 1932 and the plaintiffs were his heirs and legal representatives. The original defendants were R. K. Crawford, F. M. Crawford and his wife Ruth Crawford. Judgment was not rendered until June 12, 1945. In 1941 R. K. Crawford died, and in 1943 F. M. Crawford died, and their heirs and legal representatives were made parties defendant.

Without detailing the pleadings it may be said the original partnership included another brother S. P. Crawford who sold his interest to the others in 1904, and they continued the business of the partnership in some form until the action was commenced in 1939. The general issue presented concerned real and personal property admittedly belonging to the partnership, and whether other real and personal property standing in the name of or claimed by R. K. Crawford, or standing in the name of or claimed by F. M. Crawford, was partnership property, and for an accounting of all business done since the inception of the original partnership, which the evidence later disclosed was formed about 1892.

Issues being joined on June 7, 1940, the trial court referred the cause to a referee to hear the evidence and to report thereon by making findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thousands of transactions were inquired into and on October 5, 1944 the referee made his report, consisting of seventy-nine findings of fact, and ten conclusions of law. The plaintiffs moved to strike many of the findings of fact and most of the conclusions of law, and for additional findings and conclusions, as well as for a new trial. These motions were heard and the trial court ordered a re-reference as to one finding. Additional evidence was taken and on June 1, 1945 the referee filed his amended report. Plaintiffs moved to set aside this amended report and for a new trial. On June 12, 1945, the trial court approved the findings of fact as made and amended and the conclusions of law as made, denied the several motions of plaintiffs, and ordered judgment in accordance with the findings. The general tenor of the judgment was that the report of the referee was adopted by the court as the findings of the court; that R. K. Crawford at the time of his death owned certain specified real and personal property free from the claims of the heirs or personal representatives of either T. H. Crawford or F. M. Crawford; that F. M. Crawford and T. H. Crawford at the times of their deaths were each the owner of certain specified real and personal properties free from the claims of the heirs or personal representatives of the other brothers; and that the firm of Crawford Brothers was the owner of certain described real estate and personal property. The judgment also contained other provisions with respect to division of the partnership assets, which will be referred to later insofar as is necessary. Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial was denied.

From the above judgment, the plaintiffs appeal to this court, their specification of errors containing twenty-one paragraphs and covering various rulings made by the trial court, the judgment and their motion for a new trial. To present these, the appellants have filed abstracts containing 1850 pages and briefs containing 557 pages and have submitted scores of exhibits offered at the trial, and the appellees have filed a counter-abstract containing 215 pages and a brief containing 157 pages. In these mention is made of hundreds of transactions concerning the purchase and sale of real and personal property, how it was paid for and who got the money, the loaning of money on real and personal property, who paid the taxes, who handled and managed the property and business, and so on. As an indication of what was involved, it may be said that the final judgment lists 70 tracts of real estate consisting of farm lands of more than 14,000 acres and 39 city properties.

Appellants state in their brief that the principal question in the appeal is whether the findings of fact are supported by the evidence and the greater portion of their brief is devoted to a discussion of the evidence. Many of the transactions had by the Crawford brothers, either individually or as a partnership, are discussed at length and appellants' views of what the evidence proves or fails to prove are set out at length. We examine the record to determine whether the findings of fact are supported by the evidence and not to discover evidence which would upset the findings. We have devoted a great deal of time to studying the abstracts and parts of the many exhibits, and in some instances the evidence might be construed as appellants would have it, if other evidence be disbelieved or ignored. To state each finding complained of and to marshal the evidence in support would consume a hundred pages or more of our reports, and in the end the court would have done no more than to demonstrate that the findings were supported by the evidence, and the result would be of no interest to anybody except the parties to the suit, and of no value to the bench and bar. Under the circumstances, we content ourselves by saying that the finding of fact are supported by the evidence.

In their specification of errors appellants state that certain conclusions of law are erroneous and that some of them are really conclusions of fact. If the latter is so, that does not make them incorrect. In a general way appellants contend that even if the findings of fact stand they do not support the conclusions of law and they then discuss the conclusions of law, interlarding their arguments with reference to the evidence. We shall first review the conclusions of law and the objections thereto, reserving for later comment such as are not disposed of in the review.

