Crawford v. Longuemare

• Citation: 181 P. 283,25 N.M. 267
• Decision Date: 25 January 1919
• Docket Number: No. 2159.,2159.
• Parties: CRAWFORDv.LONGUEMARE et al.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

25 N.M. 267

181 P. 283

CRAWFORD

v.LONGUEMARE et al.

No. 2159.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Jan. 25, 1919.Rehearing Denied June 7, 1919.

Syllabus by the Court.

Where a preliminary or temporary injunction has been granted ex parte upon a verified petition, it should be dissolved upon the filing of a verified answer by the respondents, which fully and fairly meets all the equities in the petition.

The validity of the title and possession alleged by the respondents to be in them should be judicially determined at law, before its assertion, or the assertion of rights under it, should be enjoined.

Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.

In cases of trespasses, where it is necessary to quiet a rightful admitted or established possession, equity may interpose to prevent a multiplicity of suits, although there may be a remedy at law; but equity will not grant an injunction against one person merely because he is guilty of repeated trespasses, where the legal remedy affords an adequate and complete redress in damages.

To justify the interference of a court of equity in cases of trespass, in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits, there must be several persons controverting the some right, and each standing upon his own claim.

Appeal from District Court, Doña Ana County; Medler, Judge.

Action for injunction by L. M. Crawford, trustee, against Charles A. Longuemare and others. Temporary injunction issued ex parte, and from its dissolution, on defendants' motion, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

This suit is brought by the plaintiff to restrain alleged trespasses upon the real estate claimed by the plaintiff. The complaint alleges plaintiff is a resident of the state of Kansas and sues as trustee for the Amusement Syndicate Company; that he is the owner and in possession of the real estate described in the complaint; that the defendants have combined and confederated together, without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff, and entered upon said land, cutting down the trees, converting the same into wood, and removing the same, and alleging that defendants have removed from said land about 500 cords of such wood; that defendants intended to clear the land and take possession thereof from the plaintiff, and to continue the alleged acts. The plaintiff prayed that a temporary writ of injunction be issued by the court, restraining the defendants, their agents, servants, and employés, from in any manner entering upon the said land, and from cutting the trees, timber, and wood, and that upon the final hearing the said injunction be made perpetual and an accounting be had; also that the plaintiff have judgment against the defendants in the sum of $5,000.

A temporary injunction was issued ex parte upon the verified petition. The defendants filed an amended answer, denying the allegations of the complaint, setting up title and possession in themselves. Upon the coming in of the answer, the defendants also interposed a motion to dissolve the temporary injunction upon various grounds, which motion for dissolution was granted, and from the action of the court in dissolving such injunction plaintiff appealed to this court.

Where a preliminary or temporary injunction has been granted ex parte upon a verified petition, it should be dissolved upon the filing of a verified answer by respondents, which fully and fairly meets all the equities in the petition.

Jones, Jones, Hardie & Grambling, of El Paso, Tex., and Frank Herron, of Las Cruces, for appellant.

McKenzie & Loose, of El Paso, Tex., and Young & Young, of Las Cruces, for appellees.

RAYNOLDS, J.

[1][2] Plaintiff has assigned many errors, but it is not necessary to pass upon all of them, as we believe that, under the state of the pleadings, the fact that title to the property, for which the injunction was sought to prevent trespass, was in dispute and was not clearly established in the party seeking the injunctive relief, is determinative of all the questions involved. Where a preliminary or temporary injunction has been granted ex parte upon a verified petition, it should be dissolved upon the filing of a verified answer by the respondents, which fully and fairly meets all the equities in the petition. The validity of the title and possession alleged by the respondents to be in them should be judicially determined at law before its assertion, or the assertion of rights under it, should be enjoined. The authorities are uniform upon this proposition, and it is only necessary to quote from a few standard text-books and well-considered cases:

“To warrant the relief in this class of cases the party aggrieved must show a satisfactory title to the locus in quo, and if the title be denied or in doubt the injunction will generally be refused against a defendant in possession, until the title is established at law.” High on Injunctions (4th Ed.) § 698, p. 663.

“And where the title to the premises is in dispute, both parties claiming title thereto, it is held that an interlocutory injunction should be dissolved upon answer disclosing defendants' claim of title and showing that they are acting in good faith, believing themselves to be the owners of the premises.” Id. § 698, p. 666.

“When, however, there is a substantial dispute between the parties, and they have not submitted it to be tried by the equity proceeding, the equity court will generally require the plaintiff to establish his right at law before granting an injunction.” 6 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 549, p. 946.

“The preliminary injunction issued in the present case, upon the filing of the complaint, was properly dissolved. The answer sets up paramount title in the defendants, and the validity of that title should be judicially determined, before its assertion be enjoined.” Curtis v. Sutter, 15 Cal. 260.

“The general rule, as has often been stated, is that, in order to give the court of equity jurisdiction to enjoin torts to property, two conditions must concur: First, the complainant's title must be admitted, or be established by a legal adjudication; and, second, the threatened injury must be of such a nature as will cause irreparable damage, not susceptible of complete pecuniary compensation. *** It seems to be clearly settled that, whenever the complainant's title is...