Crawford v. Cuomo

Decision Date11 August 2015
Docket NumberNo. 14–969.,14–969.
Citation796 F.3d 252
PartiesJames CRAWFORD and Thaddeus Corley, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. Andrew CUOMO as Governor of the State of New York, in his official capacity; Brian Fischer, Commissioner of Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, in his official capacity; Superintendent William P. Brown, in his personal and official capacities; Superintendent William Larkin, in his official capacity; Corrections Officer Simon Prindle; and John Doe Corrections Officers 1–8, Defendants–Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Adam D. Perlmutter, Law Offices of Adam D. Perlmutter, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Daniel A. McGuinness, Law Offices of Adam D. Perlmutter, P.C., New York, N.Y.; Zachary Margulis–Ohnuma, Law Office of Zachary Margulis–Ohnuma, New York, N.Y., on the brief), for PlaintiffsAppellants.

Frank Brady, Assistant Solicitor General of Counsel (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Andrew Ayers, Assistant Solicitor General of Counsel, on the brief), for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, Albany, N.Y., for DefendantsAppellees.

Erin Beth Harrist, Corey Stoughton, Christopher Dunn, New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York, N.Y.; Lance Weber, Robert Jack, Human Rights Defense Center, Lake Worth, Fla.; Karen Murtagh, Melissa Loomis, Prisoners' Legal Services of New York, Albany, N.Y.; Seymour W. James, Jr., Dori A. Lewis, Prisoners' Rights Project, Legal Aid Society, New York, N.Y.; Alan Mills, Uptown People's Law Center, Chicago, Ill., submitted a brief in support of Plaintiffs-Appellants, for amici curiae New York Civil Liberties Union, et al.

Before: KATZMANN, Chief Judge, WALKER and LYNCH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Circuit Judge:

On March 5, 2014, the district court (Norman A. Mordue, J. ) dismissed a complaint filed by Thaddeus Corley, an inmate at the Eastern Correctional Facility (“ECF”), and James Crawford, a former ECF inmate, alleging that Corrections Officer Simon Prindle sexually abused them and, in doing so, subjected them to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In dismissing the case, the district court concluded that the complaint failed to state a claim under Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 861 (2d Cir.1997), which set forth the standard for stating an Eighth Amendment claim arising from sexual abuse in prison. Crawford and Corley appealed, arguing that the district court construed our opinion in Boddie too narrowly. We agree.

We write today to clarify the rule set forth in Boddie: A corrections officer's intentional contact with an inmate's genitalia or other intimate area, which serves no penological purpose and is undertaken with the intent to gratify the officer's sexual desire or to humiliate the inmate, violates the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, we recognize that sexual abuse of prisoners, once passively accepted by society, deeply offends today's standards of decency. The proper application of the rule in Boddie must reflect these standards.

By alleging that Officer Prindle fondled their genitals for personal gratification and without penological justification, Crawford and Corley stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court's order dismissing the complaint and REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the complaint and must be accepted as true for the purposes of deciding this appeal. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 572, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ([A] judge ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss a complaint must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

I. The Alleged Incidents

On March 12, 2011, Thaddeus Corley, an ECF inmate, was visiting with his wife when Corrections Officer Simon Prindle ordered him out of the visiting room and sexually abused him. Prindle informed Corley that he was going to make sure Mr. Corley did not have an erection,” and after ordering Corley to stand against the wall with his feet spread apart, Prindle “paused to fondle and squeeze [his] penis.” App'x 9. When Corley “jumped off the wall” in response, Prindle threatened him and told him to “get back on the wall.” Id. at 10.

Four days later, Prindle abused a second ECF inmate, James Crawford.2 As Crawford was leaving the mess hall, Prindle stopped him and initiated a search. During the search, Prindle paused around Crawford's crotch, “grabbed” and “held” his penis and asked “what's that?” Id. Crawford responded: “That's my penis, man.” Id. at 11. Prindle pushed his knee into Crawford's back, pinning him to the wall, tightened his grip around the neck of Crawford's sweatshirt, and told him to “stay on the fucking wall” if he didn't want Prindle to “ram [his] head into the concrete.” Id. Prindle continued to “squeeze” and “fondle” the area around Crawford's penis and “roam” his hands down Crawford's thigh. Id. 11–12. Throughout the search, Prindle told Crawford to [s]tay on the fucking wall” if he didn't want to “go to the box,” which Crawford understood to mean that Prindle would send him to solitary confinement if he resisted the abuse. App'x 11. When Crawford told Prindle that the search was not in accordance with search and frisk procedures, Prindle responded: “You don't have any rights in here.... I'll run my hands up the crack of your ass if I want to.” Id. at 12. As a result of these incidents, Crawford and Corley allege that they have suffered psychologically and sought help from mental health professionals.

The complaint also alleged that at least 20 inmate grievances complained of sexual abuse or harassment by Prindle. On certain occasions, Prindle demeaned Crawford and other inmates by telling them that he had “seen a little boy like [them] before on the internet” or that he had seen their penises. Id. at 14. And on other occasions, Prindle claimed that inmates were not properly complying with anal-cavity search procedures and ordered the inmates to repeatedly bend over and spread their buttocks for him.

II. Procedural History

On April 12, 2013, Crawford and Corley filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York alleging that Prindle's sexual abuse violated their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. In addition to Prindle, the complaint named as defendants Superintendent William P. Brown, Prindle's supervisor, as well as others.3 The complaint alleged that Brown, who failed to take action against Prindle despite receiving more than 20 inmate grievances alleging similar abuse, either intentionally allowed Prindle to sexually abuse inmates as a means of controlling them or was deliberately indifferent to Prindle's abusive conduct. Crawford and Corley sought monetary damages and an injunction prohibiting Prindle from having contact with inmates.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. In support of the motion, Defendants cited our opinion in Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857 (2d Cir.1997), which set forth the standard for stating an Eighth Amendment claim arising from sexual abuse in prison. Based on its understanding of Boddie, the district court dismissed the Eighth Amendment cause of action for failing to state a claim and dismissed the state law claims for lack of jurisdiction. Crawford and Corley timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo a district court's decision to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Johnson v. Priceline.com, Inc., 711 F.3d 271, 275 (2d Cir.2013). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must contain factual allegations that plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

Crawford and Corley argue that, in dismissing the complaint for failing to stating an Eighth Amendment claim, the district court erred because it too narrowly construed the standard established in Boddie. We agree. Boddie recognized that a single act of sexual abuse may violate the Eighth Amendment if, as in this case, it is entirely gratuitous and devoid of penological purpose. Moreover, in the nearly two decades since Boddie was decided, societal standards of decency regarding sexual abuse and its harmful consequences have evolved. Without suggesting that Boddie was wrongly decided in 1997, we conclude that the result in that case would likely be different applying the same rule today.

I. Eighth Amendment Claims

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from cruel and unusual punishment by prison officials. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991). To state an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must allege two elements, one subjective and one objective. First, the prisoner must allege that the defendant acted with a subjectively “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, he must allege that the conduct was objectively “harmful enough” or “sufficiently serious” to reach constitutional dimensions. Id. at 8, 20, 112 S.Ct. 995. Analysis of the objective prong is “context specific,” Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir.2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), and “depends upon the claim at issue,” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8, 112 S.Ct. 995. Although not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action,” the Eighth Amendment is offended by conduct that is “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9–10, 112 S.Ct. 995 (internal quotation marks omitted). Actions are repugnant to the conscience of mankind if they are ...

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