Crawford v. JP Morgan Chase & Co.
| Decision Date | 06 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 12-3698,12-3698 |
| Parties | PAULA CRAWFORD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JP MORGAN CHASE & COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
File Name: 13a0720n.06
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
OHIO
OPINIONBefore: MERRITT, CLAY, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.
Bernice B. Donald, Circuit Judge. Paula Crawford appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Chase Bank on her Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) interference and retaliation claims. For the reasons explained below, we REVERSE.
In May 1995, Paula Crawford began working with Chemical Bank, one of Chase Bank's (Chase) predecessors in Columbus, Ohio. (Page ID 1362.) Since Chase's acquisition of Chemical Bank, Crawford has consistently worked for Chase.1 Crawford's present appeal focuses on heremployment as a Project Manager, the elimination of that position, and Crawford's subsequent transfer to the position of Quality Analyst.
In November 2003, while she was working at Chase, Crawford also began working full-time with Safe Auto, an insurance company, as a customer service representative. In March 2005, Crawford, along with other Safe Auto employees, was held hostage at gunpoint by a co-worker. (Page ID 143-145.) As a result of this traumatic incident, Crawford sought professional mental health treatment and was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety, and depression. (Page ID 142-147, 149, 151.)
In September 2005, Chase promoted Crawford to the position of Project Manager and she remained stationed in Columbus, Ohio. This position allowed Crawford to apply legal knowledge that she acquired during her studies in law school. For example, Crawford performed Regulation AB (asset backed securities) review of contract servicing agreements for Chase's Quality Audit and Default Processing group. (Page ID 1436.) Crawford also ensured that Chase complied with all of the servicing agreements. (Id.) In this position, Crawford's primary remote supervisor was Nancy Gravine, who was based in Michigan. (Id.) Crawford's secondary remote supervisor was Marsha Fogle, who was based in Phoenix, Arizona. (Id.)
In late 2006, Crawford requested a laptop computer and the assistance of temporary workers for data entry from Gravine. (Page ID R.43, 172.) Crawford did not receive an answer to her request. From January to March 2007, Crawford took approved FMLA leave for her continuedanxiety and depression. (Id.) When Crawford returned from FMLA leave, she was assigned to a different supervisor, Parrish McIntosh. Crawford renewed her request for a laptop computer and data entry support staff when she returned from her leave, but the requests were denied. Fogle rejected the requests due to budget constraints. Crawford alleges that at least two individuals in lower-level positions received laptop computers during the same time period that she made her requests.
Beginning in the summer of 2007, a series of conversations took place via email among high-level managers that eventually resulted in Crawford's position being transferred to Phoenix and Crawford being reassigned to an ostensibly lesser position upon her return from FMLA leave. Crawford alleges that these emails show Chase's intention to demote her to a lesser position.
On September 27, 2007, Marsha Van Dam, Crawford's new remote supervisor, sent an email to Fogle regarding the possible transfer of Crawford's position. The email stated, in relevant part: "The functions now performed in Columbus would be Incorporated into current function in Phoenix with no additional head count." (Page ID 361.)
On the same day, Fogle responded: (Page ID 362.)
On October 24, 2007, Marsha Van Dam sent an email to Lauren Nicks regarding the elimination of Crawford's position stating: (Page ID 359-60.)
Lauren Nicks, a high-level Chase manager, responded with an email to Fogle and Van Dam:
As much as severance would make for a simplified solution-its not a viable option for us.... Based on the growth in broader Fogle team... -we can't justify eliminating a position. We can proceed with moving her job function to Phoenix and reassign Paula to a manager based in Paula's location...We need to work with Parrish to determine what function we can realign her to-change her responsibilities and manage her new role. If Paula refuses to accept the new responsibility-that will be considered a resignation-which we will accept. Paula's other option is to move to the new role-and we allow her to conduct a job search... but she must be successfully [sic] job function in the role.
(Page ID 359.) (emphasis added).
From December 10, 2007 through February 19, 2008, Crawford again took approved FMLA leave for depression and stress. (Page ID 1438.) Shortly after her return, on March 16, 2008, Crawford's job designation was changed from Project Manager I to Quality Analyst II. (Id.) Crawford was informed that her Project Manager I position was transferred to Arizona and Crawford would be assigned to another position based in Columbus, Ohio. (Page ID 1438, 390.) In this new position, Crawford would now report to Mike McCall, a former peer. (Id.)
Crawford initiated the instant action in March 2010, alleging, among other things,2 that Chase interfered with her rights under the FMLA and retaliated against her for using FMLA leave. (Page ID 1438-39.) Chase presented evidence showing that Crawford's salary, grade level, work hours, work location, and bonus potential did not change. (Id.) Crawford testified that her new position included more clerical duties and did not require the same level of legal expertise as the Program Manager I position. Moreover, Crawford testified that her opportunities for career advancement were diminished in her new position. (Page ID 210.)
Chase moved for summary judgment on all claims. (Page ID 1439.) The district court granted Chase's motion. (Page ID 1453.) Crawford now appeals and argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Chase with respect to her FMLA claims.3
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Davenport v. Causey, 521 F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, the discovery, and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact such that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c). Summary judgment is not appropriate if "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovingparty." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to twelve weeks of leave during any twelve -month period if the employee has a "serious health condition." 29 U.S.C. §2612(a)(1)(D). Section 2615(a)(1), the "interference" provision, provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided in this subchapter." The FMLA interference theory also arises from Section 2614(a)(1), which provides that "any eligible employee who takes leave . . . shall be entitled, on return from such leave (A) to be restored by the employer to the position of employment held by the employee when the leave commenced; or (B) to be restored to an equivalent position. . . ."
To establish a claim for FMLA interference, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she was an eligible employee; (2) her employer was a covered employer; (3) she was entitled to leave under the FMLA; (4) she gave her employer notice of her intent to take leave; and (5) her employer denied her FMLA benefits or interfered with FMLA benefits or rights to which she was entitled. Cavin v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 346 F.3d 713, 719 (6th Cir. 2003). The intent behind the employer's conduct is not relevant to an interference claim. Arban v. W. Pub. Corp., 345 F.3d 390, 401(6th Cir. 2003).
Chase does not dispute that Crawford has met the first four elements of the interference claim. Chase argues, however, that it did not deny Crawford any FMLA benefits to which she wasentitled. Chase asserts that because Crawford returned to the same position immediately after she returned from approved FMLA leave in February 2008, it did not interfere with Crawford's FMLA rights. Crawford argues, however, that Chase interfered with her FMLA rights by transferring her to a non-equivalent position shortly after she returned from FMLA leave.
"An equivalent position is one that is virtually identical to the employee's former position in terms of pay, benefits, and working conditions, including privileges, perquisites and status." 29 C.F.R. § 825.215(a). Furthermore, "[i]t must involve the same or substantially similar duties and responsibilities, which must entail substantially equivalent skill, effort, responsibility, and authority." Id. "The requirement that an employee be restored to the same or equivalent job [] does not extend to de minimis, intangible, or unmeasurable aspects of the job." 29 C.F.R. § 825.215(f).
If the positions are not equivalent, then Crawford was denied a benefit to which she was entitled under FMLA. A denial of FMLA benefits is the...
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