Crawford v. Dolgen Corp.. Inc.

• Decision Date: 04 May 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:10–00256–KD–B.
• Parties: Asheley CRAWFORD, Plaintiff,v.DOLGEN CORP. INC., d/b/a Dollar General, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

790 F.Supp.2d 1361

112 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 403

Asheley CRAWFORD, Plaintiff,

v.DOLGEN CORP. INC., d/b/a Dollar General, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:10–00256–KD–B.

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division.

May 4, 2011.

C. Michael Quinn, H. Wallace Blizzard, Wiggin, Childs, Quinn, & Pantazis, P.C., Birmingham, AL, Sherrie V. McKenzie, Monroeville, AL, for Plaintiff.Stanley E. Graham, Waller, Lansden, Dortch & Davis, LLP, Nashville, TN, Bahar Azhdari, Nashville, TN, for Defendant.

ORDER

KRISTI K. DuBOSE, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting documents (Docs. 40, 41, 42), the plaintiff's Response and supporting documents (Docs. 46, 47), and the defendant's Reply (Doc. 50) and Motion to Strike (Doc. 51). For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 40) is due to be DENIED, and the defendant's Motion to Strike (Doc. 51) is due to be DENIED in part and found MOOT in part.

I. Background

On May 19, 2010, Plaintiff Asheley Crawford (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action for alleged discriminatory termination based on her pregnancy by Defendant Dolgen Corp. Inc. d/b/a Dollar General (“Defendant”), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Docs. 1, 17). The Court has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff timely filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and filed her complaint within 90 days of receiving a “Right to Sue” letter. (Doc. 17 at 1; Doc. 46–9 at 2–4). Defendant has moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim. (Doc. 40).

II. Standard of Review

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) (Dec. 2010). The recently amended Rule 56(c) governs procedures and provides as follows:

(1) Supporting Factual Positions. A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

(2) Objection That a Fact Is Not Supported by Admissible Evidence. A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.

(3) Materials Not Cited. The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.

(4) Affidavits or Declarations. An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (Dec. 2010).

Defendant, as the party seeking summary judgment, bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met her burden, the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH–Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998–999 (11th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911, 113 S.Ct. 1259, 122 L.Ed.2d 657 (1993) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The mere existence of a factual dispute will not automatically necessitate denial; rather, only factual disputes that are material preclude entry of summary judgment. Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir.2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081, 125 S.Ct. 869, 160 L.Ed.2d 825 (2005).

III. Facts ¹

In January 2008, Plaintiff was hired by Defendant as a stocker/cashier at its Dollar General retail store in Monroeville, Alabama (“the Store”). (Doc. 41 at 2; Doc. 41–1 at 4). Plaintiff was eventually promoted to lead sales associate, a position which included such additional responsibilities as opening and closing the store. (Doc. 41–1 at 19–20). These duties entailed following set procedures, for which Plaintiff was trained by a store manager. ( Id. at 20, 35–37; Doc. 46–1 at 12–15).

Plaintiff learned that she was pregnant in October 2008 and told at least two co-workers. (Doc. 41 at 9; Doc. 46–1 at 16, 18). Some time later, while working at the Store, Plaintiff experienced cramps and bleeding. (Doc. 46–1 at 28). She informed the Store's manager, Barbie, who called the office of Dr. Angela Powell, an OB/GYN at the local hospital. ( Id. at 9, 28–29). The father of Plaintiff's baby, Betts, then drove Plaintiff to the hospital. ( Id. at 10, 30). Dr. Powell advised Plaintiff to take a week off from work and provided her with a doctor's note, which Betts took to the Store that same night, though it is not known to whom he gave it. ( Id. at 9–10). Plaintiff did not return to work before taking the week off. ( Id.).

During the week Plaintiff was off, Tara Pugh (“Pugh”) took Barbie's place as manager of the Store. (Doc. 46–1 at 6). Around that time, Donna Rivers (“Rivers”), another Store employee, discussed Plaintiff with Pugh as follows:

[Pugh] told me that she didn't think it was going to work that Ms. Crawford was pregnant and a third key holder. She said that she couldn't have her go out on maternity leave. I told her to just go ahead and train someone else and have them ready to take Ms. Crawford's place. She said that she didn't want to do that, and that she was going to have to get rid of Ms. Crawford. She asked me if I wanted the job. I told her that I didn't and that it was wrong for her to fire Ms. Crawford because she was pregnant.

(Doc. 46–4 at 2).²

Plaintiff returned to work on April 9, 2009, and was responsible for closing the Store that night. (Doc. 41–1 at 15–16; Doc. 46–1 at 31–32). Rivers closed up the store with her. ( Id. at 32). Pugh claims that the following morning, when she arrived to open the Store, she found the door unlocked and the Store's safe open. (Doc. 41–2 at 2, 18). Pugh viewed footage of the previous night from the Store's security cameras and claims that it showed Plaintiff leave the Store without closing the safe. ( Id.). As the person in charge of closing the Store on April 9, Plaintiff was responsible for making sure that the safe and the door were both locked before leaving for the night. (Doc. 46–3 at 13–14).

Pugh notified Ronald Poindexter (“Poindexter”), the district manager in charge of the Store, of the situation. ( Id. at 14; Doc. 46–2 at 5). Poindexter, in turn, contacted Trent Telford, the regional loss prevention manager, who told him that the incident constituted a severe failure to protect company assets. (Doc. 46–2 at 14). Poindexter had Plaintiff suspended while he conducted an investigation, which included reviews of the security video, the police report of the incident, and statements given by Pugh and Rebecca Harrison, another Store employee who had been present with Pugh the morning of the incident. ( Id. at 14–19). Poindexter agreed with Pugh's assessment of the incident; he and Pugh then jointly made the decision to terminate Plaintiff. ( Id. at 16–19; Doc. 41 at 5; Doc. 41–2 at 10). This decision was made sometime after April 15, 2009, the day Poindexter reviewed the security video. (Doc. 41–3 at 10, 17).

A copy of the security video allegedly showing Plaintiff's violations of company procedures was not retained by Defendant. (Doc. 41–3 at 11–12). Plaintiff disputes that she left the safe open and the door unlocked the night of April 9, 2009. (Doc. 46–1 at 32–33). In addition, Rebecca Harrison, who had initially corroborated Pugh's version of the following morning's events, now disputes it, asserting that the door was locked and the safe was closed when they arrived to open the Store. (Doc. 45–3 at 23–24; Doc. 46–6 at 2).

IV. Analysis

Disparate treatment, or intentional discrimination, under Title VII occurs when an “ ‘employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’ ” Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., 33 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir.Ala.1994) (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335–36 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977)). The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 amended Title VII to make unlawful the act of discharging an employee “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). “This act declared that women affected by pregnancy ‘shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work ...’ ” Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir.1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). Moreover, “[t]he Pregnancy...