Crawford v. Joslyn

• Decision Date: 07 May 1910
• Citation: 76 A. 108,83 Vt. 361
• Parties: CRAWFORD v. JOSLYN.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

76 A. 108

83 Vt. 361

CRAWFORD

v. JOSLYN.

Supreme Court of Vermont. Orleans.

May 7, 1910.

Exceptions from Orleans County Court; Alfred A. Hall, Judge.

Action by Perley A. Crawford against O. V. Joslyn, as tax collector, to recover a penalty prescribed by P. S. 2053, for receiving illegal fees. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings exceptions. Affirmed.

Argued before ROWELL, C. J., and MDNSON, WATSON, HASELTON, and POWERS, JJ.

W. R. Aldrich, for plaintiff.

Frank D. Thompson and W. W. Reirden, for defendant.

POWERS, J. The term "knowingly" means "with knowledge," and, when used in a prohibitory statute, is usually held to import a knowledge of the essential facts, from which the law presumes a knowledge of the legal consequences arising therefrom. Thus in McGuire v. State, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 54, under a statute providing a punishment for a person "who shall knowingly vote at any election not being at the time a qualified voter," it was held that one who voted having knowledge of the facts which disqualified him was guilty of the offense, though he honestly believed that he had a right to vote. But the word is sometimes used in the sense of "intentionally" (24 Cyc. 806), in which case it must be made to appear that the party charged was aware of the illegality of his conduct. So in Byrne v. State, 12 Wis. 519 (a case which it is difficult to reconcile with the one above), under a statute providing a punishment for one who knowingly received an illegal vote, it was held that the statute only required candor and sincerity, and only punished one who acted dishonestly and corruptly. To much the same effect is Merelles v. Banning, 22 E. C. L. 380. That the term is used in the latter sense in P. S. 2053, has already been decided by this court.

In Henry v. Tilson, 17 Vt. 479, the trial court excluded evidence offered by the defendant that it had been the usual custom for the tax collector of his town in commitment cases to charge mileage fees as he charged them in that case. It declined to charge the jury that the plaintiff could not recover unless they were convinced that the defendant charged and received the fees knowing them to be illegal; and did charge that, if the defendant charged fees that were illegal, the law would presume that he did it knowingly. A judgment for the plaintiff was reversed, and it is apparent that it was for the errors involved in the action of the court above specified. In no other way can the result be justified or the expression of the court, "the officer was clearly not entitled to pay for travel, except actual travel one way in the commitment, there being no return necessary; but such a practice might have led him to conclude he was," be understood.

Notwithstanding this decision, some five years later Judge Bennett said in Johnson v. Burnham. 22 Vt. 639, though the point was not raised: "The facts were all before the defendant; and, as it is to be taken that every man knows the law, no question can arise as to the scienter and motives of the defendant." But, if this statement was to be taken as casting any doubt upon the meaning or authority of Henry v. Tilson, the whole matter was set at rest by Haynes v. Hall, 37 Vt. 20,...