Crawford v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 28 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-7009.,02-7009.
• Parties: Curtis E. CRAWFORD, Appellant, v. Patricia A. JACKSON, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 123

323 F.3d 123

Curtis E. CRAWFORD, Appellant, v. Patricia A. JACKSON, Appellee.

No. 02-7009.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued February 7, 2003.

Decided March 28, 2003.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied May 1, 2003.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 99cv01272).

Nicholas G. Terris, appointed by the court, argued the cause as amicus curiae on behalf of appellant. With him on the briefs were Glenn R. Reichardt and Stephen W. Grafman.

Curtis E. Crawford filed pro se briefs.

Mary L. Wilson, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, and Edward E. Schwab, Assistant Corporation Counsel. John R. Fisher, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: EDWARDS, HENDERSON and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge:

Curtis E. Crawford appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the revocation of his parole. We hold, in light of the United States' waiver of any objection to lack of personal jurisdiction, that the court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal. We further hold, in light of the strong indicia of reliability of the police investigative report, that the D.C. Parole Board's reliance on hearsay evidence did not violate Crawford's due process rights. The police investigative report was detailed, Crawford's admissions corroborated portions of the report, and the report was internally corroborative of the complainant's claim that Crawford had assaulted her. In the absence of contrary evidence, which Crawford had an opportunity to present, and Crawford's far-fetched and incomplete explanation of how the complainant suffered her injuries, the report provided sufficiently reliable evidence of Crawford's culpability for aggravated assault, and thus of his violation of parole. Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

Since being convicted by a jury of second degree murder in 1972, Crawford has violated parole on numerous occasions. As relevant here, Crawford was paroled on November 14, 1996, and arrested on February 4, 1999, by the Metropolitan Police Department for aggravated assault in October 1998. At a parole revocation hearing in July 1999, the Board considered as grounds for revocation the aggravated assault charge as well as Crawford's use of marijuana and cocaine.

The Report of July 7, 1999, on the revocation hearing focuses primarily on the October 1998 assault. After summarizing the Arrest Prosecution Report of the Metropolitan Police Department ("police investigative report"), the Hearing Report states that Crawford "adamantly denies his involvement" in the aggravated assault, claiming that the complainant instead had a disagreement with a third person inside of the house, had left the premises, and then fallen while attempting to climb a fence and injured herself. The Report noted that Crawford had not been indicted for aggravated assault although he was scheduled to return to court for a felony conference. However, as the Report further noted, Crawford did not deny his drug use on two different occasions while on parole. The Report also recounted that Crawford had violated parole "at least four (4) times," continued to get arrested and to use drugs, had a history of serious assaultive behavior and illegal drug use, and had been diagnosed in 1987 as having a severe antisocial personality. Nonetheless, Crawford's probation officer recommended that his parole be reinstated. The Hearing Official disagreed, recommending to the Board that it revoke Crawford's parole and reconsider Crawford for parole by May 11, 2000. The Board concurred in the Hearing Official's recommendation and, based on the aggravated assault and two druguse violations of the conditions of his parole, revoked Crawford's parole on July 21, 1999.

Crawford filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in May 1999 challenging his detention pending a parole revocation hearing; after the July revocation, he amended his petition to challenge the revocation. Following denial of the petition, Crawford appealed, contending that his due process rights were violated at the revocation hearing because, among other claims, the Board (1) did not allow him to cross-examine the author of the police investigative report; (2) denied him the opportunity to call witnesses; and (3) relied solely on the police investigative report containing hearsay to revoke his parole. The court summarily affirmed denial of the writ except with respect to Crawford's challenge to the Board's reliance on the police report. Crawford v. Jackson, No. 02-7009 (Order of April 10, 2002).

II.

