Crawford v. Hinds Cnty., CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17CV118TSL-RHW

• Decision Date: 08 October 2019
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17CV118TSL-RHW
• Parties: SCOTT CRAWFORD PLAINTIFF v. HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI DEFENDANT
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

SCOTT CRAWFORD PLAINTIFF v. HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI DEFENDANT

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17CV118TSL-RHW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI NORTHERN DIVISION

October 8, 2019

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Scott Crawford is a disabled individual who uses a motorized wheelchair. He brought the present action against Hinds County under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. (ADA), as well as the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq., charging that the Hinds County Courthouse is not readily accessible to the disabled because of numerous mobility-related architectural barriers throughout the courthouse. In his complaint, plaintiff requested injunctive relief, monetary damages, as well as attorneys' fees and costs.

Previously in this cause, the court denied a motion by Hinds County for summary judgment and granted, in part, plaintiff's cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The County asserted in its motion, among other arguments, that plaintiff's complaint was due to be dismissed on the basis that he lacked standing under Article III of the United States Constitution. In its order, the court found that plaintiff has standing to pursue his claims in this case. That was true as to his claim for damages, but that claim was settled between the parties. In the course of evaluating evidence presented at the trial of the case, the court has reexamined the issue of standing¹ and become convinced that he has no standing to obtain an injunction. His claim for injunctive relief must therefore be dismissed.

ADA Title II/Rehabilitation Act

The ADA, passed by Congress in 1992 to address discrimination against disabled individuals, contains three separate titles which prohibit discrimination, respectively, in employment (Title I), public services and transportation (Title II), and public accommodations (Title III). Plaintiff's complaint involves Title II, which states:

no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in, or be denied the benefits of services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any public entity.

42 U.S.C. § 12132.

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which applies to recipients of federal funding, provides, like Title II, that no qualified individual with a disability "shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act generally are interpreted in pari materia. Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 223 (5thCir. 2011). While the ADA does not define the "services, programs, or activities of a public entity", the Rehabilitation Act's definition of a "program or activity" as "all of the operations of ... a local government" applies under the ADA. Id. at 225.

The parties agree that plaintiff is a "qualified individual with a disability" and that Hinds County is a "public entity" subject to the requirements of Title II. It is further undisputed that Hinds County is a recipient of federal funds and subject to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

The ADA's implementing regulations state that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, because a public entity's facilities are inaccessible to or unusable by individuals with disabilities, be excluded from participation in, or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any public entity." 28 C.F.R. § 35.149. A public entity is required to "operate each service, program, or activity so that the service, program, or activity, when viewed in its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities." 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a). While this means that a public entity must take reasonable measures to remove architectural and other barriers to accessibility, "Title II does not require [a public entity] to employ any and all means to make [its programs, services and activities] accessible to persons with disabilities... Itrequires only 'reasonable modifications' that would not fundamentally alter the nature of the service provided...." Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 511, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1981, 158 L. Ed. 2d 820 (2004). Standards for determining compliance with this obligation differ based on whether the facility was built and/or altered before or after the ADA took effect in January 1992. See Greer v. Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist., 472 F. App'x 287, 295 (5th Cir. 2012). For facilities built or altered after 1992, ADA regulations require compliance with specific architectural accessibility standards, known as the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities (ADAAG), 28 C.F.R. Ch. 1, Pt. 36, App. A. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. at 531-32, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (citing 28 CFR § 35.151 (2003)).² However, in recognition of the reality that in the case of existing facilities, a public entity would have difficulty meeting all of the technical requirements of the ADAAG, the ADA's implementing regulations provide "less stringent and more flexible" accessibility requirements for existing facilities than for new facilities. Greer, 472 F. App'x at 291. In summary,

in the case of older facilities, for which structural change is likely to be more difficult, a public entity may comply with Title II by adopting a variety of less costly measures, including relocating services to alternative, accessible sites and assigning aides to assist persons with disabilities in accessing services. § 35.150(b)(1). Only if these measures are ineffective in achieving accessibility is the public entity required to make reasonable structural changes. Ibid. And in no event is the entity required to undertake measures that would impose an undue financial or administrative burden, threaten historic preservation interests, or effect a fundamental alteration in the nature of the service. §§ 35.150(a)(2), (a)(3).

Lane, 541 U.S. at 532, 124 S. Ct. 1978. In all events, though, a public entity has a duty to "ensure that individuals with disabilities receive the benefits or services provided by the public entity" and thus to ensure that each service, program, or activity at its courthouse, "when viewed in its entirety," is readily accessible to individuals with disabilities. Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 2001).

Plaintiff's Experiences at the Hinds County Courthouse

Plaintiff has multiple sclerosis. Because of the symptoms caused by this disease, he relies on a motorized wheelchair for mobility. In December 2006, as his symptoms began progressing, plaintiff, who was living in Florida at the time, decided to move back to Mississippi so that he could have help from his family in Mississippi. Promptly upon returning to Mississippi, plaintiff went to the Hinds County Courthouse (the courthouse) to register to vote. He found that he could not enter the main entrance at the front of the building because of multiple steps leading to theentrance. There was no sign directing him to an accessible entrance, but after looking around, he found a floor-level entrance on the east side of the building. However, he required assistance to enter the building because the doors were heavy and the door handles were of a type that required tight grasping and twisting to operate, which he was unable to do. Once inside the building, plaintiff went to the Circuit Clerk's office, located on the ground level, and completed his voter registration.

Plaintiff subsequently returned to the courthouse some six years later, in October 2012, when he was summoned for jury duty by the Hinds County Circuit Court. He knew from his earlier experience to go to the east entrance; but for the same reasons as before, he had difficulty actually entering the building. Someone had to open the doors for him. After entering, he took the elevator to the second floor and located the courtroom where jury selection was taking place. Upon entering the courtroom, he found the pews in the gallery had no wheelchair cutouts to accommodate his wheelchair. He did not want to sit in the aisle because it seemed narrow and he did not want to block others or pose a trip hazard. There was an open space in the back but he has issues with his vocal cords and thought it might be difficult for him to be heard. Eventually he decided to sit in front of all the pews, to the right of the judge.

While waiting for jury selection to begin, plaintiff went to the second floor men's restroom. A sign on the door indicated it was an accessible restroom, but it was immediately obvious to him that the restroom was not ADA-compliant as it had a door knob that required tight grasping and twisting. When he actually entered the restroom, he discovered the stall was too narrow to accommodate his wheelchair and he was not able to use the restroom. Instead, he was wearing incontinence undergarments and had to relieve himself in his pants.

That day, the jury venire was dismissed with instructions to come back on Wednesday. Because he had learned that the second floor men's restroom was not accessible, on Wednesday, when he needed to use the restroom, he asked a bailiff where there was an accessible restroom. In response, the bailiff guided him through "several locked doors" to a unisex restroom that, while not fully ADA-compliant, was large enough to accommodate his wheelchair. The bailiff waited outside the door until plaintiff was finished and then escorted him back to the courtroom.

As jury selection progressed, the judge asked venire members to approach the bench if they had concerns about serving on the jury. Plaintiff, however, was not able to approach the judge because a six-inch step separated the gallery from the bar/bench area. As he had no means of navigating the step, he...