Crawford v. Hernandez
| Decision Date | 21 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:19-cv-00020-JKS,3:19-cv-00020-JKS |
| Parties | KEANE-ALEXANDER RON CRAWFORD, Petitioner, v. ARNALDO HERNANDEZ, Superintendent, Spring Creek Correctional Center, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Alaska |
Keane-Alexander Crawford, a state prisoner now represented by counsel, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus with this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Crawford is in the custody of the Alaska Department of Corrections ("DOC") and incarcerated at Spring Creek Correctional Center. Respondent has answered, and Crawford has not replied.
On December 7, 2008, Crawford was charged with the first-degree murder of his sister's fiancé following a physical altercation between the two men. He was later indicted on chargesof first- and second-degree murder and several related felonies in addition to misdemeanor charges of resisting arrest and fourth-degree assault.
Crawford asked to represent himself. After obtaining a competency evaluation, the Anchorage Superior Court granted the request. Shortly before trial was set to begin, a different judge of the Anchorage Superior Court, Judge Aarseth, to whom the matter had been re-assigned, held that Crawford was not competent to represent himself. Crawford filed a petition for review, which the Court of Appeals granted, and the case was remanded for trial with Crawford representing himself. During the pre-trial period, Crawford made a number of other motions, which will be discussed more fully in the Discussion section, infra, including a request for Judge Aarseth to recuse himself after a contentious pre-trial hearing. Judge Aarseth denied the request. A different judge of the Alaska Superior Court was appointed to review the recusal decision and found "no reason why Judge Aarseth should recuse himself in this matter." At various times during the pre-trial proceedings, Crawford also asked the superior court to supply him, as an indigent criminal defendant, with public funds to hire a number of expert witnesses. The superior court denied Crawford's various requests.
On January 6, 2010, Crawford proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of a five-week trial, the jury found Crawford not guilty of first-degree murder, but found him guilty of second-degree murder and several of the related charges. The jury acquitted Crawford of, or were unable to reach a verdict as to, the remaining charges.
Again proceeding pro se, Crawford appealed his conviction, arguing that: 1) the trial court improperly denied his motion for sanctions based on malicious prosecutorial misconduct; 2) his rights to confrontation were violated by the trial court's denial of his request to cross-examine his sister at his bail hearing; 3) the prosecution's discovery violations infringed on his right to a speedy trial; 4) he was brought to trial outside the time limits of Alaska Criminal Rule Rule 45 (); 5) his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated; 6) he was entitled to a new trial because Judge Aarseth should have recused himself; 7) the trialjudge improperly restricted his voir dire examination of prospective jurors; 8) the trial court improperly restricted or rejected Crawford's requests for an investigator, scientific testing, and a medical expert; 9) the trial court improperly denied Crawford's request to preserve his son's trial testimony by videotape; 10) the trial court violated his rights to due process, a fair trial, and confrontation by permitting the State to call without proper notice to Crawford an alcohol extrapolation expert; 11) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the right to use deadly force in defense of self and third persons; 12) the trial court improperly denied Crawford's motion for a new trial; and 13) the totality of the errors constituted cumulative error warranting reversal of his conviction. The Alaska Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the judgment against Crawford as to all claims except the superior court's refusal to provide an expert witness at public offense. Crawford v. State, 337 P.3d 4, 42 (Alaska Ct. App. 2014) ("Crawford I"). As to that issue, the appellate court solicited supplemental briefs from the parties as well as amicus curiae briefs from the Alaska Public Defender Agency and the Office of Public Advocacy. Id. Following supplemental briefing, the Court of Appeals held that: 1) the trial court was not required to provide public funds for expert witnesses Crawford requested; and 2) as a matter of first impression, the Alaska Public Defender Act, which guarantees legal counsel for indigent criminal defendants, does not authorize public funding of clerical support, investigative services, and expert consultations for indigent criminal defendants who have waived their right to appointed attorney representation. Crawford v. State, 404 P.3d 204, 223 (Alaska Ct. App. 2017) ("Crawford II"). The appellate court thus affirmed Crawford's conviction in its entirety. Id. Crawford filed a pro se petition for review in the Alaska Supreme Court, which was denied without comment on March 15, 2018.
Crawford then timely filed a pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus to this Court dated December 24, 2018. Docket No. 1; see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1),(2). After Respondent answered the pro se petition, this Court granted Crawford's renewed request for the appointment of counsel. Docket No. 12. Crawford filed an Amended Petition, Docket No. 19-1 ("Petition"),which is now ripe for adjudication. Also pending before the Court is Crawford's request for an evidentiary hearing.
In his counseled Petition before this Court, Crawford argues that: 1) the trial court violated Crawford's right to a speedy trial; 2) the trial court violated Crawford's right to due process when it declined to enforce Crawford's subpoena for the testimony of the victim's son (Crawford's nephew); 3) the trial court impermissibly limited Crawford's direct examination of Crawford's sister and other witnesses and wrongfully excluded certain impeachment evidence; 4) Crawford's right to confrontation was violated when he was denied the opportunity to call his four-year-old son to testify; 5) the Court of Appeals unreasonably applied federal law when it assessed his cumulative error claim based on the trial court's evidentiary rulings; 6) the trial court erroneously declined to give the jury a defense-of-others instruction; and 7) the trial court violated Crawford's rights to due process and a fair trial when it denied his request for funds to retain a medical expert.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the state court was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," § 2254(d)(1), or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," § 2254(d)(2). A state-court decision is contrary to federal law if the state court applies a rule that contradicts controlling Supreme Court authority or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision" of the Supreme Court, but nevertheless arrives at a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000). The term unreasonable is a common term in the legal world. The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that the range of reasonable judgments may depend in part on the nature of the relevant rule argued to be clearlyestablished federal law. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004) ( ).
The Supreme Court has explained that "clearly established Federal law" in § 2254(d)(1) "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court] as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id. at 412. The holding must also be intended to be binding upon the states; that is, the decision must be based upon constitutional grounds, not on the supervisory power of the Supreme Court over federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 10 (2002). Where holdings of the Supreme Court regarding the issue presented on habeas review are lacking, "it cannot be said that the state court 'unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.'" Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (citation omitted).
To the extent that the Petition raises issues of the proper application of state law, they are beyond the purview of this Court in a federal habeas proceeding. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 863 (2011) (per curiam) (). It is a fundamental precept of dual federalism that the states possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990) (), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
In applying these standards on habeas review, this Court reviews the "last reasoned decision" by the state court. See Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002)). A summary denial is an adjudication on the merits and entitled to deference. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). Under the AEDPA, the state court's findings of fact are presumed to be correct unless the petitionerrebuts this presumption by clear and...
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