Crawford v. George & Lynch, Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 July 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 10-949-GMS-SRF
• Parties: TAMMY L. CRAWFORD, Plaintiff, v. GEORGE & LYNCH, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

TAMMY L. CRAWFORD, Plaintiff,

v.GEORGE & LYNCH, INC., et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 10-949-GMS-SRF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

Dated: July 5, 2012

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. INTRODUCTION

Presently before the Court in this sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and retaliation action brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C, § 2000 et seq. ("Title VII"), is a motion for partial dismissal of the amended complaint, filed by defendants George & Lynch, Inc. ("G&L") and Leonard J. Brooks ("Brooks") (together, "Defendants") on March 21, 2012. (D.I. 71) Defendants assert three claims for relief: (1) dismissal of plaintiff Crawford Trucking Company, LLC ("CTC"); (2) dismissal of defendant Brooks; and (3) dismissal of the claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. For the following reasons, I recommend that Defendants' motion be granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, I recommend that the Court grant Defendants' motion as to the dismissal of CTC as a plaintiff in all counts, and dismissal of Brooks as a defendant in all counts. I recommend that the Court deny the motion as to dismissal of Crawford's claim at Count V for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Tammy L. Crawford ("Crawford") and CTC (together, "Plaintiffs") initiated this harassment, discrimination, and retaliation action against Defendants by filing a complaint in this Court on November 5, 2010. (D.I. 1) Plaintiffs amended the complaint on March 7, 2012, alleging causes of action for: (1) hostile work environment under Title VII (Crawford against G&L); (2) gender discrimination (Crawford against G&L); (3) retaliation (Crawford and CTC against G&L); (4) promissory estoppel / detrimental reliance (Crawford and CTC against all Defendants);¹ and (5) breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Crawford and CTC against all Defendants). (D.I. 57 at ¶¶ 110-150) These claims are based on events that occurred during Crawford's employment with G&L.

In her capacity as an owner of CTC, Crawford entered into a hauling contract with G&L on behalf of CTC and maintained an ongoing business relationship with G&L for several years beginning in 2003. (Id. at ¶¶ 14-18) Crawford was then recruited for a position as a dispatcher with G&L. (Id. at ¶¶ 13, 19) Crawford expressed concern that accepting the position at G&L might adversely affect G&L's business relationship with CTC, but she accepted the position after receiving assurances from Brooks, the Vice President of Administrative Services for G&L, that this would not be an issue. (Id. at ¶¶ 10, 20-23) Crawford began working for G&L on June 19, 2008. (Id. at ¶ 23)

Immediately after Crawford started working at G&L, G&L employee Mike Bursich began sexually harassing her. (Id. at ¶ 30) Crawford reported the sexual harassment on July 30, 2008, and the next day, G&L transferred Crawford to another work location and demoted her. (Id. at ¶¶ 64-70) At the same time, the business relationship between G&L and CTC was effectively terminated. (Id. at ¶¶ 96-103) On September 18, 2008, Crawford was discharged from her position at G&L because she had allegedly resolved all of the issues she was required to handle and "worked herself out of a job." (Id. at ¶¶ 79, 85)

Crawford filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Delaware Department of Labor ("DDOL") and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on September 22, 2008, alleging claims for sexual harassment and retaliation based on G&L's termination of her employment. (Id. at ¶ 104) On July 19, 2010, the DDOL issued a Final Determination and Notice of Right to Sue Letter, which became effective on July 27, 2010. (Id. at ¶ 106) On September 1, 2010, the EEOC issued a Federal Right to Sue Letter. (Id. at ¶ 108)

III. DISCUSSION

A. Dismissal of CTC from the retaliation claim

1. CTC's standing to sue under Title VII

Defendants contend that CTC should be dismissed from the retaliation count because CTC is not an "employee" and therefore lacks standing to sue under Title VII. (D.I. 71 at 3) Specifically, Defendants contend that no authority supports an extension of Title VII to non-person, non-employee entities. (D.I. 93 at 2)

