Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co., CV-87-013-GF
| Decision Date | 08 May 1990 |
| Docket Number | CV-87-040-GF.,No. CV-87-013-GF,CV-87-013-GF |
| Citation | 737 F. Supp. 1121 |
| Parties | Jess Wesley CRAWFORD, Plaintiff, v. GENUINE PARTS CO., a Georgia corporation; and Echlin, Inc., a Connecticut corporation, Defendants. Diane LaPLANTE and Rodney Lane, Plaintiffs, v. GENUINE PARTS CO., formerly NPA Automotive Parts & Accessories; Echlin Inc., formerly Echlin Manufacturing Company, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Montana |
Joseph R. Marra, Dan Spoon, Marra, Wenz, Johnson & Hopkins, Great Falls, Mont., for plaintiff.
Dennis P. Clarke, Smith, Walsh, Clarke & Gregoire, Great Falls, Mont., for defendants.
Edmund F. Sheehy, Jr., Cannon & Sheehy, Helena, Mont., for Kim Crawford on Attys. Lien only.
These consolidated personal injury actions have their genesis in a vehicular mishap which occurred on U.S. Highway No. 89, at a location within the exterior boundaries of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation, Montana. Both actions were initially instituted in the district court of the State of Montana. Approximately two and one-half years after the actions were filed in state court, plaintiffs in both actions effected settlement with, and voluntarily dismissed, all nondiverse defendants. Genuine Parts Company and Echlin, Inc., both non-resident corporations, then removed both actions to this court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. On April 10, 1989, over two years after the actions were removed to this court, and less than thirty days prior to the time the actions were set for trial, plaintiffs moved the court to stay these proceedings until such time as the plaintiffs could institute identical proceedings in the tribal court system of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation. Plaintiffs, all Indian persons, and members of the Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, impress upon the court the Blackfeet Tribal Court must be afforded the opportunity to determine that entity's jurisdiction over the subject matter of this controversy.
The plaintiffs' motion is predicated upon a dilatory invocation of the "exhaustion rule" first enunciated in National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985),1 and extended in Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 107 S.Ct. 971, 94 L.Ed.2d 10 (1987).2 The issue to be determined is whether this court must abstain from exercising diversity jurisdiction over the subject matter of these controversies until it has afforded the tribal court system of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation an opportunity, in the first instance, to determine the propriety of that entity asserting jurisdiction over these controversies.
The plaintiffs, Jess Crawford, Diane LaPlante and Rodney Lane, all members of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe, were allegedly injured on February 24, 1983, when a vehicle, being driven by Crawford within the boundaries of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation, overturned. On July 13, 1984, plaintiff Crawford filed suit in the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District of the State of Montana. Crawford advanced claims for relief against multiple defendants based upon various theories of liability.3 With specific reference to the defendants, Genuine Parts Company and Echlin, Inc., Crawford alleged the mishap, and consequent injuries he sustained, were caused by the failure of replacement parts for the vehicle braking system which were manufactured and/or marketed by the defendants.
Plaintiffs, Diane LaPlante and Rodney Lane, passengers in the Crawford vehicle at the time of the mishap, filed a joint complaint in the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District of the State of Montana on September 25, 1984. The complaint of the latter plaintiffs essentially mimicked the claims of Crawford.
Both Genuine Parts Company and Echlin, Inc., have their principal places of business in states other than Montana. The master cylinder rebuild kit at issue was manufactured outside the State of Montana and was sold at a retail outlet in Columbia Falls, Montana; a location outside the boundaries of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation. Installation of the master cylinder kit in the Crawford vehicle, as well as Crawford's purchase of the vehicle, occurred at locations outside the reservation boundaries. In sum, with the exception of the mishap itself, all transactions relating to the plaintiffs' causes of actions occurred outside the boundaries of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation.
Plaintiffs take the position the present situation falls within the ambit of the "exhaustion rule" announced in National Farmers Union. Because the vehicular mishap occurred within the exterior boundaries of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation, they submit this court must refrain from exercising diversity jurisdiction, and, for reasons of comity, defer to the Blackfeet Tribal Court, in order to allow that entity to examine, in the first instance, whether it has the power to exercise jurisdiction over the subject matter of these controversies.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that tribal courts have inherent power to adjudicate civil disputes affecting the interests of Indians and non-Indians which are based upon events occurring on a reservation. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 1258, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1680, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978). This authority emanates from the fact the several Indian tribes, as sovereign entities, possess the necessary attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 1086, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557, 95 S.Ct. 710, 717, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975). The sovereignty enjoyed by Indian tribes, however, is not absolute. Rather, it is subject to limitation by specific treaty provisions, by statute at the will of Congress, by portions of the Federal Constitution found especially binding on the tribes, or by implication due to the tribes' dependent status. See, United States v. Wheeler, supra, 435 U.S. at 322-326, 98 S.Ct. at 1085-1088; Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14, 107 S.Ct. 971, 975, 94 L.Ed.2d 10 (1987); Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587, 591 (9th Cir.1983).
A recurring issue involving Indian tribal sovereignty is to what extent the tribes retain the inherent power to exercise civil subject matter jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians on the reservation. The United States Supreme Court has addressed the limitations on tribal sovereignty with respect to the assertion of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians. In the case of Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981), the Court reiterated the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of non-members of the tribe. Id. at 565, 101 S.Ct. at 1258. Recognizing the dependent status of the tribes necessarily entails a divestiture of some attributes of sovereignty, the Court endeavored to delineate the extent to which the Indian tribes retain their inherent sovereign power to exercise civil jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians occurring within a reservation. The Court concluded:
A tribe may regulate through taxation, licensing or other means, the activities of non-members who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealings, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within the reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. 450 U.S. at 565-566, 101 S.Ct. at 1258 (citations omitted).
These two narrowly prescribed exceptions to the implicit divestiture of the sovereign power of the Indian tribes to control the activities of non-members would seem to provide the only basis upon which an Indian tribe possesses civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian.
The question of whether an Indian tribe retains the authority to compel a non-Indian to submit to the jurisdiction of a tribal court presents a question of federal law, properly determined by the federal courts; the final arbiters of federal law. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 2451, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985).4 Nonetheless, considerations of comity, predicated upon the well recognized Congressional policy of promoting tribal self-government and self-determination, compelled the Court in National Farmers Union to announce a rule of exhaustion, which requires tribal court remedies to be exhausted before the question of tribal jurisdiction is addressed by the federal courts. 471 U.S. at 856-57, 105 S.Ct. at 2453-54. The Court concluded proper respect for tribal legal institutions required the federal courts to afford those tribunals a full opportunity to consider the issues before them, and to rectify any errors. 471 U.S. at 857, 105 S.Ct. at 2454. Unconditional access to the federal forum, the Court reasoned, would contravene the federal policy supporting tribal self-government by placing the federal courts "in direct competition with the tribal courts, thereby impairing the latter's authority over reservation affairs." Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 16, 107 S.Ct. at 977.
The principle of federal deference embodied in the "exhaustion rule" is compelling regardless of whether federal jurisdiction is grounded in diversity of citizenship or federal question:
Regardless of the basis for jurisdiction, federal policy supporting tribal self-government directs a federal court to stay its hand in order to give the tribal court a full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction. In diversity cases, as well as federal...
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