The second conclusion of law was to the effect that claims prior to June 21, 1904, when a settlement was had between S. P. Crawford and his three brothers, were stale and barred. It is contended that although that settlement may have been an accounting with S. P. Crawford, it was not between the remaining partners. The contention is not good. When a settlement was had with S. P. Crawford to determine what was due him it was necessary to determine what the assets of the partnership were, and findings of fact 25, 26, 27 and 28 show that there was a full and final accounting then held.

The third conclusion of law was to the effect that there having been no express partnership agreement, such an arrangement could be deduced from the acts and conduct of the parties, and therefrom it could be deduced that there was a partnership and that F. M. Crawford was the manager of the ranch properties and business. We think that under Curtis v. Hanna, 143 Kan. 186, 53 P.2d 795, and Yeager v. Graham, 150 Kan. 411, 94 P.2d 317, the conclusion was sound.

The fourth conclusion of law, that upon the death of T. H Crawford in 1932 the partnership terminated, was legally correct. Appellants argue it was wrong because thereafter the partnership activities continued, and our attention is directed to Big Four Implement Co. v. Keyser, 99 Kan. 8, 12, 161 P. 592, 594, L.R.A. 1917C, 166, where in a situation somewhat analogous to the one now before us it was said, 'In one sense a new partnership was established which included all the interested parties.' It is clear from the findings of fact that the dealings of the Crawford brothers individually and of the firm of Crawford Brothers, were inquired into from about 1892 up to the time the suit was commenced in 1939 and were taken into consideration in the final result. Actually the conclusion of law is of no moment for, concededly, activities did continue and the widow and children of...

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6 cases
  • Painter v. Toyo Kogyo of Japan
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • October 18, 1984
    ...Duncan, 672 S.W.2d 765 (Tenn.1984), our Supreme Court lent its interpretation of Rule 14. Quoting at length from Crawford v. Crawford, 163 Kan. 126, 181 P.2d 526, 531-32 (1947), the Duncan court "[The Kansas Court] limited the scope of such evidence so as not to include " '... what would be......
  • State v Williams
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
    • January 9, 2001
    ...not the propriety of the conduct of the district court, but the nature of the judgment to be directed.'" Crawford v. Crawford, 163 Kan. 126, 181 P.2d 526, 531-32 (1947) (quoting Hess v. Conway, 93 Kan. 246, 144 P. 205 (1914)), quoted with approval in Duncan, 672 S.W.2d at Under facts simila......
  • Martin v. Hunter
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • May 5, 1956
    ...of his duty to his co-adventurers, he must account to them therefor. Kincaid v. Miller, 129 Colo. 552, 272 P.2d 276; Crawford v. Crawford, 163 Kan. 126, 181 P.2d 526. Plaintiffs contend the court erred in refusing to permit, on rebuttal, the introduction of a blueprint map dated May, 1954, ......
  • Duncan v. Duncan
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • June 25, 1984
    ...615 (1975). There is no need, however, to go so far as to prohibit consideration of all post-judgment facts. In Crawford v. Crawford, 163 Kan. 126, 181 P.2d 526, 531-32 (1947), the court held that a statute permitting appellate courts to receive additional evidence would be unconstitutional......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • The Kansas Revised Uniform Partnership Act
    • United States
    • Kansas Bar Association KBA Bar Journal No. 68-10, October 1999
    • Invalid date
    ...See HILLMAN, VESTAL & WEIDNER, RUPA 40-44. [FN263]. RUPA § 103 cmt. 4. [FN264]. Id. A similar result was reached in Crawford v. Crawford, 163 Kan. 126, 181 P.2d 526 (1947), on the basis of an implied waiver. [FN265]. K.S.A. 1998 Supp. 56a-103(b)(3)(ii). [FN266]. RUPA § 103 cmt. 5. [FN267]. ......

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