In response, Plaintiffs contend that CTC is a proper party in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011), whichsupports the proposition that third party retaliation is actionable under Title VII. (D.L 84 at 3) Applying Thompson, Plaintiffs contend that CTC was within the "zone of interests" sought to be protected by the statutes because Crawford raised the issue of potential retaliation against CTC prior to her acceptance of the job with G&L. (Id. at 5-6) Plaintiffs concede that the third party retaliated against in Thompson was also an employee of the company, but they contend that other courts have extended standing to non-employee spouses and friends of the complaining party. (Id. at 4)

The language of Title VII does not support an extension of these principles to an entity that is adversely impacted as a result of an employer's retaliation against its employee. Specifically, Title VII defines "employee" as "an individual employed by an employer," a definition that does not include a corporate entity. 42 U.S.C. § 20Q0e(f), The statute provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). The statute further provides that

[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). These provisions do not apply to CTC as a non-employee corporate entity that cannot participate in protected activity.

Plaintiffs misconstrue Thompson and its progeny. The Supreme Court in Thompson heldthat the plaintiff fell within the zone of interests protected by Title VII because he was an employee of the defendant, noting that Title VII's purpose is to protect employees from their employers' unlawful actions. See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870. The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant fired the plaintiff in order to retaliate against the plaintiff's fiancee, who had previously filed a complaint for discrimination with the EEOC. Id. The facts of Thompson are not analogous to the situation presented in the instant matter because CTC is an entity that was not employed by G&L. Title VII expressly states that it is to protect employees from their employers' unlawful actions, and as a non-employee entity, CTC does not fall within the zone of interests.²

Plaintiffs also cite two decisions from district courts outside of the Third Circuit in support of their argument. In McGhee v. Healthcare Services Group, Inc. ,2011 WL 818662, at *2-3 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2011), the plaintiff was employed by a subcontractor of the company that employed his wife. The plaintiff's wife filed a charge of discrimination against her employer, after which the subcontractor terminated the plaintiff at the request of his wife's employer. Id. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that allowing an employer to induce its subcontractor to fire the subcontractor's employee in retaliation for the protected activity of the terminated employee's spouse, would contravene the purpose of Title VII. Id. The court found that the two employers and their employees were "intertwined." Id. at *3.

In Ali v. District of Columbia Government, 810 F. Supp. 2d 78, 89 (D.D.C. 2011), the plaintiff claimed retaliation based on his employer's threats to terminate his best friend, who was employed by the same entity. The court denied summary judgment on the retaliation claim, concluding that a factual dispute existed as to whether threatening the plaintiff's best friend with termination was unlawful under Thompson. Id.

Neither of these cases supports the theory that Title VII extends to non-person entities, or that a company such as CTC would fall within the "zone of interests" intended to be protected by the statute. Each case cited by Plaintiffs involves an individual employee alleging a claim of retaliation for engaging in protected activity, based on actions taken by the same employer or a subcontractor of the employer, against another individual employee. Thus, a reprisal against another employee, who is a relative or close friend of the subject employee alleging the employment violation, may support a charge of retaliation under Title VII. However, accepting Plaintiffs' argument that an employer's termination of a contract with a business entity owned by an employee constitutes retaliation for the employee's protected conduct, would result in a new and substantial expansion of the law on third party reprisal claims under Title VII.

2. CTC's exhaustion of administrative remedies

Next, Defendants contend that Crawford's Charge of Discrimination did not include CTC as a Charging Party, and CTC would be required to exhaust its administrative remedies to assert a valid claim for retaliation under Title VII. (D.I. 71 at 3) In response, Plaintiffs contend that CTC exhausted its administrative remedies through Crawford because Crawford timely filed a complaint with the DDOL and the EEOC. (D.I. 84 at 6) According to Plaintiffs, CTC qualifies as a person aggrieved under the Administrative Procedures Act because...