The threshold question of our jurisdiction has been resolved by the United States' waiver of any objection to lack of personal jurisdiction. See Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 813 (D.C.Cir. 1988). When Crawford originally filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, he was confined as a D.C. prisoner at the District of Columbia's Correctional Complex in Lorton, Virginia, where his custodian was Warden Patricia Jackson. At that point there is no question that the court had jurisdiction to consider the petition. As the court stated in Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1039 (quotation omitted), reh'g granted in part on other grounds, 159 F.3d 591 (D.C.Cir.1998), "the appropriate defendant in a habeas action is the custodian of the prisoner," which would have been the warden of Lorton, over whom we have jurisdiction, id. at 1043; McCall v. Swain, 510 F.2d 167, 177 (D.C.Cir.1975).

Pursuant to section 11201(b) of the National Capital Revitalization and Self-Government Improvement Act of 1997 ("1997 Revitalization Act"), Pub.L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251, 734, however, Crawford was subsequently removed in June 2000 from the Lorton Correctional Complex, and was eventually transferred to the Federal Correctional Institution at Petersburg, Virginia. Section 11201(b) required the District of Columbia to close its Correctional Complex in Lorton, Virginia by December 31, 2001, and directed that "the felony population sentenced pursuant to the District of Columbia Code residing at the Lorton Correctional Complex shall be transferred to a penal or correctional facility operated or contracted for by the Bureau of Prisons." Crawford's transfer thus raised the question whether the court lacks jurisdiction to consider his petition.

Although the transfer of a prisoner from one correctional facility to another would not ordinarily deprive the court of jurisdiction over the habeas petition, see Blair-Bey, 151 F.3d at 1039 n. 1, the transfer here was not simply a transfer between correctional facilities, but also a transfer of responsibility for the imprisonment of D.C. felons from the District of Columbia to the United States, such that the District of Columbia asserted that it is "now powerless to comply with any court order that [Crawford] should be released... or have a new parole revocation hearing." Appellee's Br. at 5. Given both the fact that Crawford is currently housed in the federal Petersburg correctional facility in Virginia and the questions surrounding the continued applicability of this circuit's precedent to the transfer of such a D.C. prisoner, the court ordered the United States to enter a limited appearance to advise the court whether it may substitute the United States as appellee in this case. Crawford v. Jackson, No. 02-7009 (Order of February 7, 2003). In light of a pending appeal involving D.C. prisoners transferred pursuant to the 1997 Revitalization Act, the court granted leave to file an amicus curiae response to the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia. Id. (Order of March 12, 2003).

The court need not now address the complex issues that may arise regarding the effect of the 1997 Revitalization Act on this circuit's preexisting habeas corpus precedent. See, e.g., Blair-Bey, 151 F.3d at 1039 n. 1; Chatman-Bey, 864 F.2d at 806 n. 1; Fed. R.App. P. 23(a). The United States has entered an appearance and advised that it is waiving any objection to lack of personal jurisdiction in this case, and that the court "may substitute the Warden at FCI Petersburg, Stephen M. Dewalt, as the custodian of appellant/petitioner Curtis E. Crawford." Entry of Appearance and Response to Court Order of February 19, 2003, at 1. The United States also adopted, except as to an argument regarding Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 23, the brief filed by the District of Columbia pursuant to D.C.Code § 24-132(h)(1)(c). While Crawford claims, in addressing the Response of the United States, that he is being unlawfully held because his transfer violated Rule 23, to the extent that Crawford claims that he therefore should be released from confinement, he never made such a claim in his opening brief although he had raised the claim in the district court. Because the jurisdictional question has been resolved by the United States' waiver and Crawford has not preserved any other Rule 23 claim, the court need not address whether, as the United States maintains in its February 13, 2003 Response, Rule 23 is inapplicable to a transfer under the 1997 Revitalization Act. See Benkelman Tel. Co. v. FCC, 220 F.3d 601, 607 n. 10 (D.C.Cir.2000)

Accordingly, we substitute Stephen M. Dewalt as the respondent, and in view of the United States' waiver of objection to lack of personal jurisdiction, we hold that the court has jurisdiction to address the merits of Crawford's appeal.

III.

The essence of Crawford's remaining challenge to the D.C. Parole Board's revocation of his parole is that the Board impermissibly relied solely on an uncorroborated police investigative report containing hearsay evidence. He contends that under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d...